Introduction to the Special Collection on Military Logistics: The Transformation from Peace Support Operations to Territorial Defence

Military Logistics: History and Definitions

Military logistics has always confronted three basic alternatives regarding resources: carry them with the troops, obtain them on the battlefield, or transport them to the troops (Kress, 2002, p. 10). Early war fighters required weapons, which they likely had to carry to the battlefield, and ammunition, which they either had to carry or obtain on, or in the vicinity of, the battlefield. Such logistical considerations have always dictated the planning and execution of military operations (van Creveld, 1977, pp. 7–8), long before there was a formalized function named “military logistics”.

If modern military logistics must be a combination of all three logistical alternatives, only the third alternative, transportation of supplies to the battlefield, can sustain a modern army over time (Kress, 2002, pp. 14–15). Regardless of the type of operation, armed forces cannot accomplish their objectives over time if the logistical function does not guarantee a continuous flow of the right supplies, in the right condition and quantity, to the right units and place, at the right time and speed (Ekström, 2020, p. 29; Foxton, 1994; Serrano et al., 2023; Simon, 2001) – a suitable supply chain, in other words, which avoids logistics culmination (Kress, 2002) or vacuum (Prebilič, 2006; Skoglund et al., 2022). Military logistics thus determines what military forces can be delivered to an operational theatre, the time it will take to deliver that force, the scale and scope of forces that can be supported once there, and the tempo of operations (Uttley and Kinsey, 2012, p. 401).

In line with Kress (2002) and Serrano and colleagues (2023), we subscribe to the notion of duality and consider modern military logistics to include quantitative aspects such as calculations of amounts of fuel and ammunition, the number of spare parts, and the time required for transportation, for example, and qualitative aspects such as creativity, intuition, insight, and flexibility in the decision-making process. This duality is akin to George Cyrus Thorpe’s idea, from the beginning of the 20th century, of a division of pure and applied logistics, where “pure” refers to the study of the theoretical aspects of logistics and its role in military theory, and “applied” to the insights and conclusions subsequently implemented (Falk, 1986, p. 5).

Military logistics has impacted the conduct of war in the past and is likely to do so the in future (Thompson, 1991, p. 313). Its study is, thus, consequent. As frequently attributed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower: “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” And as Fleet Admiral E. J. King, is held to have said: “I don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.” Yet, despite its obvious importance, logistics is often given a lower status and priority than strategy and tactics, especially in time of peace – at least from the point of view of published academic research and theory development.

Perhaps the lower status of logistics in Western Europe can be explained by the impact that Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Major General in the Prussian army, has had on military thinking and theory. Unlike his contemporaries, such as Baron Antoine Henri Jomini (1779–1869), Lieutenant General in the Russian Army, Clausewitz did not pay as much explicit attention to logistics as he did to tactics and strategy (Rutner et al., 2012). Clausewitz wrote about “the use of the fighting forces by tactics and strategy” and all “else that is needed so that fighting forces can be taken as a given for tactical and strategic purposes” (Proença Júnior & Duarte, 2005), which implicitly alluded to logistics, whereas Jomini explicitly defined and used the term logistics (Rutner et al., 2012). With Jomini, “the father of military logistics” (Rider, 1970), “logistics assumed a much more important role in fighting and in the organization of modern armies” (Prebilič, 2006).

The relationship between strategy, tactics and logistics can be summarized as: strategy is “what we would like to achieve”; tactics are “ways of doing it”; and logistics “define what we can actually do in any given situation” (Page, 2007, p. 165). Military logistics is thus “a pivotal component of war” (Erbel and Kinsey, 2018), which is “fundamental to the successful execution of strategy” (Ti and Kinsey, 2023) and a critical enabler for successful military operations (Zsidisin et al., 2020). In short, the logistic capabilities limit the size of armed forces that a nation can employ in combat operations (Prebilič, 2006). Hence, “logistics ought to excite us, because it helps to set the stage upon which strategists act, and therefore ranks among the factors which decide the course and outcome of a war” (Kane, 2001, p. 1).

