¿Es La Epistemología De Virtudes Fiabilista Una Teoría Meritocrática?
By: Jesús Navarro and Juanma Poyatos
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Language: Spanish
Page range: 203 - 230
Submitted on: Nov 19, 2025
Accepted on: Feb 16, 2026
Published on: Apr 30, 2026
Published by: Pontifical University of Salamanca
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
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© 2026 Jesús Navarro, Juanma Poyatos, published by Pontifical University of Salamanca
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.