Maritime Diplomacy: Advancing Africa’s Strategic Interests

Contemporary Maritime Diplomacy: Advancing National and Regional Interests

Throughout the history of the development of states and state power, the importance of sea power has been overlooked, frequently treated as an extension of land power, as even land power itself (De Carvalho & Leira, 2022). As states and empires emerged, seaborne force was required both for the establishment of overseas holdings and for their subsequent protection and expansion (De Carvalho & Leira, 2022). Given the evolution of the nature and aspirations of states in the contemporary era, navies and a seafaring capacity are no longer considered imperative for the expansion of territory – but they remain critical for the protection of regions, states and their territories. It is in this context that naval diplomacy – the non-belligerent and political use of naval forces (Widen, 2011) – is important; notwithstanding the place it historically has been granted, diplomacy applies to the domains of sea and land alike.

Our understanding of security at sea has also evolved, broadening to include a number of threats to maritime security which could destabilize state security, necessitating changes to the traditional roles of navies (Till, 2022). In an interconnected world, strong coercive naval power and a traditional approach to naval diplomacy – so-called “gunboat diplomacy” alone may no longer suffice; there has been a turn to a broader understanding of maritime diplomacy to bridge the gap.

Maritime diplomacy, defined by Le Miére (2014, p. 7) as “the management of international relations through the maritime domain”, generally manifests in one of three forms – coercive, persuasive or cooperative – depending on the aim of the operation and the political context in which it is carried out (Widen, 2011; Sugiharto & Shafwatullah, 2021). Gunboat diplomacy can be seen as coercive means to pursue state objectives without engaging in a large-scale conflict (Mehmood & Khan, 2022). This is typically achieved by means of naval exercises where naval hardware is on full display: a reminder to others of the naval power of those participating in the exercise, described by Mehmood and Kahn (2022, p. 162) as “an important tool of statecraft for prevention of war … bringing into play the interplay of deterrence and compellence”. Seen as a political tool, gunboat diplomacy thus acts as a deterrent for conflict through the “threat of limited force” (Mehmood & Khan, 2022).

In the context of cooperative maritime diplomacy, maritime assets are used to manage the relationship between states. Making use of hard power naval assets, states use soft power elements such as port visits to reassure allies and build diplomatic relations, sometimes offering disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in what has been referred to as “gunboat philanthropy” (Mehmood & Khan, 2022) or “soft maritime diplomacy” (Le Miére, 2014). Naval forces can also be used in persuasive diplomacy for political purposes during times of peace. Such actions differ from cooperative maritime diplomacy in that they are not collaborative and are used to “increase one’s recognition of national power and build prestige at the global stage” (Mehmood & Khan, 2022, p. 163).

The flow of globalized trade and information by means of undersea cables has significantly increased the importance of the sea (Speller, 2022). Oceans afford states access to the globe unhindered by international borders or infringing sovereignty; operating within this flexible domain, Speller (2022, p. 56) posits that “balanced navies [are] useful tools for diplomatic signalling”. It is in this context that maritime diplomacy has become a crucial element of modern diplomacy, shaping maritime security agendas at state, regional, and international levels, encompassing cooperative, persuasive, and coercive methods to advance a nation’s maritime interests.

Although historically practiced by states with significant naval power, maritime diplomacy can no longer be seen as falling only within the prerogative of superpowers or single states. The multinational nature of maritime security issues such as piracy, environmental concerns and terrorism has elevated naval competition to a regional level (Widen, 2011, p. 716), even bringing it within the purview of non-state actors such as Hezbollah and, more recently, the Houthis in the Red Sea (Mehmood & Kahn, 2022). Maritime diplomacy plays a critical role in the implementation of maritime strategy by translating strategic objectives into diplomatic practice through engagement, negotiation, and cooperation. In this sense, maritime diplomacy serves as a bridge between the goals articulated in a state’s or region’s maritime strategy and their operationalization, enabling states and regional actors to address maritime security and economic and environmental challenges.

