Introduction
National security policymaking in parliamentary democracies is governed both by formal procedures – the Swedish Riksdag Act (Swedish Government, 2014), for example – and by culture and norms. In high-stakes situations of crisis or war, it is common for major policy shifts to be driven by parliamentary debates marked by clashing viewpoints (Walsh, 2006; Peters & Wagner, 2011; Raunio & Wagner, 2017; Wagner et al., 2017). While moments where strategic culture and norms drive pivotal shifts in security policy rightly draw significant scholarly attention (see, for example, Lödén, 2012; Bergman-Rosamund & Agius, 2018; Edström & Westberg, 2020), national security policymaking in parliamentary democracies more commonly occurs without the pressure of imminent war and crisis. Although such less dramatic processes can significantly shape a country’s security policy, directing its international security cooperation and its use of military power, they remain surprisingly underexplored. This study addresses that gap by analysing how this quieter domain of security policymaking generates policy change and reinforces continuity through institutionalized norms and discursive strategies.
To do so, this study introduces the concept of mid-range national security policymaking. Importantly, “mid-range” does not suggest limited influence here; it refers, rather, to a tier of national security policymaking that falls below the threshold of crisis and above instances of more routine decisions – a range which, while less driven by any immediate threat, retains considerable influence on a country’s foreign relations and defence.
The study’s empirical focus is on two such Swedish cases: the parliamentary deliberations on joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994, and the ratification of the Host Nation Support (HNS) agreement in 2016. Though neither decision involved limits on Swedish sovereignty or the use of military power abroad, both significantly deepened Sweden’s cooperation with NATO, enabling joint military exercises and mutual support (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1994b, 2015b; Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2014). While they may not represent critical turning points in the same way as the high-stakes security policy decisions, they indicate stepping stones toward more significant policy shifts, such as Sweden’s 2022 decision to join NATO (Swedish Government, 2022).
By analysing the parliamentary debates surrounding these so-called mid-range cases, this study examines how norm dynamics shape the ways parliamentarians defend or challenge security policy. The study shows how rhetorical strategies and roles adopted by members of parliament reveal the influence of the mechanisms through which national security policies evolve, even in the absence of crisis or war. Exploring the “mid-rangers” helps deepen our understanding of the complexities of security policymaking beyond crises, offering valuable insight into the underlying mechanics of both continuity and change.
The analysis that follows employs an interpretivist approach founded on a norm dynamics framework. It echoes Flyvbjerg (2006, pp. 230, 237) in justifying its choice of Sweden as an “information-oriented” case that may successfully “capture the rich ambiguity of politics”. The country’s long-lasting policy of military non-alignment was very recently abandoned in favour NATO membership; its self-ascribed role as a “moral great power” (Åselius, 2005, p. 26), articulated through its humanitarian aid programmes, is de-coupled from political party ideologies (Kärre & Svensson, 1989), while it is a nation “recognized as a traditional consensus democracy” (Wikman, 2021, p. 287) with strong parliamentary control regarding the use of military power (Dieterich et al., 2010).
The article makes three contributions. First, it broadens the understanding of national security policymaking by focusing on the underexplored mid-range layer, adding to research on security policymaking in parliamentary democracies. Second, it examines how norm dynamics operate both in driving policy change and maintaining its stability – insights likely to be relevant beyond Sweden. Third, it adds empirical depth to this layer of security policymaking by analysing underlying mechanics in norm dynamics in parliamentary debates in the two selected instances.
Although the study is based on a Swedish context, it argues that the findings are of more general value for understanding mid-range policymaking in other national contexts. Among other things, the results highlight that certain interactions between strategic culture and institutionalized norms are important for understanding both stasis and change in security policy; they point to the power of these underlying mechanics in policymaking that restrict security policy change, even when the security landscape is in flux; and they suggest that institutionalized norms play a more central role than party politics in deciding the ways in which members of parliament respond to, and ultimately shape, security policy in mid-range security policymaking.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature informing this study’s analysis of security policymaking in parliamentary democracies. It also introduces theories of strategic culture and norm dynamics providing the theoretical foundation for the analysis. This is followed by a presentation of the empirical material and an outline of the study’s analytical methodology, drawing on Bloomfield’s (2016) norm dynamics framework. The second half of the article analyses the two selected cases – the PfP and HNS deliberations – exploring patterns of norm contestation and concordance. The article concludes with reflections on the findings and their implications for future research.
Previous Research and Theoretical Assumptions – Review and Discussion
For this study, strategic culture and norms are acknowledged as key concepts for understanding security policymaking in parliamentary democracies. As theoretical concepts, they constitute the undercurrents that influence national security policy to provide perceptions rather than explanations (Gray, 1999). Seen as interrelated with norms as a “standard of appropriate behaviour” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891), they create norm dynamics between the parliamentarians (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016) that influence the evolution of security policy. To this end, Ångström and Honig (2012) provide a valuable discussion on how strategic culture and regulatory norms work to shape policymaking and policy in political deliberations.
