Introduction
Increased attention to the world’s oceans in academic, governmental, commercial, and activist contexts has highlighted the emergence of a more competitive security landscape. Whether for profit, control of access, the expansion of terrestrial interests, or strategic advantage, our oceans are increasingly exposed to security threats and vulnerabilities. The capacity to protect, maintain, manage and defend national and international ocean landscapes, however, remains subject to certain constraints, frequently arising from governance.
The African maritime security landscape is characterized by geographic hubs of insecurity driven primarily by threats and vulnerabilities such as armed robbery, illegal fishing, smuggling of goods, people, and weapons, and pockets of piracy largely permitted by weak maritime security governance (Siebels, 2020). The Horn of Africa (HoA), the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), and the southern Mediterranean off Libya are all prominent African ocean regions plagued by incidents of maritime insecurity underpinned by criminal and even hybrid-styled armed threats.
Given the extended scope of maritime security threats, the development of suitable responses on the part of governments is no easy matter; their willingness to respond is constrained by a deficit of the institutional reach and capacity necessary for programmes to be set up and executed. Despite agreements on regional security cooperation, the GoG, with its array of 19 littoral countries and high population density, continues to face severe maritime security challenges including piracy, illegal fishing, and the vulnerability of critical subsea infrastructure (Africa Defence Forum (ADF), 2023). Multiple overlapping frameworks exist to mitigate these challenges – but their effectiveness is thwarted by limited regional integration, political inertia, and institutional inefficiencies.
Shortcomings in good governance, we suggest, can be practically mitigated by developing physical and virtual communities of practice (CoP). These are informal assemblages of like-minded individuals motivated to harmonize their endeavours to address mutual challenges or concerns (Leal and Baeta, 2006; Penfold, 2010, p. 2) – in this case to specifically address the ever-growing suite of maritime security threats to GoG-governments, their communities, economic health, and developmental ambitions. This article aims to outline how CoPs can serve as a viable support mechanism for the strengthening of maritime security governance where traditional state-led approaches have rendered limited benefits. The underlying rationale is that CoPs (both traditional and virtual) offer a way to help address complex problems that require multiple actors to cooperate and contribute collectively.
In the maritime context, the application of CoP theory has been uneven. Most scholarly attention has focused on the Western Indian Ocean and HoA, where CoPs such as those emerging around the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) have been studied extensively (Bueger, 2013; Bueger, Edmunds & McCabe, 2019; Bueger & Mallin, 2023; Bueger, Hofius & Edwards, 2024; Bueger & Edmunds, 2024). These studies have demonstrated how epistemic communities and transnational practices can foster maritime situational awareness, enhance coordination among state and non-state actors, and strengthen maritime governance in otherwise fragile or fragmented regions.
In contrast, the GoG region has received comparatively limited attention in the CoP literature, despite being one of the areas most affected by maritime crime, including piracy, illegal fishing, and threats to subsea infrastructure. While the GoG has seen the development of various cooperative frameworks, notably the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC), their functionality and integration remain contested, and the region continues to suffer from coordination and capacity deficits. As such, there is an urgent need to explore how CoP frameworks might inform, complement, or transform existing governance approaches in the region.
This study responds directly to this gap. It extends CoP theory into the GoG context and explores how both physical and virtual communities of practice could contribute to maritime security governance and capacity-building efforts. By engaging with established CoP scholarship (Wenger, 1998; Roberts, 2006; Kerno, 2008) and recent maritime security studies working with CoPs (Bueger & Mallin, 2023; Bueger et al., 2024; Bueger & Edmunds, 2024), the article identifies three sectors where CoPs could make a tangible difference: (1) strengthening the YCoC architecture; (2) protecting strategic subsea infrastructure; and (3) mitigating IUU fishing through community-based knowledge-sharing.
By applying CoP theory to these domains, the article makes three key contributions. First, it offers an empirical extension of CoP research to a critically understudied region; second, it provides a conceptual link between informal learning networks and formal regional security frameworks; third, it offers context-specific insights into how collaborative practices can address complex capacity and trust deficits in maritime governance. The analysis draws upon a diverse body of qualitative sources to illustrate how the concept of the CoP might be applied to maritime security governance. These sources include peer-reviewed academic publications, official regional policy frameworks, reports by international organizations, and literature from think-tank publications, government statements, and conference proceedings.1
The discussion unfolds as follows.
First is an overview of CoPs. An account of their utility, limitations and permutations follows. The section following this addresses maritime security in the GoG before turning to CoPs and the means of building capacity in the region. Three specific maritime security domains are then addressed; one considers the YCoC arrangement as a CoP to explain the lack of efficiency and to consider how it might be mitigated; another takes a more prospective look at possible CoPs to help with the protection of subsea cable networks; the third addresses the creation of CoPs to help counter illegal fishing in the waters of Gulf states. After this is a reflection on the potential of virtual communities of practice (VCoP) as a means to strengthen maritime security practices.
Communities of Practice: Origin and Theory
Social theory of the CoP started to gain momentum in the early 1990s with the work of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991). The original concept was constructed to conceptualize the process of acquiring knowledge, skills, and resources in social practices and the relation to the construction of individual identity.