Maritime diplomacy in the African context: strategic frameworks

The importance of the maritime domain for Africa cannot be overemphasized.

Africa is in a unique position: surrounded by the Atlantic to the west, the Mediterranean to the north, the Suez Canal and Red Sea (with the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait) in the northeast and the Indian Ocean to the east, it is bordered by the world’s major sea lanes (Khan, 2023). Yet, while approximately 90% of world trade is conducted by sea, only 1.2% of world shipping is conducted by African-owned ships, with African ports handling 6% of worldwide maritime cargo and only 3% of worldwide container traffic. Thirty-eight coastal states share a 48,000-kilometre coastline (Sagoe & Kell, 2022) with territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) covering 13 million square kilometres and the legal continental shelf comprising approximately 6.5 million square kilometres (Khan, 2023). African nations possess a vast maritime space plagued by a vast number of security threats impacting maritime security – challenges ranging from governance insecurities, economic challenges and environmental concerns. Its states seek solutions within internal constraints of many kinds.

A number of AU and regional initiatives have been developed in an attempt to address these challenges. Strategies such as the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2025) and Agenda 2063 were developed at the continental level to provide a comprehensive approach to maritime development, security and governance, requiring cooperation between states and regions to ensure maritime safety and security, the sustainable exploitation of maritime resources, and environmental protection (Vreÿ, 2024).

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) has similarly formulated regional maritime strategies to combat various transnational crimes, address maritime security and enhance regional cooperation, while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted an Integrated Maritime Security Strategy in 2022 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted its Integrated Maritime Strategy in 2014 (Walker, 2025b and EIMS, 2014).

However, in spite of the existence of these strategic frameworks, challenges remain in leveraging these goals into improved security and development. Some of these are internal to the initiatives themselves: AIMS 2050, for example, while perceived to be an essential document providing a useful framework for maritime governance on the African continent, requires updating if it is to reflect current and emerging maritime security challenges such as critical underwater infrastructure protection and cyberattacks. Work on this document, mandated to the AU Office of the Legal Counsel, has been slow and erratic, and no nation has been designated to champion the African maritime domain (Walker, 2025a). Lekunze (2022) identifies other challenges as arising from limited maritime domain awareness, continuing sea blindness, the under-exploitation of the blue economy, and a lack of sea power.

In spite of AIMS 2050’s call for the establishment of African navies, African states generally lack naval and coastguard capabilities, resulting in an inability to secure their waters (Lekunze, 2022). It is in this context that Vreÿ (2024) has argued that Africa can strengthen its deficiencies by building “capacity in the persuasive and cooperative ambit of maritime diplomacy”; while limited resources do not prevent a state (or region) from pursuing its strategies, the limitation does dictate which strategy may be followed. Here the effective use of maritime diplomacy can assist Africa in realizing its cooperative and developmental goals (Lekunze, 2022).

Challenges for African naval and diplomatic capacity

African states and regional organisations face a range of structural, institutional and strategic constraints preventing them from fully leveraging existing maritime assets and opportunities for diplomatic influence and economic growth. The discussion thus turns to some of these challenges, including maritime insecurities and chokepoints – “strategic, narrow passages that connect two larger areas to one another” which generally experience high volumes of maritime traffic due to their strategic location (Ang, 2021) – limited naval capabilities, and the weak integration of maritime issues into policy, largely driven by a focus on landward threats which together contribute to the under-utilization of maritime diplomacy in Africa.

African maritime insecurities

For Vreÿ (2024), the principal hubs of maritime insecurity in Africa are the Gulf of Guinea, considered the continent’s most insecure waters, the Gulf of Aden along the Horn of Africa, where a resurgence of piracy is raising concern, the waters of northern Mozambique (a spillover of the insurgency in northern Mozambique), and the Mediterranean bordering the coast of Libya, where syndicates of organized crime exacerbate the humanitarian crisis of migration to Europe.