Scholarly discussions commonly involve the influence of legislative and executive structures, along with their inherent dynamics (Dieterich et al., 2010; Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010; Peters & Wagner, 2011; Österdahl, 2011; Mello & Peters, 2018; Wagner, 2018). Central to their discussions, Dieterich et al. (2010, p. 8) refer to “parliamentary war powers” as “the capabilities of national parliaments to transfer citizens’ war-averse preferences into security policy decisions”. Given the Swedish Riksdag’s institutional influence on debate and the development of security policy regarding the use of military power, they argue, parliament may therefore be considered to wield strong war powers. This institution’s notable influence on security policy can be explained by the dynamics defining relations between the government and the institution, in which consensus, especially in high-stakes cases, is the norm. Here, research commonly emphasizes the complexity of executive-legislative influence on security policymaking (Wagner, 2018).
While there is ample research on high-stakes security policymaking, the literature remains limited when it comes to instances where the level of institutional constraint and geopolitical risk is lower, yet the issues under deliberation are still normatively charged and challenge the norms that define the institution itself. To understand change and continuity in these mid-range security policymaking contexts, it is useful to draw on norm-contestation literature. For instance, a straightforward consideration of traditional right-wing/left-wing perceptions is not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of change and continuity for all levels of national security policymaking (Béland, 2009); rather, the influence of roles assumed by members of parliament and the dynamics informing decision-making within parliaments as institutions play a dominant role in foreign and security policymaking (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010).
Indeed, if party ideology only plays a limited role in strategic culture (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007), an investigation of norms and ideas and of the assumption of roles in the institution is highly relevant, particularly concerning instances of security policymaking conducted at a remove from the pressure of crisis (Raunio & Wagner, 2017). The analysis of mid-range security policymaking requires close attention is paid to the discursive nuances and more subtle displays of inherent dynamics underpinning security policymaking in a parliamentary setting.
As the aim of this study is to elucidate how normative undercurrents shape mid-range national security policy, the field of research investigating ideational change and policymaking is relevant. For instance, Béland (2009) argues that ideas are social assumptions that may become ingrained in the build-up of national security policy; from this position, they may gain the power to both sanction and question existing policies. It seems reasonable then, that ideas expressed in parliamentary deliberations are of equal importance in mid-range policymaking, and conducive to the evolving grammar of national security policy. This suggests that parliamentary deliberations could sustain strategic culture, informing not only how security policy is discussed and debated, but how it is ultimately put into practice (Gray, 1999; 2007; 2010).
Furthermore, the influence from the Riksdag’s institutional praxis is acknowledged in literature as particularly influential for both political discourse and security policymaking (Möller & Bjereld, 2010; Österdahl, 2011; Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström, 2017). Together with arguments put forward by, for example, Dieterich and her colleagues (2010), Österdahl (2011), and Wikman (2021), it appears that the Riksdag, in concert with formalized practices such as the Riksdag Act (Swedish Government, 2014), is powerful enough to influence these underlying mechanics forging the contestation and defence of national security policy. While some point to the role of partisan influence on security policymaking (Oktay, 2018; Sieberer, 2006), such factors may not always be the primary driver – indeed even less so, when a policy decision is relatively uncontroversial ideologically. Swedish military non-alignment could instead be considered a national security policy important enough to have evolved into a national identity, aligning the parliamentarians’ perceptions with this institutionalized idea (Möller & Bjereld, 2010). Furthermore, the country’s principled and ethical approach to global politics is considered resistant to systemic and internal changes (Dahl, 2006; Simons, 2020). In short, it is not unlikely that the ideologies of political parties should be subject to these normative undercurrents. As a highly regulated institution the Riksdag, then, may simultaneously demonstrate internalized and codified norms with the power to shape security policy. For instance, when the strategic environment is more ambiguous, domestic political institutions have increased importance in security policymaking (Baun & Marek, 2019). Bringing this down to the level of individual parliamentarians, these actors operate within this structural context of embedded norms. This interdependency between actor and institution places intentional action and the institutionalized contestation of norms at the very heart of policy change (Panke & Petersohn, 2016). The actors’ persuasive capacities are seen to directly affect both normative change and continuity (Panke & Petersohn, 2016; Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Clearly, norms are sensitive to organizational context (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007; Bloomfield, 2016; Lantis & Wunderlich, 2022). Hence, the significance of the institution as such calls for an analysis that pays attention to institutionalized norms in parliamentary deliberations. There is, undoubtedly, much to be gained by appraising the institution-actor relationship for understanding the way discursive mechanisms are employed by members of parliament in debates and how this is key for understanding national security policy change and stasis in mid-range cases of security policymaking.
In sum, it may be more difficult to determine the significance of strategic culture and norms for national security policy when matters related to threat perception and foreign relations are less clearly defined as this article argues is the case in mid-range policymaking. Moreover, the government in office does not affect the continuity of the country’s strategic culture: transformation, inherently incremental, is further slowed down by popular resistance to change (Gray, 2007). It appears that research falls somewhat short of interpreting and understanding these less dramatic policymaking instances where change and transformation occur gradually. Therefore, investigating role-taking and discursive strategies through norm dynamics may offer a more promising approach for elucidating drivers of policy change and continuity – these underlying and institutional mechanics that shape both parliamentarians’ actions and the policies they make.
Looking for a means to analyze these more subtle interdependencies in the selected material, this study draws on Alan Bloomfield’s (2016) norm dynamics framework as its analytical tool, further discussed below.
Selected Material and Analytical Methodology
To investigate how norm dynamics impact security policy in the Riksdag deliberations during more modest mid-range security policymaking, the study adopts an interpretative approach. The primary material consists of official Riksdag debate transcripts, commission analyses and propositions concerning the PfP programme in 1994 (Swedish Government, 1993), and the HNS agreement in 2016 (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2015a).