According to Wenger, a community of practice (CoP) rests on three pillars: the domain; the community; and the practice (Wenger, 2006). Here “domain” refers to a network with a shared domain of interest constituting a shared identity across the community. The domain is categorized by collective competencies; the individuals who practice them and share an intention of learning from one another for the sake of improving these competencies (Wenger, 2006, pp. 1–2). The CoP is thus based on the idea of recurring interactions among actors within the same area of expertise to share information, experiences, and techniques (hence “community”) while practitioners within fields share a common repertoire of resources, tools and best practices to form a desired best practice (hence “practice”).
If the amalgamation and interrelationship of these three dimensions constitute what may be understood as a community of practice, it should be assumed that their presence is essential for the community to engage in a practice (Wenger, 2006, pp. 1–2). The practice within a community can be operationalized into explicit and implicit practice codes. Here “explicit” designates well-defined roles, language, documents, and codified procedures; “implicit” is defined by the embodied understandings, underlying assumptions, and shared views of the domain in which the community is placed (Wenger, 1998, p. 47; Sethi, 2017, p. 5). A healthy and functional CoP is characterized by a simple, informal, and trusted environment with a rapid flow of communication to foster engagement and continuous knowledge-sharing. Collectively, the features described above speak directly to aspects of maritime security and the need for collaboration towards communication, information flows and knowledge sharing.
This article studies three specific maritime domains and considers how characteristics defining CoPs – mutual engagement, joint enterprise, and a shared repertoire of knowledge, norms, and tools, for example – are either present, underdeveloped, or could be deliberately cultivated to address governance shortfalls. VCoPs, in particular, are considered in contexts where real-time coordination and knowledge exchange remain are entirely necessary yet physical collaboration is logistically or politically constrained.
Utility and Criticism
Mutual engagement, shared goals, and a common repertoire of skills shape the meaning and usefulness of a CoP. However, the concept has also faced criticism: applying it too broadly risks diluting its specificity and reducing its value. Such conceptual stretching can weaken both its academic clarity and, more importantly, its practical utility (Hughes, Jewson & Unwin, 2013).
Time is an especially scarce resource in a competitive environment where competencies must be improved if a changing social, economic, and political landscape is to be successfully negotiated. Further, CoPs have financial requirements and must operate within financial constraints, while the very fact of their existence can provoke unforeseen challenges. They are expected to function effectively in situations characterized by very specific dynamics, even as their efficiency – sometimes even their legitimacy – is questioned by outside stakeholders. (Kerno, 2008, p. 73).
When CoPs must work within or are subject to established organizations, they become constrained in their functioning. The societal element is also important. A deeper element of community awareness tends to foster a better basis for the functioning of CoPs. This is where African entities like those of the Gulf of Guinea, with their own styles and traditions, enter the broader debate on CoPs. While Kerno (2008, p. 75) highlights an East-West divide, it is also relevant to consider African social culture, among other social phenomena, that might positively contribute to the functioning of CoPs in the greater region. It has been noted in the GoG, for example, that scientific and indigenous knowledge sympathetically contribute to the enhancement of the conservation of marine life and resources (Porri et al., 2023).
But the meeting of so-called Eastern and Western values, outlooks and practices in the CoP can become entangled and competitive rather than collaborative in nature. Participating actors, such as states, organizations, agencies and individuals from different politico-cultural contexts bring their own prioritizations and understandings of security, power and trust (not to mention other less tangible or recognisable predispositions) into the CoPs (Kerno, 2008, p. 77). Competitive behaviour can be generated, meaning the roles and nature of CoPs are not always amicable or above criticism.
The triad of power, trust, and predispositions are, indeed, particularly worthy of consideration (Roberts, 2006, p. 626). The potential of any CoP arises from the experience, expertise, age, personality, authority, and standing of its constituent actors. The scope or level of participation is also relevant. Trust is crucial: a lack of trust hinders the development of openness and the transfer of knowledge, both of which are requisite for the functioning of a CoP given the centrality of knowledge to the community and its practical goals (Roberts, 2006, p. 628). Predispositions are decisive for what is allowed in and accepted, what is shut out or rejected, and the degree of resistance to change within the community. Together, in combination with factors regarding trust and power, these things can limit the advantages of a CoP.
Faced with a deficiency of trust, CoPs must engage in trust building (Loss et al, 2007, p. 28). Such a process requires time and cooperation and a willingness to participate. There are four ways, at least, to collectively promote the building of trust. First, socially oriented contractual trust is entrenched by the keeping of promises and building confidence. Second, the sharing of information and maintaining discretion regarding sensitive or embarrassing information about members builds trust regarding communication. Third, competency trust can be firmed by showing competence and demonstrating skills relevant to the field the CoP must address. Fourth, caring trust is developed when the interest of the CoP and its goals are perceptibly more important than narrow or personal interests. These four crucial fields of trust are particularly critical when a CoP is composed of diverse participants, serving as a catalyst for deeper engagement (Ardichvili, 2008, p. 151; Williams, 2001, pp. 378–380; Eggs, 2012, pp. 214, 219).
As CoPs engage with higher order matters of security, and participants are answerable to state actors and the corporate sphere, two other instruments can help. First, if time is not a factor, an incremental approach based on graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRITR) is useful. GRITR functions by lowering tension through incremental concessions, allowing spaces or opportunities for trust to grow. Alternatively, costly signalling can speed up building the building of trust; this requires actions characterised by higher risk and a corresponding potential to increase confidence in wary partners, facilitating cooperation or mitigating their competitive stances. At the level of state interaction and security communities, these means outlined above offer solutions for CoPs (virtual or in-person) to promote trust as a means to accelerate the achievement of their goals (Wheeler, 2012, pp. 11–13).