Jomini was the first to define military logistics (Thompson, 1991, p. 5): “Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops. In a word, it is the execution of strategic and tactical enterprises.” There are now numerous definitions of what military logistics is, ranging from clear and succinct to all-embracing and comprehensive, and formulated from different perspectives. Basing his idea on Jomini’s, van Creveld (1977, p. 1) concisely defines military logistics from an operational perspective: “Logistics is the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.” The purpose of military logistics in this sense is to ensure that the material elements of combat capability come together at the right place and time and in the right configuration to be useful (Swartz and Johnson, 2004; van Fenema and van Kampen, 2021, p. 5). However, modern military logistics involves a wide range of activities and services required for both production and operations. It is the bridge between defence industry and deployed forces, and NATO therefore, from a life cycle perspective, previously defined logistics as:

Consequently, modern military logistics embraces a much broader spectrum of acquisition, support and disposal challenges than storage and distribution of supplies (Yoho et al., 2013). In essence, military logistics “exists to support combat forces” (Foxton, 1994, p. 11) and the supply dimension of military logistics has to do with acquiring, holding and moving supplies to bridge the time and place discrepancy between production and consumption (Hauk, 1964) – in other words, to ensure readiness and sustainability. In military logistics, readiness and sustainability have explicit meanings, which differ considerably from other contexts (Ekström, 2020, p. 32). There is a difference between operational readiness, “ready for when”, and mobilization readiness, “ready for what” (Betts, 1995, p. 216), or availability and preparedness. The availability of a military unit is its ability to begin an activity immediately. The preparedness of a military unit is its ability to begin an activity after mobilization. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives (NATO, 2025b, p. LEX-8).

In doctrinal development, particularly in NATO doctrinal documents, the current development regarding military logistics is especially dynamic. In NATO, a doctrine is a set of “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application” (NATO, 2022, p. LEX-4). There is currently a dramatic shift in how NATO describes and defines military logistics in its doctrines. In August of 2025, AJP-4(C), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Sustainment of Operations replaced AJP-4(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics (NATO, 2025b, p. iii). NATO thus now puts an emphasis on sustainment, which is a joint function (NATO, 2022, p. 105), rather than on logistics. The new NATO Joint function framework is “informed and directed” by two joint functions, command & control and intelligence, and “supported” by two others, sustainment and force protection (NATO, 2025a, p. 51).

Sustainment is defined as “the provision of personnel, logistics, medical support, military engineering support, finance and contractor support necessary for Alliance operations and missions”, collectively known as sustainment functions (NATO, 2025b, p. 1). The new perspective on logistics has many implications. One such is that medical support and infrastructure are no longer considered to be a part of logistics; they are all functions of sustainment (NATO, 2025b, p. iii). The six sustainment functions are regarded as “critical enablers”, which “influence the tempo, duration and intensity of actions, operations and campaigns” (NATO, 2025b, p. 1). NATO now, from an operational, reinforcement and sustainment, perspective, defines logistics as “the planning, preparation, coordination and execution of the supply, movement, maintenance and services to support the full spectrum of operations, using military, civil and commercial resources” (NATO, 2025b, p. 25). This is a dramatic change from when we began planning for this SC.

Unique Challenges and Modes of Military Logistics

Military logistics is “the bridge between our national economy and the actual operations of our combat forces in the field” (Eccles, 1959, p. 10) and it is “a system established to create and sustain the military capability” (Peppers, 1988, p. iv). Compared to business logistics, military logistics faces several unique challenges. Whilst an error in a business logistics context can lead to a loss of profit or even to the demise of an organization, a similar failure in the military domain can result in death or injury (Yoho et al., 2013). Furthermore, while companies in the private sector exist to increase the wealth of their shareholders, making efficiency the default goal of supply chain design in the private sector (Basnet and Seuring, 2016), public sector organizations are not profit maximising entities (Wilhite et al., 2014). Defence authorities such as armed forces, defence procurement agencies and defence logistics organizations exist to generate, use and support military forces. Military logistics is a matter of supporting the armed forces in the pursuit of successful operational outcomes, not financial outcomes like in the private sector (Yoho et al., 2013). Such operational outcomes present unique supply chain design issues (Melnyk et al., 2014). Furthermore, in military logistics, catastrophic events are not disruptions; they are its raison d’être (Martel et al., 2013).