This material is selected as the two instances are considered representative of the mid-range security policymaking defined in this study. First, Swedish sovereignty is not restricted, and the propositions do not involve sending Swedish troops to conflict areas abroad – characteristics commonly associated with high-stakes policymaking (Walsh, 2006; Peters & Wagner, 2011; Raunio & Wagner, 2017; Wagner et al., 2017); second, the two propositions do, however, involve extensive bilateral security cooperation and military exercises with NATO member countries on Swedish territory, and thus have significant impact on the implementation of Swedish defence and security policy. Furthermore, the parliamentary deliberations provide interesting examples of how normative undercurrents influence both the parliamentarians’ discursive strategies and the transformation and status quo of national security policy. While this study does not aim to trace a causal path between the two, the PfP programme illustrates how an earlier stage of international defence cooperation helped pave the way for deeper security collaboration reflected in the HNS agreement two decades later.
With this as the contextual background, the analysis focuses primarily on how various discursive strategies, influenced by institutionalized norms relating to the contesting and defending of security policy, are displayed in the role-taking of parliamentarians. There is broad parliamentary unity around the PfP programme; for the HNS agreement, notably less so. Studying these two cases in parallel is valuable not only because both contribute to important shifts in Sweden’s foreign and defence policy and exemplify mid-range security policymaking, but because they both display how underlying mechanics in norm dynamics continue to be instrumental for policy transformation, even in the absence of crisis and war.
To interpret these Riksdag deliberations and understand their implications for policymaking, this study turns to Bloomfield’s (2016) norm-dynamic framework to capture the interplay between role-taking, discursive strategies, and institutional context. The framework is deliberately open-ended, prioritizing analytical exploration over strict categorisation. This allows for a more nuanced analysis of how parliamentarians shift between roles, engage in different rhetorics, and respond to entrenched institutional norms – factors central to understanding why policies evolve or remain unchanged (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007; Panke & Petersohn, 2016; Lantis & Wunderlich, 2022).
While Bloomfield’s (2016) framework facilitates a way to discover nuances and discern subtler shifts, it lacks some conceptual clarity. To ameliorate this, the study draws on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998, p. 891) definition of norms as “standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”. It further acknowledges that norms and practices may become mutually reinforced (Lantis & Wunderlich, 2022), which, in turn, influences how parliamentarians use rhetorics that sustain strategic culture (Gray, 1999), so impacting a country’s security policy. Together, this forms the conceptual foundation for analysing norm entrenchment, the interaction of norms, and the flexibility of norms in security policymaking.
Three dimensions of Bloomfield’s (2016) norm-dynamic framework, outlined below, provide analytical lenses: role-taking in the cohort of parliamentarians; the aims and intentions of parliamentary members; and the institutional context of the Riksdag.
Role-Taking
Bloomfield (2016, p. 319) offers an alternative to the binary division between the ideal types of norm-entrepreneurs, defined as “pure changers”, and norm-antipreneurs, defined as “implacable resisters”. Following his proposal, this analysis focuses more on the roles that actors play than on connecting excerpts to actors. To remain analytically sensitive to the institutional context and entrenched norms in which the roles impact security policy, the analysis traces how actors adopt their roles’ discursive strategies as debates evolve (Bloomfield, 2016, p. 321). The focus is therefore shifted from the actors’ formal positions in the Riksdag or their political party affiliations to the way roles are manifested in the rhetorics employed to support and resist policy change depending on roles’ discursive goals.
Aims and Intentions
In contrast to the more obvious ideological clashes common in high-stakes security policymaking, mid-range deliberations are assumed to feature subtler articulations of policy support or resistance. Bloomfield (2016, p. 319) highlights the importance of actor intentionality in understanding the undercurrents of policymaking and the outcome of policy itself. This aspect in the framework serves as a useful lens for tracing how parliamentarians express aims – both explicitly and implicitly – towards reinforcing, weakening, or reinterpreting national security policy. Through close reading of the selected material, the analysis looks for rhetorical cues such as justifications, appeals to values, and framing of normative stakes.
Institutional Context
Norms operate within institutional contexts, where certain ideas become entrenched through long-standing practices and shared understandings (Bloomfield, 2016, p. 321). Therefore, the analysis examines the interdependency of strategic culture and institutionalized norms and how this shapes the discursive landscape of security policymaking. The analysis identifies and interprets references made in the deliberations to institutional practices, procedural norms, and national identity. These references reveal how institutional context may influence both policy continuity and change, drawing on institutional memory, invoking strategic cultural assumptions, and shaping conditions for either parliamentary consensus or policy dissonance. The analysis also traces how parliamentarians navigate, are constrained by, and seek to influence national security policy within these deeply embedded norms and values.
While this study considers Bloomfield’s (2016) framework promising for capturing discursive strategies and norm dynamics, it is a framework that does not offer much guidance to distinguish between the three dimensions set out above. For the purposes of this analysis, when a quote may reflect more than one, it is associated with the dimension regarded as the most relevant.
The analysis proceeds sequentially, beginning with the 1994 PfP programme and followed by the 2016 HNS agreement. For clarity and coherence, each case is structured in the same way. First, the context of the case is briefly introduced, with excerpts from the Riksdag deliberations illustrating the broader norm dynamics at play. The analysis then focuses on three key dimensions: role-taking, aims and intentions, and institutional context. Each case section concludes with a brief synthesis of key findings. This structure is intended to explicate how normative undercurrents shape this mid-range tier of policymaking and, ultimately, influence national security policy.