Security communities often include CoPs whose members are not directly answerable to state actors. Within the security community, and given their multinational and often multicultural architecture, CoPs are frequently obliged to facilitate a learning culture capable of transcending certain barriers, so allowing individuals to gain experience from one another. Where a specific security threat requires interaction and the transmission of specific knowledge if threats or vulnerabilities are to be successfully mitigated, organizational and material resources should, ideally, be shifted toward best practices informed by learning and sharing (Adler, 2008, p. 198).
The CoP, founded on learning, cooperation and offering the flexibility of physical or virtual options, is a viable option when threat complexity and actor proliferation combine. Maritime security governance is such a case. In the sections, below the utility and relevance of physical and virtual CoPs are further addressed with reference to maritime security threats and risks in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. Three risk domains are covered: the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the illegal fishing sector, and the emergent difficulty of protecting subsea cable networks (SSCNs) traversing the Gulf of Guinea, terminating in Atlantic countries as distant as Senegal and Angola.
1. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct as a CoP – Potential and Limitations
In June 2013, 25 West and Central African governments signed the Yaoundé́ Code of Conduct (YCoC) to formally create what has come to be called the Yaoundé Architecture (Yücel, 2021). The YCoC was – in West African terms – a very notable and key endeavour undertaken by member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to create a regional maritime security regime stretching from Senegal and Cape Verde in the North to Angola in the South (Danso et al., 2021, p. 3). The code is divided into inter-regional (Interregional Coordination Centres), regional (CRESMAC/CRESMAO), sub-regional (Zone A, D, E, F & G), and national sectors through national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). The code is designed to deal with a huge variety of issues pertaining to maritime security, including piracy, armed robbery, smuggling, trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, and illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing. While the code has achieved much in terms of regional information sharing and general coordination to address maritime security concerns across the Gulf (a decade-low number of piracy attacks were recorded in 2022), the code has met much criticism for being too focused on anti-piracy (Ukeje & Ela, 2013), being insufficiently binding legally (Hassan & Hasan, 2017), and lacking capability to address the root causes of crime (Ali, 2014; Hasan & Hassan, 2016; Hassan & Hasan, 2017; Ifesinachi & Nwangwu, 2015; Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).
In many ways, the YCoC resembles a community of practice, and there are obvious similarities to the DCoC in East Africa (Bueger, 2013) in the sense that the actors within the YCoC are brought together from diverse nations and traditions of knowledge, and cooperate in distinct geographical zones defining the areas in which the communication and practice take place. Actors have a shared repertoire of effort built on the organizing of practical activities in the form of meetings and training to standardize operating procedures (Yücel, 2021, p. 149), seeking harmonization, routinization, the creation of awareness and information-sharing, together ensuring best practices for maritime security in the GoG. This constitutes what can be translated as a maritime security community of practice.
A further testament to this is the way communication across interregional, regional, sub-regional, and national levels serves as the mechanism to a shared repertoire for intended information-sharing and efficient coordination to mitigate maritime (in)security drivers such as piracy and IUU fishing. However, the YCoC has faced much criticism due to the Code’s inability to function effectively; indeed, Rear Admiral Issah Yakubu, Ghana’s Chief of Navy, for example, has forthrightly said that “the Yaoundé Architecture (for Maritime Security) is currently stressed and risks collapsing altogether” (Wingrin, 2024).
After 10 years, frustrated by questions of sovereignty, the YCoC is still yet to be made binding (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2021). This impedes the YCoC community from identifying new challenges and securing the optimal use of resources, leaving it without a defined strategic vision for the foreseeable future. In the long term, this is inimical to awareness and practices, leading to the diminishing of explicit codes, a demotivation and disharmonization of the YCoC’s endeavours, and an inability to address transnational maritime security challenges. Ultimately, this serves to weaken the shared repertoire and general coherence among actors within the community.
At a meeting in Dakar in August 2023, an action plan was developed for the YCoC to be evaluated at the annual summit of Heads of State and Government in September 2023 in Abuja; however, as of late 2024, nothing has been published. Although joint training and personal connections among staff in the respective regional centres have enhanced cooperation since 2013 (Yücel, 2021, p. 151), Zone G in Cape Verde became operational as late as 2024, Zone A in Angola is yet to become operational, and others – the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre’s (MMCCs) – lack financial and human resources. In theory, the physical presence of regional liaison officers should enable the swift exchange of information between member states and provide a forum for the discussion of common threats and challenges. Unfortunately, this has been inadequate, and the effectiveness of the Code often relies on informal personal ties instead of institutional channels, indicating the challenges for the YCoC as a community of maritime security practice.
The reliance on personal relationships to establish a successful CoP poses a risk of weakening formal operational and diplomatic frameworks. Fostering trust among member states is imperative for the effective exchange of information and dissemination of knowledge. Consequently, in the absence of regular communication, the potential for learning within the community will be significantly diminished (Sethi, 2017, p. 17). Nevertheless, the emphasis on personalization among participants as a foundation for the community’s cohesion could inadvertently hinder the sharing of knowledge and information across the YCoC, as it constrains a degree of engagement from individuals who are not part of these personal networks. Wenger (1998, pp. 47–48) describes this as a “less binding” community due to the implicit codes of the practice such as untold rules of thumb, underlying assumptions, recognizable intuitions, and perhaps also world views not being widely shared within the architecture. This is an indication that information-sharing, awareness, and best practices are only routinized among certain actors within the YCoC, hindering the ability to create mutual regional engagement, political buy-in, and a shared consciousness on how to specifically act on maritime issues within the region. The fact of only a few key people being aware of the community’s repertoire, one could argue, fosters a further lack of trust and dealignment, thus disrupting the potential advantages vested in the architecture, undermining it as a CoP.