These maritime insecurities are largely created by land-based conflicts, insurgencies and political instability at critical chokepoints. In the context of African maritime security, the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, are particularly relevant. As evidenced by recent developments, these chokepoints are highly vulnerable to deliberate disruptions during conflict or political unrest (Ang, 2021).

The Bab el-Mandeb strait between Yemen and Djibouti is taking the brunt of Houthi attacks that began in earnest in October of 2023 (Kuoman, 2024) and which have resulted in shipping largely being rerouted along the Cape Sea Route; as a result, the number of transits through the Red Sea declined from 2068 in November of 2023 to 877 in October of 2024 (Raydan & Nadimi, 2024). The escalation of hostilities in the region was met with a global response when the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 2722 condemning the attacks and demanding that Houthis cease their attacks on international shipping passing through the Red Sea. In response, the United States and United Kingdom conducted five joint naval airstrikes against the Houthis over the period from 11 January, 2023 to 30 May, 2024 (House of Commons, 2024). The African response, however, has been conspicuously constrained, even absent, in response to the unfolding hostilities, despite the fact that it directly impacts Egypt and a significant number of nations along the East African coast. At the publication of Resolution 2722, the three non-permanent African members at the UNSC – Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Algeria – called for diplomatic solutions, with the AU remaining silent on the crisis (Walker, 2024).

Only recently, more than a year after the escalation of the conflict, there has been some movement. In January 2025 it was reported that Egypt had engaged in diplomatic talks on securing the Red Sea with a number of nations in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, after having lost 11 billion U.S. dollars in revenue over an 11-month period due to the shipping disruptions in the region. Egyptian officials have also engaged countries outside the Horn of Africa, including Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Congo, Kenya and Chad in a bid to generate cooperation within the region to ensure the region’s maritime security (Xinhua, 2025).

The AU and African leaders’ lack of response to the significant impact on maritime security in East Africa caused by the disruptions of the last years is a missed opportunity to employ maritime diplomacy to find solutions.

Limited naval capabilities

While AIMS 2050 envisages the establishment of African navies and coastguards, many African littoral states do not possess a navy; those that do have small and poorly equipped fleets, leaving vast maritime areas vulnerable to illegal activities. There is a large disparity in the naval capabilities across the continent. Only Egypt, Algeria and South Africa possess a blue-water navy capable of operating in open seas and projecting naval power far from their home country. The navies of Nigeria (the fourth-strongest navy on the continent), Morocco, Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea are limited to their territorial waters, while the navies of Angola, Tanzania, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana and Cameroon are restricted to operations within their littoral waters. Senegal, Gabon, Mauritius and Togo limit their maritime operations to law enforcement action around their harbours and seaports (Vreÿ, 2024).

For most African countries, the cost of operating a fully functional navy is prohibitively expensive (Lionel, 2023). The context of general economic constraint is exacerbated by constant budget cuts, inconsistent ship acquisitions, and a pervasive lack of maintenance that further erodes relatively limited naval capabilities. When coupled with little operational and combat experience, it is perhaps unsurprising that African navies have difficulty in combating maritime threats, much less projecting maritime diplomacy (Lionel, 2023). There has, however, been some improvement with the help of the international community: Germany, Israel, France, Italy and Turkey have provided a number of West African and North African countries with naval hardware, improving their respective capabilities.

Although arguably the largest factor, African naval capabilities are not restricted by economic factors alone. Political situations play a role, too: Ethiopia, for example, lost its naval capability with the loss of its coastline on the independence of Eritrea. In a bid to regain direct sea access, Ethiopia has entered into an agreement with Somaliland, which has permitted the building of a coastal naval base on the coast, providing Ethiopia with both direct access to the sea and an opportunity to revive its navy. This has, however, significantly increased tensions in the region (Yibeltal, 2024).