Mid-Range Security Policymaking Through a Norm-Dynamic Lens
The Partnership for Peace Deliberations
During the early to mid-1990s, a transformative time for security policy, many states broaden their security concepts (Posen, 2006; Lawler, 2013; Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2016). In this context, the legacy of Sweden’s military non-alignment policy has made Solidarity as a concept synonymous aid programmes and human rights (Swedish Government, 1993). However, entering a new security landscape, old ideas lose ground to extended foreign policy ambitions (Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström, 2017; Thomson & Blagden, 2018). In 1994, very shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Riksdag ratifies NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, initiating a chain of various multinational defence collaborations (Swedish Ministry of Defence, 1999).
The Riksdag deliberations leading up to this ratification largely convey shared political aspirations. This sense of parliamentary uniformity seems to establish a common foundation for parliamentarians who are usually ideological opponents in debates, reflecting scholarly discussions on how fundamental norms are built on beliefs that have profound legitimacy and power, often overruling practices or ideas (March & Olsen, 1998; Bloomfield, 2016; Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Furthermore, strategic concepts and policies may gradually shift from contested ideas to become part of the strategic cultural framework (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Sweden’s self-proclaimed role as a bridge builder between the East and the West (Åselius, 2005) is an example of this. The following statement, leading into the analysis of the Riksdag deliberations on the PfP programme, illustrates how Sweden’s post-Cold War security policy is less a matter of party politics than a constituent of a common strategic identity:
The particular world order of the Cold War is slowly disappearing into the past. A new order is laboriously being formed. … Sweden will be able to participate in close cooperation between East and West, which we all have strived for, and which is now a possibility. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 1)
Role-Taking
Though the Riksdag deliberations principally convey shared views and broad security policy consensus regarding NATO’s PfP programme, there are also clear instances where parliamentarians enact the roles of norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs, thereby actively contesting or defending national security policy through their rhetorical strategies. Following the argument that Sweden’s military non-alignment is a strategic choice (Möller & Bjereld, 2010), it is notable that such a central policy is omitted from the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ opening remarks in the security policy debate. Instead, the minister emphasizes reinforced international cooperation, both regionally and with the European Union, stating the need “to play the role befitting our responsibility and tradition and according to the requirements of a new era” (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 1). Though subtle, this omission, viewed alongside the emphasis on international engagement, aligns with the role of the norm-entrepreneur, opening the floor for further contesting national security policy.
The PfP programme seems to provide an opportunity for norm-entrepreneurs to use their role to promote transatlantic cooperation to advocate a shift in normative priorities. The following statements both signal potential policy trajectories and challenge the entrenched tradition of non-alignment, repositioning Sweden’s security identity. Here, norm-entrepreneurs act on the opportunity offered by the PfP programme to weaken the idea of Sweden’s role as an ideological bridge-builder (Åselius, 2005):
The value of the [PfP] initiative consists not least of the broadly intended European participation. It is also a confirmation of a continued American commitment to European security. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 1)
Sweden’s intention is to utilise the PfP cooperation for developing the collaboration with NATO, with the intention of increasing our own capability and that of other states. (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1994a, Section 4.1.2)
Aims and Intentions
Emphasizing international ties reflects both a desire to align Sweden’s strategic culture with broader international norms and security priorities, and to maximize Sweden’s security – aims informed by a defensive realist theory of foreign policy (Baun & Marek, 2019). This accords with the way smaller states are seen to benefit from multilateral security cooperation (Pedersen, 2023).
The following statements position Sweden as an active participant in European security cooperation, with norm-entrepreneurs highlighting values shared with neighbouring countries, so emphasizing the importance of geography for shaping strategic culture and behaviour (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007). They also serve to reinforce the argument that European cooperation is not only compatible with but instrumental to Sweden’s national security policy. With an emphasis on European security, these statements indicate a shift from a prior Swedish understanding of solidarity, considered synonymous with aid programmes and human rights (Swedish Government, 1993):
The premise of Sweden’s interest is Swedish readiness to contribute to a collective, European security order. Sweden shares the core values expressed by PfP. (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1994a, Section 4.1.2)
It is imperative that we try to establish a coordination of the various patterns that are being constructed for security policy cooperation in Europe. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 22)
To counterbalance these cues, norm-antipreneurs appear to use the changing security situation, instead emphasizing the promises of a peaceful, democratic development in Russia. Ensuing from this, their arguments are about maintaining military détente in the region along with “a need for an all-European cooperation” rather than defence alliances (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 2). Thus, the PfP programme is seen as “a continuation of this common security policy, preventive diplomacy and peace-building” (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 6). Adding cultural and historical characteristics to the PfP programme would be a way for the norm-antipreneurs to shepherd the initiative to become “devoid of characteristics of a relationship between NATO and the Eastern countries. NATO and the West European union are defence pacts of the West, born during the Cold War” (Swedish Government, 1994b, Statement 9).