The limitations of the code’s informal practice point to the need for stronger governance; the operations of the YCoC’s structures and functions should be understood as requisite and binding if they are to be fully implemented and operational across the entire Gulf. Furthermore, it illustrates the discrepancy between the politicians’ ambitions and the practical implementation of the Code, as exemplified by the lack of financial resources provided by West African governments. Ultimately, it shows the interesting sovereignty trade-off that occurs when states enter a regional security cooperation framework such as the YCoC. In exchange for security guarantees, states trade some sovereignty for regional governance and more efficient information sharing; however, due to West African leaders not being willing to accept this trade off, the practice of the community is left with less room for cooperation, leading to a less effective CoP.
The functioning of the YCoC is also hindered by a mixture of initiatives limiting the region’s ability to create a common practice – presumably as a result of the above-mentioned lack of trust in the structure to deliver on its promises. The YARIS (Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System), Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG), and the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (GoG-MCF/SHADE) represent a triad of platforms that seek to enhance information sharing, situational awareness, and coordination among actors. Regrettably, a lack of interoperability among these various initiatives undermines their collective efficiency (Schandorf, 2024, p. 411). This all contributes to less-than-optimal information sharing across the region.
In Figure 1 below, we see another contributory example in the shape of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), an initiative which also aims to foster information-sharing and joint patrols at sea. In May 2023, 11 GoG countries signed the Concept of Operations (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2024). The CMTF was then instituted with the aim of establishing fleets for each of the zones in the YCoC – but, again, the YCoC’s functioning was greatly impaired due to issues of sovereignty; in this case a want of authority to authorize hot pursuits within the respective exclusive economic zones of the member states.2
Figure 1
CMTF-GoG organogram.
In theory, the CMTF should not limit cooperation through uncertainty. If the Task Force can heighten regional joint patrolling and close existing loopholes in coordination issues between member states, it should be a welcome initiative for the region’s combat of illicit maritime activity. But the creation of multiple initiatives, clustering certain member states and excluding others, only weakens the region’s shared repertoire and creates confusion in terms of information-sharing flows, with actor proliferation interfering with the CoP ordering mechanisms (a glance at Figure 1 above should clarify the degree of proliferation and organisational complexity).
From a CoP theory perspective and in terms of providing the right capacity to address illicit maritime activities, the region appears to be most effectively equipped by implementing a single, cohesive platform focused on utilizing a shared best practice through the exchange of information, joint patrols, and training exercises. If the much-needed political buy-in, financial resources, and human resources are applied, the Yaoundé framework already offers a blueprint for the effective enablement of collaborative responses among otherwise heterogeneous groups of regional stakeholders and for a cohesive mixture of maritime security strategies and solutions to be disseminated across the region. In this manner, a maritime security CoP that comprehensively understands issues in a way both mutually recognizable and adaptable to the national contexts of each member state becomes possible.
2. CoPs as Key Actors in Protecting Critical Subsea Infrastructure
In this section, “infrastructure” refers to subsea cable networks (SSCNs) traversing the ocean floor in the GoG (Figure 2). Overall, the growing international focus on the protection of SSCNs is a recent arrival in the contemporary maritime security debate. The protection of subsea infrastructure such as undersea communication cables has only become more important in recent years. In 2021, Chapman noted that, given that the volume of information that now runs via SSCNs cannot be handled by satellite networks – some 97% of global communications – the strategic importance of sub-sea infrastructure cannot be understated. Subsea networks carry the world’s financial transactions, underpin cloud computing and artificial intelligence; failure or interference cause “cascading” breakdowns in domains such as finance, military logistics, energy flows, food supplies, and medicine (Chapman, 2021, p. 3). Given that these are critical modern-day services, and any damage or destruction has wide repercussions, the importance of their protection is paramount. By 2024, academic debates and deliberate threats to these networks dovetailed as research and military threats began to coincide.
Figure 2
Subsea communication cables in the Gulf of Guinea as on 2023.
Note. Map, designations and ownership compiled from the interactive TeleGeography submarine cable map (2025). Cable designations and ownership from north to south off Liberia. Top of map points north. Light brown: Maroc Telecom West Africa – Maroc Telecom; Light green: ACE Africa Coast to Europe – Multiple owners; Blue: Glo-1 – Globacom Ltd; Light blue: SAT-3/WASC – Multiple owners; Purple: MainOne – MainOne Equinix; Blue: West Africa Cable System (WACS) Multiple owners; Dark Brown: Equiano – Google; Grey: 2 Africa – Multiple owners; Red: South Atlantic Interlink (SAIL) – Camtel & PR China; Dark green: South Atlantic Cable System (SACS) – Angola Cables.