Focus on landward security threats

African states, including the 38 littoral states, have generally prioritized landward defence to address internal conflicts (Lionel, 2023). This results in heavy reliance on armies and air forces, with navies considered less of a priority and consequently lagging behind the other arms of service (Lionel, 2023). Neglecting sea forces, however, creates opportunities for the illegal exploitation of the maritime environment (Martin, 2021), once again resulting in a limited or absent diplomatic focus on maritime affairs.

The inward focus on security inevitably leads to the maritime domain being overlooked. Instead of benefiting from their own sea assets, Lekunze (2022) notes, African countries frequently allow external actors and foreign states extensive access and influence over their maritime territories. Lekunze further notes that, despite the numerous foreign military bases in Djibouti, Russia’s intention to establish a naval base in Sudan and the United States’s continuous presence in African waters, Ethiopia’s plans for a naval base in Somaliland were met with international condemnation. There are various reasons why Ethiopia’s presence in Somaliland may or may not be desired – but it is telling that non-African states do not garner the same attention and condemnation as a proposed “new” African presence in African waters.

Currently, African states, unable to compete with the sea-power and the capacity to engage in maritime diplomacy enjoyed by these foreign states, will remain on an unequal footing, both in the maritime domain and in their ability to leverage such diplomacy for the improvement of their own maritime security.

The Cape Sea Route – Challenges and Opportunities for Maritime Diplomacy

The Cape Sea Route (CSR) has recently garnered heightened attention due to increased maritime traffic around the Southern African coast, something which might be attributed to geopolitical realities in and around the African continent. To understand the role and importance of the CSR in African maritime security and diplomacy, it is important to examine its historical significance, highlighting the strategic importance of maritime choke points and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) around the African continent, before focusing on the South African Navy’s leading role in its protection. The current maritime security situation provides both unique opportunities and challenges that will have to be met if the maritime routes are to remain safe for seafarers.

Historical significance of the Cape Sea Route

Potgieter (2000), Feigen (1985) and Tossini (2020) note that the maritime defence of the CSR was a question of colonial power for centuries – first on the part of the Dutch, later a Great Britain commitment to the protection of its strategic route to India. The Royal Navy’s presence in South African waters was long, extending from 1806 to 1957; during World War II, around 6,500 ships stopped in South Africa for resupply when sea traffic was re-routed around the Cape to avoid unsafe Mediterranean waters. Although Allied forces operated some 60 anti-submarine forces on this route to protect shipping, they could not prevent 238 sinkings. After the war, South Africa and Britain shared responsibility for the security of the CSR, with Britain providing ships and equipment to the South African Navy. The Simon’s Town Agreement signed in 1955 provided for defence of this vital sea line of communication, South African naval expansion, British naval command of Simon’s Town naval base, and the use of other South African facilities, both in peace and war. The expansion of the South African Navy included four anti-submarine frigates, ten coastal minesweepers and three seaward defence boats. This agreement remained in force until officially terminated by Britain in June of 1975.

Potgieter (2011) writes that after the cancellation of the Simon’s Town Agreement, the South African Navy took responsibility for the protection of the Cape Sea Route. While the political situation and consequent arms embargo limited the force in terms of acquisitions, the country managed to acquire three and build six fast attack craft, as well as various other smaller crafts and a combat support ship. Due to the land war in Namibia and consequent limited budget for the South African Navy, in 1978 the country stated that the protection of the South African coast, harbours and coastal waters and the patrolling of its exclusive economic zone would become its priority, scaling down its commitments to the protection of the CSR.

After the turbulent early 1990s, a period in which the Cold War ended and the Apartheid regime fell, South Africa’s political transition heralded a shift in priorities towards the economic development of Southern Africa and the task of accessing international trade, including access to the world at large. The CSR assumed its rightful place in the international obligations of the nation and the prioritization of the equipment, roles and functions of the South African Navy.