It is possible to discern a more implicitly reinterpreted security policy in the following statement. By letting a new, key, security concept – cooperation – transcend party politics and overrule earlier political ideologies, it gains a broader impact on security policymaking itself (Lantis, 2002; Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016; Swinkels, 2020) than it would by serving a concept politically tied to any particular ideology:
PfP is a concrete effort of creating cooperation. … This is incredibly important, and therefore the Left Party – maybe surprising to some – supports Sweden’s participation in PfP. (Swedish Government, 1994b, Statement 3)
Institutional Context
When the Riksdag deliberated the PfP programme, the Minister for Foreign Affairs represented a right-wing party, traditionally more supportive of the use of military power (Wagner et al, 2017). The minister’s introductory speech on the country’s security and foreign policy indicates, however, that strategic culture and norms can exert a stronger influence than political party ideology. The minister declares, for example, that “poverty is still getting worse, which places heavy demands on our solidarity” (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 1). Indeed, it is also possible to interpret this statement demonstrating the possibility of concepts such as “poverty” and “solidarity” losing some of their political power (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Rather than signalling party-political alignment, they are embedded into both Sweden’s strategic culture and its self-image as the forerunner of humanitarian aid and egalitarian ideals (Åselius, 2005; Bergman-Rosamund & Agius, 2018).
In the debates, norm-antipreneurs employ consequential reasoning, exemplified by a normative logic (March & Olsen, 1998), and building on the norm-antipreneurs’ preferences for maintaining Swedish security policy associated with conciliatory qualities, where solutions based on prior national security policymaking norms are taken for granted (Dahl, 2006) and become closely linked to Swedish strategic culture. Norm-antipreneurs apply this normative approach to the concepts of peace and stability, thereby putting an influence on the shared perception of how “national security policy” should be defined in public policy:
Peace can never be established with violence. … Therefore, the concept of security itself must change from narrowly meaning the security of nations … to include the security of peoples. Thus, a comprehensive peace policy must be formed. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 33)
This echoes the reigning norm of Sweden as a buffer between East and West (Wivel, 2013). Norm-antipreneurs, for whom a change in national security priorities risks the start of a new Cold War, reiterate Sweden’s military non-alignment and neutrality to counter the perceived security risk, thus simultaneously reinforcing the understanding of the non-alignment policy as derived from certain tacit values. The following statements illustrate the Swedish “harmony-oriented activism” (Dahl, 2006, p. 897) in which a norm-antipreneur ambition is declared to keep foreign and security policy unchanged:
For Sweden, the best way to create security is to maintain its non-alliance and neutrality, and to use this resource when creating relationships with Russia, building on trust and cooperation. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 4)
The classic phrase regarding Swedish neutrality policy is non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war. … Hence, in the past as well as in the future, Sweden sees itself free to take a stand, very actively, in different conflicts. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 24)
Furthermore, these statements point to an interdependence between the nation’s strategic culture, its collective, historical experience, and its security policy (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; March & Olsen, 1998; Gray, 1999; Bloomfield, 2016). As has been argued, while national history does not in itself produce policies, what is considered a policy breach serves to demarcate its normative boundaries (Kier, 1995). Even if these boundaries are porous, the statements demonstrate an important demarcation of how unrestricted or how narrow the definitions of national security policy are.
Lastly, given the overwhelming security policy concordance in the Riksdag, structured around entrenched institutionalized norms, the following norm-entrepreneur statement stands out in stark contrast. It challenges the dominant strategic culture and established national security priorities, thus illustrating how security policy can be pushed to establish new bearings for Swedish security policy, even in the absence of urgent crisis:
Sweden should definitely not be a stranger to a defence cooperation with the EU or NATO. Rather, Sweden should promote such a development. … It is no longer possible to hide behind announcements about non-alliance and neutrality. (Swedish Government, 1994a, Statement 3)
Synthesis of the Partnership for Peace Deliberations
The deliberations themselves seem to emanate from a shared, cultural and normative outlook, even if conceptualized ideas and national security priorities are contested and defended. In the wake of the Cold War, Sweden’s foreign relations in Europe gain importance, apparently creating an opportunity to reconsider, and indeed reinvent, Sweden’s international relations and security coalitions. With few exceptions, norm-entrepreneurs cautiously introduce new ideas, using subtle rhetorical cues rather than overt challenges to introduce changes to the existing policy. Meanwhile, the role of the norm-antipreneurs indicates flexibility, not only defending established norms but reinterpreting them to fit the post-Cold War security environment: Swedish legacy concepts such as “peace,” “solidarity,” and “non-alignment”, are invoked, both for the sake of reaffirming continuity and to adapt their meaning. Political party affiliations alone, that is to say, are insufficient for understanding national security policymaking (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007; Béland, 2009).
Furthermore, underlying intentions can be seen in the way norm-entrepreneurs frame policy change as incremental and pragmatic, avoiding direct confrontation with entrenched, institutionalized norms. In contrast, norm-antipreneurs anchor their arguments in long-standing national values to safeguard some form of status quo. However, even in these defensive stances, policy is quietly reshaped to fit the post-Cold War context.
Lastly, the institutional context – Sweden’s strategic culture, its tradition of military non-alignment, and a deeply ingrained parliamentary consensus norm – limits how far security policy can shift. The enduring strength of these norms makes contesting the prevailing security policy an uphill battle. Change is possible, but only through discursive strategies that carefully navigate the boundaries set by institutional memory, history, and national identity (Gray, 2007). The PfP programme thus emerges as a point of entry for norm-entrepreneurs to test new security policy norms and to contest old security priorities, initiating a normative move towards a tighter security collaboration with NATO, explicitly aiming to join the alliance. To avoid policy change, norm-antipreneurs reinterpret established policy norms and redefine core concepts belonging to the prevailing national security policy. For instance, Swedish legacy concepts of “peace”, “solidarity”, and “non-alignment” are used both to reinforce normative strongholds and to reinvent them by supplementing them with new values. In sum, with minor but important adjustments, the core principals of the reigning national security policy persist.