Military logistics operates in three modes: peace (typified by stagnation), mobilization (typified by desperation) and war (typified by operations), which are closely interconnected (McGinnis, 1992). Military logistics in peace ought to be the result of national security policy and thus the type and range of contingencies that the state selects to prepare for – the ability for operations to be conducted at the desired tempo depend on it (Erbel and Kinsey, 2018). However, governments are not necessarily inclined to provide the required financing in peace, especially when politicians imagine that there is a peace dividend to be reallocated to other societal sectors (Humphries & Wilding, 2001). In peace, while military logistics must thus operate cost-efficiently, provisions should be made for mobilization and, ultimately, war, in which effectiveness is paramount and cost a secondary consideration (Kovács & Tatham, 2009). An intricate balancing act is required, then, if decisions are to remain on the right side of justifiable cost-efficiency initiatives, avoiding indiscriminate cost-reduction measures (Eccles, 1959, pp. 320–321).

In times of peace, military logistics must ensure that military units have sufficient supplies to fulfil requirements of readiness; in times of increased alert or open conflict, supplies must be delivered so that any requirement for sustainability is met. This involves guaranteeing the continuous flows of supplies (Ekström, 2020, p. 29). In other words, military logistics must be cost efficient in peacetime, when dormant, and effective in war, when activated (Kovács and Tatham, 2009). In peacetime, military logistics support training, maintenance, stockpiling of supplies and other activities for force generation (Moore et al., 1991; Kress, 2002, p. 42). In wartime, military logistics support the use of force on operations (Kress, 2002, pp. 42–43; Davids et al., 2013), where the enemy is likely to damage critical infrastructure and attack logistics flows (Glas et al., 2013; Skoglund et al., 2022).

Military logistics must be able to work in all modes – peace, mobilization and war – at different times and conducted so that it is possible to switch between these modes at short notice (Sharma & Kulkarni, 2016). While leanness and efficiency are important requirements on military logistics in peace, the overarching requirements in war are on agility and effectiveness (Kress, 2002, pp. 42–43; Kovács & Tatham, 2009).

Dimensions and Perspectives of Military Logistics Research

The area of military logistics research is diverse, and there are many ways in which the field can be categorized. It has been argued that military logistics research has evolved along two major pathways, the historical and the operational (Yoho et al., 2013), or past and present. We argue that we can describe and categorize military logistics research more intricately, with specific methodological approaches and theoretical lenses, along several different dimensions; these include the temporal, hierarchical, functional, and relational and other perspectives, such as production (generation of force) versus operations (use of force); supply chain (from raw material extraction to the end-user); and life-cycle (from pre-concept to disposal).

In the temporal dimension, researchers study the past (history), present (current production and operations), and future (e.g., future contingencies and requirements for capability development) of military logistics. In the hierarchical dimension, we can study military logistics at the political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, tactical, and combat technical levels (Kress, 2002, p 17). In the functional dimension, we can study the generic functions of military logistics: supply; transportation and movements; and maintenance and repair (Foxton, 1994, p. 11). In the relational dimension, we can study buyer-supplier, civil-military, public-private, and government-agency relationships.

Further, we can study the generation of force (production logistics) versus the use of force (operations logistics) and the defence supply chain, or network of supply chains, from raw material extraction to the war fighter, including aspects such as defence supply chain resilience, and dyadic and triadic relationships. We can study military logistics from a life-cycle perspective, from pre-concept to disposal of technical systems, military units and operational capabilities. And, finally, we can use different methodologies and theoretical lenses in our studies. Based on these dimensions and perspectives, schematically illustrated in Figure 1, several combinations are possible. We could, for example, study historical examples of production logistics, concerning transportation resources. Such a study could investigate the construction and importance of railways for the British in the Crimean War (1853–1856), or for the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). We could also study a current example of operational logistics, concerning consequences of supply chain vulnerability. Such a study has already been conducted (Skoglund et al., 2022), concerning operational limitations for the Russians in the early stages of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Figure 1