The necessity of protecting subsea data cable networks requires an acknowledgement of the complex nature of responsibilities for the security of such networks in general and, specifically, in terms of specific maritime regions. Additional complexity arises from the proliferation of actors who own, use, maintain and protect these networks as individual entities, and particularly where they cluster in ocean landscapes. One such African region is the GoG, harbouring its own subsea communication cable networks requiring security.
The map in Figure 2 shows those 18 countries in the Gulf of Guinea from Senegal to Angola with cable landing stations serving coastal states and their hinterlands: from north to south Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Congo Republic, the DR Congo, and Angola. When considering the triad of protection, cooperation, and communities of practice, the practicalities of aligning or collating a wide span of networks with multiple littoral governments and agencies are further complicated by the jurisdictional dilemma embedded in differential actor responsibilities in different maritime zones, from territorial waters to those beyond national jurisdictions.
Protection of subsea infrastructure is governed by legalities, institutional matters, the rights of private companies, and the various interests of governments and international organisations. In addition, an emerging regime of conventions and bodies such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) and other, lower, order agreements or conventions also play a role, requiring the building of an international consensus amongst governments and non-governmental bodies (Kavanagh, 2023, p. 24). Inherently the security of subsea cables as critical national, regional and international infrastructure rests upon different configurations of formal cooperation, informal collaboration and consensus at national, regional and global levels. This entangled multi-actor reality highlights the need for cooperation and the pooling of skills, the sharing of knowledge, and astute leadership. These are constituent elements of CoPs – whether virtual or physical.
CoPs focused on subsea infrastructure operate within a broader maritime security landscape that shapes 21st-century ocean governance. While SSCN infrastructure is hidden, indeed often ignored altogether, it serves many interests. Many actors, both directly and indirectly, are either responsible for or depend on its protection and optimal functioning. Decisions concerning it are therefore not a matter for any single national interest or state; SSCN is subject to a complex reality of cooperation based on a shared normative understanding of what is at stake for multiple partners (Bueger, Hofius & Edwards, 2024, p. 3). Cooperation must derive from a combination of trust, mutual understanding and commitment sufficient to attract assemblages of actors sharing a common interest in SSCN security, prepared to build joint enterprises for its protection. A single CoP, that is to say, is no solution: it is better to set up multiple CoPs, virtual or physical, to respond to the full suite of risks to SSCNs.
In the GoG, a multitude of organizations are concerned with the region’s maritime security (Abdallah & Alootey-Pappoe, 2022 p. 7; Siebels, 2020, pp. 116–117). Some, such the YCoC, have a regional connection; others are more issue-oriented, concerned with environmental risks, while others align more closely with harder maritime threat mitigation (maritime security contractors) or offer information to actors (the Oceans Beyond Piracy projects, for example). These entities have a common interest in mitigating maritime security threats (Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance, 2023, pp. 4–5). This multi-actor locus of maritime interests offers spaces to build communities of practice. Such endeavours must overcome both the lack of political will and ignorance or disinterest in marine security issues if adequate resources are to be found to deal with them (Côrte-Real, 2022, p. 65).
With unique characteristics regarding users, owners, and physical transnationality as listed under Figure 2, SSCN protection stands upon cooperation and the coherent integration of actors and interest groups. The deliberate elevation of SSCN to the status of critical infrastructure follows the targeted sabotage and interference of targets considered high value. In addition, protection practices must address a difficult but critical maritime security sector largely located on the seabed, invisible and shrouded in complexity, whether real or perceived. Circumstances oblige a transition from theoretical discussion towards material implementation and practices of protection, awareness and cooperation.
Potential CoP Partners in the Gulf of Guinea
While no African regional organisation features within the ICPC membership to address the protection of subsea infrastructure (ICPC, n.d.), the overall membership of the ICPC does include both a number of industry players and certain regulatory authorities from the GoG. Given that SSCNs traverse national and international waters in the GoG, involvement at both regional and national levels is required if attention is to be directed to its protection and other interested parties are to be attracted.
GoG countries hold membership of the ICPC through related cable or infrastructure organisations in Angola (Angola Cables), Benin (SBIN SA), Gambia (GSC), Ghana (Dolphin Communication), Nigeria (One Cable Co Ltd), Senegal (Sonatel), Sierra Leone (Zoodlands SL Ltd), and Togo (Togo Telecom). This membership is expressed through domestic industry partners and authorities from each country tying governments and industrial partners from the GoG into an interest-driven relationship with SSCN protection as a common benefit. From a CoP perspective, the infrastructure organisations offer members the protection of SSCNs, albeit in conjunction with other partners bringing different interests into the arrangement.
At the national level, responsibilities related to SSCNs lie with government departments. Departments act as brokers for actors seeking to set up a CoP for security cooperation. As brokers, government departments can build both clusters of players converging around a concept, and mobilize parties towards joint enterprises and a shared repertoire. While governments with weak or altogether absent policies and regulatory frameworks contribute to the insecurity of SSCNs, they can still be active participants and benefit from the learning and information-sharing dynamics of a CoP instituted for SSCN protection. Cooperation is essentially required if these networks are to be fully protected.
Certain national entities in the littoral countries of the GoG deal with, or are able to influence, the security and protection of SSCNs through membership of, or support for, CoPs. According to the ICPC-membership roster, 16 Gulf states have national or state-affiliated telecommunication entities affiliated with the ICPC; according to the TeleGeography submarine cable map page, about seven large NGO styled companies are directly involved with SSCNs and thus have an interest in the protection regimes (TeleGeography, 2025).