The Host Nation Support Deliberations
Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014 marks a crisis that challenges security policies throughout Europe: here, Cold War threats resurface alongside international terrorism, adding new challenges to national security policymaking (Thomson & Blagden, 2018). As a response to this, the EU and the Nordic countries become prominent topics in Swedish political debates (Swedish Government, 2016a, 2016b; Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2016). Moreover, since joining the PfP programme, the idea of solidarity is gradually associated with security and defence cooperation (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2015; Swedish Government, 2016a) than with poverty in third world countries (Swedish Government, 1993). Passing the HNS agreement and its memorandum of understanding brings about significant impact in its direct contribution to the Armed Forces’ capability development in infrastructure and logistics (Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2019). It also enhances the organization’s capacity to both receive and provide military support between Sweden and other countries (Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2014, p. 25). By 2016, however, the Swedish Armed Forces have simultaneously undergone significant budgetary cutbacks and been assigned the task of prioritizing expeditionary forces in international operations (Åselius, 2005; Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2016; Friede, 2022). Further complicating Swedish security policymaking, an armed attack against Sweden is still considered unlikely (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2015), despite the deteriorating security situation in Sweden’s vicinity leading up to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine in 2014.
Notwithstanding that “our world is marked by aggression and division”, the Foreign Minister clearly states that military non-alignment remains the national security policy that “contributes to regional stability and security in Northern Europe” (Swedish Government, 2016a Statement 1). Clearly, core national security policies and values are not easily shifted. Compared to the minister’s statements, the Defence Commission’s report comes across as incongruous, concluding that the Armed Forces’ capabilities require improvement – in part through the ability to both receive and provide military support to other countries. The Commission proposes that the HNS bilateral agreement with NATO meet this requirement (Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2014). As such, the agreement is presented as a complement to the existing multilateral PfP programme rather than a new initiative (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2015a). It is not unlikely that this functions to mitigate the risk of parliamentary opposition, which would challenge the strong tradition of consensus in the Riksdag, in turn jeopardizing any policy changes. The analysis of the Riksdag deliberations on the HNS agreement that follows illustrates how security policy in this complex political situation is contested, defended, and reinterpreted.
Role-Taking
The “parliamentary peace” that characterized the Riksdag deliberations on the PfP programme appears to have given way to overt dissension in the HNS debate, where two fundamentally conflicting roles emerge shaped by divergent threat perceptions and strategic visions. On one side, norm-entrepreneurs adopt an openly critical stance in the Defence Commission’s report, positioning themselves in the role of challengers (Bloomfield, 2016, p. 311), highlighting perceived weaknesses and seeking to reframe Sweden’s international cooperation in light of shifting geopolitical realities:
The government and their coalition parties have not agreed to anything else than a general, security policy analysis on pros and cons regarding Sweden’s international cooperation. … The People’s Party regret the debility and lack of realistic insight which is characteristic of the coalition’s security policy conclusions. (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2015, p. 29)
Opposing them, norm-antipreneurs reinforce the role of status quo defenders (Bloomfield, 2016, p. 311), expressing concerns rooted in values, national identity, and strategic caution. Their choice of discursive strategies reflects an emphasis on military non-alliance and normative commitments, echoing arguments from the 1994 PfP debate while staying clear of any great power competition (Kennedy & Schmitt, 2020). Both excerpts illustrate a norm-antipreneur standpoint that seeks to defend security policy status quo. This is expressed in the quotes below, excerpted from a cross-party report and a debate in the Riksdag.
The Host Nation Support reduces the credibility of our military non-alliance and provides no guarantees for increased military security for Sweden. (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2016, p.13)
Is Sweden going to follow a consistent and brave foreign policy, founded on explicit values, or is this going to be a country which becomes quiet … and which compromises its values? (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 71)
Given the entrenched norm of consensus in Swedish security policymaking (Wikman, 2021; Drent & Meijnders, 2015), it is unsurprising that norm-entrepreneurs adopt a discursive role that avoids overt confrontation. Rather than framing the HNS agreement as a major shift, they downplay its novelty and rely on gentle nudges rather than forceful bashing. The following debate statements reflect this:
The HNS … is nothing new. It’s been in reports a long time. Sweden is now writing an agreement with NATO, which is about managing nation support when military personnel come here for exercises. (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 20)
Swedish security policy is based on solidarity … within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, paragraph 42.7. To realise this, Sweden needs to have the capability to provide and receive civilian and military support. (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 62)
New or emerging norms are commonly questioned (Panke & Petersohn, 2016). In this context, advocating for moderate adjustments to policy is a discursive strategy that seeks to avoid triggering resistance from norm-antipreneurs that would counteract policy change. A more forceful approach could provoke backlash and mobilize defenders of the status quo (Bloomfield, 2016). By framing the HNS agreement as a continuation of existing commitments rather than a policy leap, norm-entrepreneurs carefully adjust their role to reduce opposition and avoid political failure (Walsh, 2006; Béland, 2009).