In addition to these dimensions and perspectives specific to military logistics, research in the field, like research in any other domain, can also be categorized according to research purpose (e.g., explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive), research paradigms (e.g., positivism or interpretivism), research approach (deductive, inductive, or abductive), research strategy (e.g., qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods), and theoretical points of departure (e.g., the resource-based view, transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory). Taken together, these additional grounds for categorization render the number of possible research combinations virtually infinite.

Governance Frameworks

Pedersen and colleagues (2025) advance the theoretical foundations of defence logistics by proposing a structured framework for governance in buyer–supplier relationships. Based on a systematic literature review, their contribution lies in clarifying how mechanisms of trust, control, and performance interact within procurement networks, and how these dynamics shape resilience and efficiency. By synthesizing insights from supply chain theory with the specific institutional and strategic demands of defence contexts, the article provides a conceptual tool for both researchers and practitioners to evaluate governance arrangements and design more effective procurement strategies.

Edward Deverell (2025) employs qualitative content analysis and interviews to situate logistics within the broader political economy of defence, tracing the evolution of state–industry relations in Swedish defence policy over more than a decade. His contribution is to show how shifts in policy frameworks, industrial strategies, and procurement practices directly affect supply chain resilience and capability sustainment. By connecting logistics research with defence policy analysis, the study underscores the strategic importance of industrial relations and provides a nuanced account of how national policy choices shape the operational realities of defence logistics.

Supply Chain Resilience

Thomas Ekström (2025) provides empirical evidence on the systemic barriers and enablers of resilience in defence supply chains. Drawing on interviews, Ekström contributes by identifying organizational, cultural, and structural factors that hinder or support adaptive capacity, thereby moving beyond abstract definitions of resilience to concrete insights grounded in practice. By highlighting the conditions under which resilience can be cultivated, the study informs both theory and policy, offering actionable recommendations for defence organizations seeking to embed resilience into their logistical systems.

Lasse Elvemo (2025) focuses on operational realities through a case study that examines how command and control structures shape resilience during military operations. Building on a survey and partial least squares structural equation modelling, his contribution is to show resilience not only as a systemic property but as an outcome produced through leadership, coordination, and decision-making in the field. By analysing the interplay between organizational design and operational execution, the article provides a nuanced understanding of how resilience manifests itself in practice, offering lessons for commanders and planners tasked with sustaining supply chains under pressure.

Force Expansion and Infrastructure

Hellberg and Antai (2025) provide a detailed case study of the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment, which highlights the organizational and systemic challenges of building logistical capacity for new military units. The key contribution is to demonstrate how interdependencies among actors, resources, and processes influence the pace of development, often constraining or accelerating progress in unexpected ways. By situating these findings within broader debates on force generation and capability expansion, the study offers practical lessons for defence organizations facing similar challenges of scaling up under resource and time constraints.

Takvam and colleagues (2025) apply advanced operational research methods and model port selection under conditions of correlated disruptions, a scenario highly relevant to contested maritime environments. Their contribution is both methodological and practical: it demonstrates how stochastic modelling can improve decision-making in supply chain planning, offering tools to anticipate and mitigate risks in Nordic defence logistics. By integrating analytical rigour with operational relevance, the study exemplifies how quantitative methods can strengthen resilience in defence supply chains facing geopolitical and environmental uncertainty.

Historical Perspective

Aurélien Rouquet (2025) conducts a historical study that traces the institutional emergence of logistics functions in the U.S. Army under the pressures of World War II. Using a genealogical historical approach, his contribution is to anchor contemporary debates in their historical foundations, demonstrating how logistical innovation and organizational adaptation have long been central to military effectiveness. By examining the origins of formal logistics functions, the article provides perspectives on the enduring challenges of institutionalising logistics, reminding readers that today’s debates are part of a longer trajectory of military adaptation and learning.