Choke points

Ang (2021) graphically depicts several maritime choke points around the African continent with the strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the Cape of Good Hope being the most significant. The Mozambique Channel is mentioned, among others, but does not strictly conform to the definition of a choke point due to its relative width. Grey (2017) writes that the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a chokepoint between Africa and the Middle East connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, is eighteen miles wide at its narrowest point and includes a two-mile-wide navigation channel. 70% of the wheat imports to north African countries and 32% of the world’s potassium chloride transits through this channel. Disruptions to maritime traffic here disrupts the transport of oil, wheat and fertilizer and has already led to environmental damage in the region (Inzam, 2024).

Bailey and Wellesley (2023) posit that climate change, institutional and political failure (labour disputes and bureaucratic inefficiencies), physical attacks (piracy, armed conflict and terrorism) as well as cyber conflicts could exacerbate disruptions at choke points. Such major disruptions are not the norm, but the current situation around the Bab-el-Mandeb strait indicate that it should not be disregarded. For Bailey and Wellesley, while disruptions at one choke point may not be significant, the consequences of a compounding effect on global supply chains should not be underestimated. It is important to note that, of the 14 recognised choke points in the world, only the Strait of Gibraltar has been free from disturbances over the last decade and a half.

According to Bailey and Wellesley’s (2023) analysis of the security risks at choke points, the Suez Canal enjoys low risks of conflict, piracy and cyber-attacks and a medium risk of terrorist attacks; the Bab-el-Mandeb strait is subject to low risk of cyber-attacks, medium risks for terrorist attacks and conflict, and a high risk for piracy. With the security situation in the Middle East having deteriorated after the Israel-Gaza conflict and the subsequent involvement of the Houthis in Yemen, it should be recommended that the level of risk in all categories for the Suez Canal be increased to “medium” and to “high” for the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.

According to Gunathilake (2021), the restriction of maritime choke points has serious global implications, including restricted access to markets, price hikes for goods and services, energy and food shortages, increased shipping and insurance costs, restrictions on humanitarian aid and shipment delays. As all of these will have a direct impact on the livelihoods of ordinary people, the authors argues that such choke points should be declared critical global infrastructure.

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)

Nel (2015) describes South Africa as being located along one of the busiest shipping routes in the world, providing opportunities as a half-way point for international trade. While some 9,000 ships visited South African ports annually, Nel notes, alarmingly only a single ship was registered in the country. A Statista fact sheet (Statista, 2024) confirms that South Africa is situated along major international trade routes, and that the maritime industry should play a vital role in the national economy. In 2022, South African ports processed more than 4.4 million TEU container units¹ (a 10% increase from 2021), 5.6 million tons of break bulk cargo (a 50% increase from 2021) and around 173 million metric tons of dry bulk cargo (a decrease of 1% from 2021). At the same time the number of ships passing stood at 700,000 units – an increase of 46% from 2021. South Africa has a 7% share of the global seaborne trade while the value of national trade transported by sea stands at 67%. But despite its favourable location, the country only services around 1% of the global market of ship repair and refurbishment (Zuma, 2014).

The economic importance of the CSR to South Africa cannot be explained without discussing the South African government’s plant to harness the potential of the sea through Operation Phakisa. Forming part of the nation’s National Development Plan, the operation, an adaptation of the Malaysian “Big Fast Results” methodology, was developed with the aim of maximizing the economic opportunities at sea by stimulating economic growth and job creation. Operation Phakisa estimated a contribution of R177 billion to the GDP of the country and the creation of more than a million jobs by 2033. The location of the country should put it in good stead to serve both the global trade which transits the CSR and the booming African offshore gas and oil industry, through marine manufacturing, including ship and rig repair, refurbishing and boatbuilding.