Aims and Intentions
The pronounced political discord surrounding the HNS agreement is key to understanding the competing perspectives and the motivations behind both the push for change and the defence of existing security policy. This normative conflict reveals a deeper ideational divide, a kind of “incompatible-ness”, in which the rival actors have fundamentally conflicting viewpoints (Bloomfield, 2016, p. 319), making it difficult for Swedish policymakers to discern a clear path forward in matters of security. In this geopolitically complex setting, security policy transformation is reached by a more indirect approach by norm-entrepreneurs. They seek legitimacy by aligning their arguments with the evolving security environment, often invoking international norms and EU-based rationales (Matlary, 2006; Heller & Kahl, 2013; Csernatoni, 2022).
A notable strand of their rhetoric aligns with the intentions of maximizing security through international security cooperation (Baun & Marek, 2019). Norm-entrepreneurs emphasize the need for strengthened national security as a response to Sweden’s uncertain geopolitical position. Hence, they use the ambiguity of the regional security situation, which offers a more permissive political context than immediate crisis (Baun & Marek, 2019), to justify closer cooperation with NATO – including the prospect of membership – as a necessary step to reinforce both national and regional defence.
We welcome the host nation support agreement with NATO as a part of our collective capability. … Madame Speaker! Today, we can see an increasingly aggressive, revengeful, and nationalistic Russia. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 66)
To meet increasing uncertainties, Sweden must cooperate more with other countries. … The aim of the current host nation support agreement with NATO is to build security together with others. (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 29)
The norm-entrepreneurs do not seem to promote a radical policy shift but to justify change as a cautious but necessary reaction to evolving threats (Pedersen, 2023). This strategy offers a practical rationale for reconsidering Sweden’s policy of military non-alignment:
It’s impossible to disregard NATO as the key actor for security and stability in our part of the world. Therefore, I still call for concrete arguments for not even being willing to brave the discussion [of a NATO membership]. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 5)
Norm-entrepreneurs also point to the risks of not joining NATO, arguing that it means “inviting the thief to come in” (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 49). Once again, it is not only Sweden that is being threatened but the entire region:
Our neighbours – all but Finland – are NATO members. They regard Sweden as the weak link, devoid of thresholds, constituting a threat to their security. (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 47)
We want to provide security to the Baltic states. … We do that by applying for NATO membership, not by non-alliance. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 13)
Working to counterbalance these changes, norm-antipreneurs shape their rhetorical choices to assert self-determination and control. This is an interesting aspect of the more subtle strategies to resist security policy change. Establishing this sense of autonomy for norm-antipreneurs can, indeed, become a goal in itself: rather than rejecting change outright, norm-antipreneurs seek to redefine or adjust national security policy in ways that preserve alignment with institutionalized and culturally familiar core values. This makes the policy more defensible in future debates, as it remains anchored in established normative frameworks. Instead of formulating arguments that would also have to work for yet-unknown issues in much later security policy debates, norm-antipreneurs create a new threshold for future debates (Bloomfield, 2016):
There are plenty more keys on the piano to play, and tools in the toolbox to use, than military support to provide help and support, and so on. The debate is one-sided. (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 50)
Sweden’s task in the world is to contribute to and enhance positive development. We can and we will do this using our military non-alliance as a point of departure, our centennial tradition of democracy, enjoying 200 years of peace and having 250 years of freedom of the press. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 98)
We can never become a military superpower, and there is little use in becoming a minor cog in another military superpower’s machinery. We are going to become a superpower of peace. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 132)
Institutional Context
The HNS agreement constitutes a formal, binding instrument for Sweden that contributes to shaping security policy (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2015a; Lantis & Wunderlich, 2022). Yet, for such a transformation to occur, political support is key (Gray, 2010), particularly broad backing across party lines (Sieberer, 2006; Gray, 2010). In this context, the influence of political backbenchers can be instrumental for accomplishing normative change (Petersen, 1988). For norm-entrepreneurs, securing this broad parliamentary support is therefore essential.
This need for support makes it crucial to navigate within, rather than against, prevailing institutional expectations. In this context, the institutionalized norms of the Riksdag, together with Sweden’s embedded strategic culture, remain as influential during the HNS deliberations as they were during the PfP debate. Norm-entrepreneurs appear acutely aware of this, strategically adjusting their role and their discourse, to find ways to “poke” security policy to transform without having to justify an entirely new position, risking too much of an opposition thereby going against the entrenched norm in the Riksdag and losing support from backbenchers.
This subtle discursive strategy aligns with the dynamic and competitive relationship between norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs (Bloomfield, 2016; Raunio & Wagner, 2017). This would mean that there are circumstances when institutionalized norms have greater leverage on national security interests than party ideology. It seems that the practice of parliamentary peace and the consensus norm in the Riksdag regarding Swedish security policymaking illustrates the power of this normative leverage, a key feature also in high-stakes security policymaking (Dieterich et al., 2010; Österdahl, 2011; Wikman, 2021).
Interestingly, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, while highly geopolitically consequent, does not lead to any major changes in Swedish security policy. Instead, core security policy norms remain. This may reflect the way ambiguous inter-state relations and unclear threat perceptions may diminish the power of an institutionalized norm of consensus. More pronounced dynamics in the executive-legislative relationship may therefore be permitted as international complexity increases (Raunio & Wagner, 2017; Baun & Marek, 2019). Hence, the HNS debate is marked by this institutional flux.
