From Myth to Mechanism: Brentano’s Naturalistic Deconstruction of Artistic Creation

This paper explores Franz Brentano’s theory of artistic genius, arguing that creativity does not spring from mysterious, unconscious forces but rather from a specific configuration of mental acts. I clarify Brentano’s distinction between the unconscious and the unnoticed or implicitly conscious states, alongside the role of habit as a psychological foundation. By contrasting Brentano’s work with rival theories of mimesis, fusion, and inspiration, I demonstrate why his psychological approach offers a more robust explanation of the creative process. Furthermore, I examine the normative side of creation through the concept of taste. For Brentano, taste is not a cold intellectual judgement but a refined emotional disposition that allows one to experience pleasure as correct. Ultimately, the paper concludes that Brentano views genius not as a departure from reality but as an intensification of ordinary psychological laws guided by an intuitive aesthetic sense.