For Otto (2019), however, Operation Phakisa is characterized by a lack of coherent delineation of responsibilities, while a lack of funding and capacity has meant a lack of cooperation between the necessary government departments. Although the operation had enormous potential, it was seen as a legacy project of the former President Zuma which failed to live up to its potential. Vreÿ (2020), corroborated by DPME (2022), contend that this could be attributed to factors such as unrealistic job creation targets, limitations of infrastructure, policy uncertainty and slow transformation resulting from misaligned investment, weak coordination and insufficient stakeholder engagement. The plan remains a key maritime priority due to its alignment with the implementation of the country’s National Development Plan (NDP) as articulated in the official Phakisa website which states:

The United Nations Trade and Development rapid assessment (UNCTAD, 2024) highlights the importance of sea lanes of communication to global trade and highlights the effects of disruption to these transport lines, specifically in light of the current geostrategic events, primarily in the Middle East and the Black Sea, discussed above. The Suez Canal accounted for 22% of global container trade and 12% of global maritime trade. The number of transits through the Suez Canal had dropped by almost 42% from January to October 2023, and by 82% by February 2024, illustrated by the fact that there has been a massive shift in container ships deciding to alter their routes, preferring the Cape Sea Route to the Suez Canal. As far as tonnage is concerned, the shipping entering the Gulf of Aden declined by 76% from December 2023 to February 2024, while the number of car carriers declined by 50% from October, 2023. Commensurate with the above, vessel tonnage passing through the Cape Sea Route has increased by 89% while 621 container ships have rerouted to this route by 18 February, 2024 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

UNCTAD (2024) further indicates that the current security situation in the Red Sea resulted in a 40% decline in Suez Canal revenues for Egypt, which normally contributes around US $9.4 billion, or 2.3% of the country’s GDP. Trade volumes through the Suez Canal for selected countries are as follows: Sudan (33.9%), Yemen (31.6%), Djibouti (30.5%), Saudi Arabia (26.4%) and Seychelles (19.7%). The change in shipping routes had a number of knock-on effects for shipping companies: an increase of between 9 and 17 days of transit time, with corresponding increases in price, wages, insurance, chartering and maintenance, increased requirement for security due to an uptick in piracy, the increased costs of research into alternative supply routes and the increased costs of expanded infrastructure required for additional storage. All of this highlights the importance of the CSR and the security of SLOCs.

Maritime diplomacy in action

South Africa conducts numerous forms of maritime diplomatic actions, mainly centred on cooperative forms of diplomacy with humanitarian and disaster relief operations where required.

The South African Navy has long participated in anti-piracy operations, deploying ships and submarines to patrol the Mozambique Channel due to the spread of Somali piracy. These operations started in 2011, using the mandate stemming from a tripartite memorandum of understanding between the RSA, Mozambique and Tanzania signed in February 2012. The original intention of having a ship permanently on station was hampered by a limited budget and other logistical constraints with statistics indicating that a total of 14 patrols were conducted from 2011 to 2022, with a marked reduction in deployments since 2019 (Martin, 2025).

Not only has the South African Navy conducted 60 diplomatic missions between 1994 and 2022, it has also been heavily involved in search-and-rescue missions. The country’s navy continues to play a meaningful role in search and rescue, with most of the surface ships having been involved in 13 such missions conducted since 1994 (Vreÿ and Blaine, 2024). Between 1994 and 2022, on 10 occasions the SA Navy was further tasked to assist other government departments in inter-departmental operations.

The SA Navy has made a significant maritime diplomatic contribution in its involvement with regular scheduled exercises with visiting navies and exercises when deploying abroad. These include (Vreÿ and Blaine, 2024):

• Exercise Interop East and Interop West – annual exercises conducted on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts, including other African navies.

• Exercise Atlasur – biannual exercises conducted by the South African and South American navies since 1993, planned for alternating between RSA and South American waters and facilitating interoperability, enhancing readiness and developing doctrine, tactics and operating procedures.

• Exercise Ibsamar – trilateral, biannual joint military exercises conducted by India, Brazil and South Africa; the initial exercise was held in 2008 to promote maritime cooperation.