Norm-entrepreneurs readily seize this opportunity, and the security policy is pushed to change:
Mister Speaker! As an organization, NATO is essential to European security. Our security policy is practically dependent on NATO for providing and receiving help in the event of war in our vicinity. … For us, the question isn’t if Sweden will be a member, but how.1 (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 27)
In contrast, policy status quo relies on the way norm-antipreneurs are anchored in the combined impact of the consensus culture in Swedish security policy (Drent & Meijnders, 2015; Wikman, 2021), the long lineage of military non-alignment, and the value-based foreign and security policy, collectively reflected in Swedish strategic culture. Accordingly, norm-antipreneurs ground their arguments in the Riksdag’s own institutional practices.
Research on parliamentary democracies highlights how institutionalized norms shape collective behaviour and expectations (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010; Peters & Wagner, 2011; Panke & Petersohn, 2016; Wagner, 2018). As Gray (2010) argues, institutions (the Riksdag among them) can contrive security strategies out of their own inherent culture, practice, and norms. Speaking to this, the sheer weight of institutionalized norms, formed of an amalgamation of standardized knowledge, practices and setups (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016), could become robust enough to withstand any significant changes to security policy. This is true to an even greater extent if a norm goes from being institutionalized to becoming entrenched (Bloomfield, 2016). Thus, when the norm-entrepreneurs go against this culturally expected behaviour, entrenched values and norms form a departure point for defending the status quo; of the following statements, the first even drawing a round of spontaneous applause:
It’s important that security policy doesn’t wobble and that new messages where we’re headed are not communicated haphazardly. I think we should stick together. I wish I could see that behaviour in the Moderate Party, as well. [Followed by applause]. (Swedish Government, 2016a, Statement 4)
There is no comprehensive investigation or analysis about the agreement’s actual connotations for Sweden’s non-alliance. Despite its significance, the Host Nation Support wasn’t preceded by a broad debate. (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2016, p. 12)
The Swedish approximation to NATO is characterized by gradual slips and sly changes without proper debate. (Swedish Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 2015, p. 27)
Synthesis of the Host Nation Support Deliberations
The HNS deliberations in the Riksdag show pronounced discordance regarding threat perceptions between norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs. In this division of ideas and perceptions, justification for policy change is sought in arguments based on bilateral security cooperation (Baun & Marek, 2019; Pedersen, 2023). In more confrontational rhetoric, however, the HNS agreement is employed to put Swedish NATO membership on the parliamentary agenda – something which would, indeed, require an about-turn for Swedish security policy.
Norm-entrepreneurs also employ a less assertive strategy to downplay the impact of the HNS agreement, seeking both political acceptance for the agreement and broader parliamentary support. Furthermore, the use of the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clause (Swedish Government, 2016b, Statement 62) launches the agreement as a pivotal step towards both national and regional safety reflecting the rationale of defensive realism (Baun & Marek, 2019). Meanwhile, resisting policy change, the norm-entrepreneurs’ breach of institutionalized norms is exploited by norm-antipreneurs. In this way, institutionalized norms and practices are reinforced and entrenched, effectively limiting the normative boundaries of security policy transformation.
It is also interesting to note that norm-antipreneurs reframe Swedish security concepts to align with strategic cultural ideas and to maintain a degree of control over future security policy debates. This effort contributes – perhaps counterintuitively – to transform national security policy (Martill & Gebhard, 2022). This suggests that the norm-antipreneurs’ ultimate goal may not be the preservation of an unyielding status quo. In fact, given the likelihood of future normative contestation, defining Swedish security policy too rigidly may become strategically undesirable, even for those seeking continuity.
Conclusion
Passing the PfP programme and the HNS agreement in the Riksdag had a significant, practical impact on foreign relations and military capability (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1994b; Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2014; Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2015b). Although they have not yet attracted the same scholarly attention as high-stakes security policymaking, studying these more incremental and modest mid-range cases illustrates how interdependencies in norm dynamics shape national security policy, offering deeper insight into their impact. Using empirical material from the two specific, relevant, cases of Swedish Riksdag deliberations, this study has analysed the interplay of strategic culture, institutionalized norms, and parliamentary discourse informing these deliberations, indicating how they outweigh party politics.
While Bloomfield’s (2016) framework provides valuable insights and has proven applicable in this study, its blurred conceptual boundaries may also limit analytical precision to elucidate norm dynamics and to show the impact of such dynamics. That said, the study has shown how parliamentarians navigate these norm-dynamics, using the roles of norm-entrepreuner and norm-antipreneur to suit their intentions for contesting or defending policy positions.
It has further demonstrated how both more forceful and more subtle rhetorics are applied as discursive strategies.
The article concludes that analysing norm-dynamics through actor roles and intentions provides a more nuanced understanding of security policy change and stasis. Mid-range security policymaking events, though often overlooked, hold rich empirical value for understanding how security policies evolve in democratic systems.
It bears mentioning that the findings in this study are limited. Extending future analyses to politically similar contexts, such as other Scandinavian or European parliamentary democracies, would shed further light on this layer of security policymaking. As an example, incorporating a longitudinal perspective, researchers could also trace how such policymaking evolves over time to explicate its influence on broader strategic shifts and its impact on a country’s foreign relations and defence forces.
Notes
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Editorial team and the two anonymous reviewers for their detailed, perceptive, and critical feedback, which greatly enhanced the analytical clarity of this article.
Competing Interests
The author has no competing interests to declare.