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Competitive Strategies in the European High North Cover

Competitive Strategies in the European High North

Open Access
|Mar 2022

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.93 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 31 - 44
Submitted on: Nov 2, 2020
Accepted on: Dec 16, 2021
Published on: Mar 1, 2022
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2022 Sigbjørn Halsne, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.