Regionally, the following bodies also concern themselves with maritime security in the GoG:
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): ECOWAS is a regional economic union of West African countries. It addresses maritime security issues through various mechanisms, including the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy.
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS): ECCAS focuses on security cooperation among Central African countries and may be involved in addressing maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea.
Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) Yaoundé: The ICC Yaoundé is a regional centre established to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It involves countries from both West and Central Africa.
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC): The GGC is an intergovernmental organization that promotes cooperation among Gulf of Guinea countries in various areas, including maritime security.
The above discussion outlines a hierarchy of actors with a degree of common interest in aligning best practices through CoPs to protect SSCNs in the Gulf of Guinea.
The different entities form clusters of public and private actors with national, regional and transnational jurisdictions, as well as common and individual interests. The common interests relate to setting up and pursuing best practices to mitigating issues regarding the protection of SSCNs and so serve different ownerships and national, regional and global interests. Both the spectrum of actors and their specific interests offer components of a mutually reinforcing mix of elements and catalysts for the setting up of physical and virtual CoPs (whether formal or informal) with a focus on SSCN protection in the Gulf of Guinea.
Turning to the structure and functioning of communities of practice, the protection of a national security asset is normally the responsibility of state apparatus. Protecting SSCNs however, upsets the logic of the nation-as-protector, with SSCNs the responsibility of many actors and concerned parties with differing interests, skills and resources, all sharing the protection imperative (Liebetrau & Bueger, 2024).
In the case of a community of practice for SSCN protection in the Gulf of Guinea, a constellation of CoPs is one pathway to address the underlying risk complexities with a focus on best practices (Adler et al., 2024, p. 8). A constellation of CoPs to minimize deliberate, accidental, and natural risks and to respond to disruptions, brings different sets of responsibilities, skills and resources to the table. The rationale is underpinned by the stark reality of different players with common security interests and differing skills, knowledge and resource sets.
Developing more effective institutions for SSCN protection offers a setting for the CoP approach to help protect against deliberate or previously unforeseen threats. Keeping the actor spectrum noted earlier in mind, the following indicators help to direct the practice elements of the actor community emerging as outlined by Liebetrau and Bueger (2024): setting up multi-stakeholder fora; harnessing self-protection measures; sharing information; legal coordination; filtering in local indigenous populations and knowledge; international stakeholder coordination; regional cooperation; and the institutionalization of private-public partnerships.
For Liebetrau and Bueger (2024), international law and the law regarding naval warfare offer little to guarantee protection for critical undersea infrastructure from deliberate acts of aggression stemming from armed actors and circumstances characterized by conflict (Pedrozo, 2025, p. 62). For the moment it remains up to the signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other regulatory arrangements to respect what they signed up to and to not target this category of infrastructure (or to target it only within the bounds permitted by international law) and to hold transgressors accountable. As for the spectrum of actions and actors that Liebetrau and Bueger outline, viewed under the banner of the multiple maritime actors present in the Gulf of Guinea, the selection of local and regional players, responsibilities and contributions for the building CoPs for the peacetime protection of SSCNs in the waters of the Gulf is a national and regional matter.
3. The CoP as a Tool to Mitigate Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing
Damaging economic revenue, the environment, and the livelihoods and conditions of people in coastal communities, the UN has identified illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing as one of the seven major threats to global maritime security. IUU fishing in the Gulf has been estimated as 37% of the catch (FAO, 2020), the highest proportion globally, with severe consequences for fisheries, ecosystems, and local economies while also facilitating broader transnational crime. The World Bank currently projects that by 2025, Ghana’s fish catch will be depleted by 25% (World Bank, 2019). Currently, fish provide 60% of total animal protein in the West African diet, meaning further depletion poses a highly critical risk to the livelihoods of coastal communities in the GoG.
The lack of transparency within the fishing industry (local authorities and agencies) has made IUU fishing a huge problem for coastal livelihoods within the Gulf. Information-sharing is frequently inadequate or altogether absent: a significant deficiency in the execution of measures to improve the negative trend. Despite most states in the Gulf having national legalization, only 11 are party to the Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), the first binding global convention that specifically focuses on IUU fishing and its effects. As many important fish stocks are migratory and regionally shared, better regional cooperation is needed. This is where the region should turn to CoPs to streamline its efforts and mitigate the impact.
The use of CoPs to deter illicit activities has had great success in Vietnam with community-based groups helping to preserve the marine environment and to detect IUU fishing in the coastal central province of Khanh Hoa. A similar case can be made in Malaysia, where community reporting systems help to allow fishers and local coastal communities to report maritime security threats (Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2024, p. 4).
As things stand at present, many local coastal community members do not have access to the information and knowledge required for the effective management of national and regional fisheries. Local community-based CoPs can permit practitioners in the coastal communities to deliberate and share their knowledge and best practices to foster commonalities, so developing a shared practice to promote the short-, medium-, and long-term sustainability goals of fisheries management. If actors recognize the centrality of trust and transparency, such practice-oriented communities can also provide the key building blocks for the regional fishing entities to establish regional CoPs. Bottom-up CoPs could also play a vital factor in mitigating the level of distrust between coastal communities and governments (Geall et al., 2023, p. 48), offering nuanced insights and allowing actors to disseminate knowledge and to better understand where their perspectives converge and differ. Theoretically including all relevant layers, from the artisanal fishers to regional fishery bodies, they can also help with creating more structured communication channels.