• Exercise Good Hope – an initial exercise conducted by the RSA and German navies took place in 2000; a total of seven (increasingly irregular) exercises has since been conducted.

• Exercise Oxide – biennial exercises conducted by South Africa and France since 2011, taking place in South Africa and Reunion on a rotational basis.

• Exercise Mosi – exercises conducted by the navies of Russia, China and South Africa; the first took place in 2019, the second in 2023.

As far as symposia are concerned, the Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) was initiated by the African Chiefs of Navies after the International Sea Power Symposium in the United States in 2003 with the first symposium held in Cape Town in 2005. The common themes for the symposia include charting Africa’s maritime zones, maritime security, patrol of the hydrocarbon resources, control of maritime choke points, enhancing regional cooperation, and disaster management. Two further symposia were held in 2006 and 2009, after which there was a lull; Nigeria hosted in 2022 and South Africa in 2024 (Potgieter, 2011; DefenceWeb, 2024).

Regionally, the South African Navy was recently involved in the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), being deployed on 15 July, 2021 to combat instability in the Mozambican Cabo Del Gado province. The South African Navy contributed to the mission as Operation Vikela, deploying one frigate and two offshore patrol vessels (SADC, 2021).

In mapping the SA Navy’s involvement in these various maritime diplomatic endeavours, statistics (1994 to 2022) obtained from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) highlight the fact the South African Navy was mostly involved in exercises, of which there were 70. There were 60 diplomatic deployments (“showing the flag”), 13 search-and-rescue efforts, 10 instances of assistance to other government departments, and three instances of humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Exercises with other navies and visits by foreign navies (360 since 1994) allowed ample opportunity for the exchange of expertise and knowledge (Vreÿ and Blaine, 2024).

Challenges and opportunities

With the increase in maritime traffic, the environment remains a critical issue in challenges and opportunities posed by the CSR. The increase in shipping around the South African coast has highlighted the challenges posed by the weather. The Panama-registered Ultra Galaxy sank off the Atlantic coast on 11 July, 2024 while nearly 200 containers from 6 ships were lost on the route during the winter storm months of 2024 (Schuler, 2024; Lepic, 2024).

Governance of the maritime domain will remain a critical issue in harnessing the potential advantages resulting from the current crisis in the Red Sea, with safety and security remaining crucial. While safety is an international obligation, security will have to be cultivated. In this regard, cooperation (Djibouti and Yaoundé Codes of Conduct), capacity building (Standing Maritime Committee of SADC) and coordination of strategies at the continental and regional levels (AU and SADC) will play an important role in ensuring maritime security in the region. This should be seen as an opportunity to create consensus on the responsible use of the oceans as a source of economic growth, as a catalyst for a healthy, functional maritime domain, and as global consensus of the rule of law in the maritime domain.

Baker (2012) argues that while the South African Navy is a capable naval force, its impact on African maritime security has been limited, mainly due to budget constraints, a lack of political will, and a mismatch between its assets and the specific challenges it confronts. Although the navy is equipped as a warfighting force, it operates without any rival navy – an echo of the “golden era” of the 1960s and early 1970s. The chance of combat in the CSR is and remains remote, which might explain the continued use of the navy in roles aligning more with maritime diplomacy. The above examples of South African naval employment could mainly be categorized into cooperative diplomacy (exercises, HADR, symposia, port visits and combined training), and persuasive diplomacy (naval exercises and regional engagements).

Walker (2024) contends that South Africa will need to upgrade its maritime infrastructure if it is to harness the potential offered by the increase in shipping along the coast due to the insecurity in the Red Sea region. At the same time the country is becoming a popular destination and stop for international cruise tourism. In spite of this, South African ports are considered to be among the most inefficient in the world due to congestion, outdated infrastructure, corruption and cyber vulnerabilities. A quote by Bacroft and Faure for UNCTAD sums up the current situation:

Our contention is that the opportunity has not been sufficiently seized.