On Lithoconcepts: A Critical Contribution to the Discussions about the Study of Concepts

In discussions related to the study of concepts in disciplines such as history, history of philosophy, and political thought, in which many scholars, especially Reinhart Koselleck, Quentin Skinner, and John Pocock have made significant contributions, a kind of polarity has occurred. Most of the attention has often been paid to the possibility of the history of separate concepts, with a focus on the change of their meaning, on the one hand, or to the priority of intention, convention, and context, with an emphasis on the use and function of concepts, on the other hand. Despite their differences and while acknowledging their remarkable achievements, both approaches attempt to resolve simply the problems arising from and recognizable by the complex interrelation of the semantic structure of concepts and pragmatic factors, and also, the interrelation of diachronic and synchronic aspects, with some general and exclusive rules. I argue in this article that the recognizing of what I call lithoconcepts, as a significant but relatively neglected category of concepts, can demonstrate that the problematic of concepts is not limited to what has been disputed in the mentioned approaches. By examining the process of the genesis of lithoconcepts, it would be revealed that we are dealing with a spectrum of concepts, the proper understanding of which requires more comprehensive approaches.