The intersection between scientific and indigenous knowledge remains key in establishing bottom-up CoPs by enabling the sharing of different cultural approaches to fishing, creating an avenue for closer collaboration between local practitioners and the governing managers (Stellenbosch University, RDDC & KAIPTC, 2024, p. 7; Porri et al., 2023). In Cameroon and Congo, this intersection has enhanced local fishers’ knowledge of local fish populations and their migratory patterns, thereby aiding researchers and national and regional regulators alike in cost-effective assessments of fish stocks. Thus, having meaningful dialogues and the conducting of joint training should enable the actors to develop a shared repertoire, if given sufficient time through regular engagements.
For the GoG, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) such as the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea3 (FCWC) and the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission4 (SRFC) aim to monitor regional fishing activities. However, the proliferation of institutions and agreements without inter-institutional coordination risks the efficiency of regional conservation mechanisms. Consequently, the key is to utilize the already existing ECOWAS-FCWC-SRFC Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) within the structure of the YCoC to formalize procedures and enhance the region’s capacity for regional information sharing, knowledge dissemination, and cooperation. This can increase the sharing of fisheries intelligence and greater harmonization of fisheries regulations and management.
Carefully constructed CoP frameworks can ensure the coordination required to combat IUU fishing through improved monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) and joint coastal guard surveillance activities. Similarly, the Tripartite MoU should enable the regional fishery bodies to share blacklists of vessels engaging in IUU, harmonize catch document systems (CDS) and improve traceability requirements of trade restriction measures (TREMs). Greater integration between the YCoC, national fishery commissions and local grassroots coastal communities would also, notwithstanding the cost, enable occasional sea patrols, heightening surveillance activities to curb illegal fishing. The FCWC Task Force funded by the Norwegian government is already increasing national and regional MCS as well as enhancing coordination through steering group meeting. But, still lacking the much-needed inter-institutional coordination, existing fishing CoPs are limited to certain areas within the Gulf.
The practical difficulty faced by FCWC, with member states in Zones F and E of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, creates challenges for the MMCCs to coordinate effectively. Similarly, the SRFC includes countries from both Zone G and F (Guinea and Sierra Leone), are required to report illegal fishing activities to the SRFC headquarters in Dakar, while also being theoretically obliged to do so to the MMCC F in Accra. This does not happen, despite an existing memorandum of understanding between ECOWAS and the RFMOs obliging both parties to provide information on vessels with approved fishing licenses to curb the illegal activity (MMCC Zone F & RDDC, 2024).
A harmonizing of the YCoC’s zonal outline and the respective member states within the SRFC and FCWC would provide the opportunity to optimize information sharing and awareness to aid the development of a shared practice. The formation and maximization of the latter is key if IUU fishing is to be dealt with efficiently across the region. Through this shared practice, partners within the fisheries bodies and the YCoC could establish inter-sectoral forums that push to define and manage exclusive economic zones, aiding the adoption of a holistic approach that considers social, economic, and environmental facto. Unfortunately, only bilateral attempts have been made to implement an effective fisheries management structure. For instance, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire engage in joint maritime patrols and joint assessments of fishing activities as well as simultaneously closed fishery seasons (Amoako, 2023).5 While the regional CoPs will need to efficiently establish themselves over time, opportunities to utilize CoPs to solve the critical risks related to IUU fishing remain great. Similarly, a regional fisheries management structure creates bargaining power for states in West Africa, thus improving conditions for coastal communities dependent upon fishing.
Virtual Communities of Practice (VCoPs)
Given the complexity of protecting SSCNs as critical national and regional infrastructure and containing IUU fishing, operationalizing the various elements required for prevention and protection remain a wicked problem. If left unaddressed, these threats carry a wide range of implications (Khan & Neis, 2010; Pandey & Bhushan, 2023). As noted earlier, Adler et al. (2024) highlight the growing need to confront emerging threats and vulnerabilities in a rapidly changing security environment, calling for swift prevention, mitigation, and damage control in response to an expanding range of state and non-state actors across terrestrial, maritime, and aerospace domains.
To recap, the virtual CoP offers an innovative mode of responding to emerging problems, freeing its members from the obligation to meet at a specific time and place. The VCoP is also more focussed than associations such as the traditional CoP, which are usually considered to be voluntary in nature (Bourhis, Dubé & Jacob, 2005, p. 23). Dealing with complexity brings about a certain need for an expanded actor spectrum with leadership, sponsorship and knowledge/skills as defining features. The utility of the VCoPs should be acknowledged in the context of a general growing familiarity with IT and virtuality, offering space where complex protection needs can be addressed in meetings of networked security providers or agencies.
SSCNs continue to be particularly vulnerable to intentional kinetic attacks – a matter illustrated by the uncertainty surrounding the November 2024 incident in the Baltic and the interception of the Chinese vessel by the Danish Navy (Milne and Telling, 2024).6 VCoPs should be considered especially appropriate to addressing this growing grey area rather than the full span of threats and vulnerabilities, some of which are protected within the traditional prevention-mitigation-response triad (Nasiri, 2024, pp. 1–2; Frascà & Galantini, 2023, pp. 59–60).
For regions, there are important advantages in the capacity to overcome geographical barriers, promote expert connectivity, and allow the timely sharing of threat intelligence. Virtual communities pull together limited regional experience and permit cost-effective knowledge transfer from actors more familiar and better resourced to build and sustain the VCoPs themselves. Further, they also allow for local/cultural knowledge (an often-absent element leading to disruptions) to be accounted for, improving contextual relevance and so better satisfying imperatives for local knowledge. When constructed over time to build familiarity, trust and institutional knowledge, VCoPs optimize information flows and foster a far greater responsive capability in the domains of prevention, mitigation and damage control. Against the backdrop of highly complex problems such as mitigating threats to SSCNs and addressing illegal fishing, for example, such incremental progress is important to chip away at the elements and actors that slow down advancement towards solutions.
The above advantages must also contend with risks associated with the use of VCoPs in general, as their ability to enhance the protection of SSCNs remains vague. Over time, IUU fishing has attracted a host of groupings that developed extensive ways and means to prevent or contain illegal practices. These can be coordinated by way of virtual platforms. Ardichvili (2008), Hara & Hew (2007), as well as Fontainha & Gannon-Leary, (2008, pp. 20–29), however, outline some general risks that relate broadly to knowledge sharing and avoiding any overload or misuse of information. Both risks speak to security and trust concerns within the hierarchy of actors – and to their different spheres of responsibility, automatically bringing about a hierarchy of security classifications. The basis of both risks resides in the quality of trust existing within the VCoP; trust facilitates sharing, in particular (Ardichvili, 2008 p. 551).
Technological challenges, often associated with the diversity of backgrounds and cultural assumptions of the community’s members, can also be a factor. While risks and difficulties cannot be avoided altogether, they can be mitigated by using a constellation of specialist VCoPs to assist in the building of the community. The latter may help to overcome difficulties, address issues arising from complex collaboration, and offer a way to ameliorate the risks associated with virtual work. In mitigation of such difficulties, Bourhis, Dubé and Jacob (2005, p. 28), for example, cited the central role of leadership and institutional sponsorship to attract and glue together partners. According to their case studies, however, VCoPs are not incontrovertibly any blueprint for successfully addressing the field’s many complex problems.
Conclusion
This article has examined how communities of practice can help address governance limitations in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) by creating physical and virtual networks that support responses to a growing range of maritime security threats. We show how these collaborative structures can foster cooperation among diverse stakeholders, strengthen shared practices, and reduce persistent gaps in regional security efforts.
The analysis centred on three themes. First, we showed how existing security initiatives such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) can integrate CoPs to enhance capacity-building through shared activities like workshops and joint training. Such integration can improve the collective preparedness of member states to confront maritime security challenges. Second, we highlighted the importance and complexity of protecting subsea cable networks (SSCNs) in the GoG, where international, regional, national, non-state, and private actors all play roles. CoPs can serve as a platform for these actors to coordinate, exchange knowledge, and develop more comprehensive strategies for SSCN protection. Third, we discussed how CoPs can help address IUU fishing by cultivating trust and communication among local communities, governments, and regional organizations. As demonstrated in Vietnam and Malaysia, bottom-up CoPs can empower fishers, strengthen governance, and link sustainable fisheries management to broader maritime security frameworks.
The discussion also underscored the value of virtual CoPs (VCoPs) in mitigating challenges related to geographic dispersion, rapid information demands, and limited opportunities for in-person collaboration. VCoPs can bridge distance and enable real-time coordination, improving the collective capacity to respond to maritime threats.
Overall, the article shows how CoPs and VCoPs can promote collaboration, integrate local knowledge, and advance shared regional objectives. By addressing the economic, environmental, and humanitarian effects of maritime insecurity, they can support the protection of critical infrastructure, strengthen sustainable fisheries management, and enhance regional cooperation.
Finally, the article emphasizes the importance of reflexivity for shaping future responses, especially as emerging risks, such as damage to or attacks on SSCNs, intensify. Reactive approaches are insufficient; effective CoPs must be established early. Early formalization of cooperation increases the efficiency of CoP networks and improves their ability to deliver timely, targeted outcomes. When intentionally designed and strategically deployed—whether virtual or in-person—CoPs can accelerate learning, improve coordination, and put preventive measures in place before threats escalate. For SSCNs, prevention and rapid response must work together, though this combination does not automatically extend to armed or wartime protection. If used effectively, CoPs can evolve from reactive forums into proactive tools of maritime governance—capable of shaping security outcomes in fisheries, SSCN protection, and the implementation of the YCoC, rather than simply responding to events. Properly implemented, these collaborative frameworks offer a promising path forward for maritime security governance in the GoG.
Notes
[1] Seminars and conferences arranged by the Royal Danish Defence College, sponsored by the Danish Peace & Stabilisation Fund. See, for example: https://www.fak.dk/globalassets/fak/dokumenter/2025/-11---april-2025--maritime-action-platform-ii--communique-.pdf.
[2] MMCC Zone F zonal MoU review together with the Royal Danish Defence College is planned for 2025.
[4] Comprised of Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
[6] This incident, in which the Danish Navy stepped in to prevent the Chinese vessel from leaving the Baltic, is part of a broader campaign perceived by European countries as the deliberate disruption of and damage to SSCNs in the Baltic. On 4 July, 2025 (according to Reuters), a Chinese ship’s captain appeared in a Hong Kong court on charges of damaging a gas line and telecom cables between Finland and Estonia on 23 October, 2023.
Competing Interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.