Supply Chain Resilience – An Empirical Exploration of Barriers and Enablers in Military Settings

Operational Requirements on Military Logistics

The term “logistics” originates in the military (Rutner, Aviles & Cox, 2012). Military logistics operates at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in peace, mobilization and war (Kress, 2002, p. 17; McGinnis, 1992). In peace, military logistics support the generation of potential force through activities such as training and exercises; in operations and in war, logistics support the use of force itself (Davids, Beeres & van Fenema, 2013). Defence supply chains must be able to support all these activities, in different levels of conflict, with the ability to switch between them quickly (Sharma & Kulkarni, 2016). Leanness and efficiency are important requirements for defence supply chains in peace; in war, the chief requirements are agility and effectiveness (Ekström, Hilletofth & Skoglund, 2020; Kovács & Tatham, 2009). Armed forces must design their supply chains accordingly.

In peace, armed forces must weigh motivated cost-efficiency initiatives against undiscriminating cost-reductions (Eccles, 1959, pp. 320–321), and balance operational risk-taking and efficiency (Moore, 2000, p. 947). However, armed forces are not profit-maximising organizations like commercial companies (Wilhite et al., 2013). In war, they must achieve successful operational outcomes, not successful financial outcomes (Yoho, Rietjens & Tatham, 2013), in an environment where supply chains are likely targets (Glas, Hofmann & Eßig, 2013). The Russian war in Ukraine demonstrates that modern warfare extends beyond military units and their supply chains, and that adversaries target critical infrastructure and civilian facilities (Ekström, Listou & Hannenko, 2023; Skoglund, Listou & Ekström, 2022). Furthermore, for defence supply chains, war is not a disruption of operations as it is for commercial supply chains; rather, as their very purpose is to support the use of military force in operations (Davids, Beeres & van Fenema, 2013), war is what defence supply chains are specifically designed for (Martel et al., 2013).

Military logistics are crucial in deciding the success or failure of operations (Erbel & Kinsey, 2018). The purpose of logistics is to create and maintain the readiness, sustainability, and mobility required of military units (Swedish Armed Forces, 2023, p. 13). Readiness is divided into operational and mobilization readiness (Betts, 1995, p. 216), or availability and preparedness. In peace, the defence supply chain must ensure that military units have sufficient supplies to fulfil requirements of a state of readiness; in war, logistics must deliver supplies to meet the necessities of sustainability and mobility (Ekström, 2020, pp. 28–30). For sustainability and mobility, especially, military logistics are dependent on the resilience of commercial supply chains and critical infrastructure. In peacetime, military logistics should align with national security policies and the contingencies governments prepare for (Erbel & Kinsey, 2018). But governments may not provide the required financing, especially if they assume that they can capitalize on a peace dividend (Humphries & Wilding, 2001).

While readiness, sustainability, and mobility are essential operational requirements for military logistics, many Western countries separate procurement from operations. Defence procurement agencies (DPAs) handle acquisitions, while defence logistics organizations (DLOs) manage logistics. This division creates tension, as issues are often “thrown over the wall” from the DPA to the DLO, driven by the DPA’s mandate to prioritize cost-effectiveness while leaving ownership challenges to the DLO (Kincaid, 2002, pp. 14–15). The problem was accentuated in Europe with the advent of the European Union law on public procurement, and for most Western countries with the enforced savings after the Cold War. Operational requirements do not necessarily dictate procurement.

Constructs in Supply Chain Resilience Theory

Research in supply chain resilience has been unable to delimit its domain from supply chain risk management. In line with several researchers (Altay & Pal, 2023; Dolgui & Ivanov, 2021; Macdonald & Corsi, 2013; Sawik, 2017), this paper considers SCRES to be distinctly different from SCRM, an aspect of supply chain disruption management (SCDM).

SCRES is often conflated with supply chain robustness. In this paper, in line with Mackay, Munoz & Pepper (2020), resilience and robustness are considered different properties of a supply chain. As defined by Brandon-Jones et al. (2014), SCRES is “the ability of a supply chain to return to normal operating performance, within an acceptable period of time, after being disturbed”; supply chain robustness describes “the ability of the supply chain to maintain its function despite internal or external disruptions.”

In line with Davis-Sramek & Richey (2021), this paper advocates the idea that resilience implies both “bouncing back” to the initial state (remaining the same) and “bouncing forward” to a more desirable state (becoming better); this is in line with the stability-based view and the adaptation-based view of SCRES, respectively (Ivanov, 2024), or the engineering perspective and the social-ecological perspective on resilience (Wieland & Durach, 2021). This paper subscribes to the notion that disruptions should be divided into pre-disruption (preparation, planning), during disruption (response, resistance), and post-disruption (recovery, adaptation, growth) phases (Shishodia et al., 2023). The paper also follows the categorization of SCRES strategies as proactive, concurrent, and reactive (Ali, Mahfouz & Arisha, 2017). Figure 1 summarizes the stands taken by the study.

Figure 1

Flexibility, redundancy, agility, and collaboration are the four most frequently suggested strategies for SCRES (Shekarian & Mellat Parast, 2021). Tactics in redundancy include having multiple suppliers, safety stock, overcapacity, and back-up suppliers, whereas tactics in flexibility include having alternative transportation routes and modes, and rerouting strategies (Kamalahmadi, Shekarian & Mellat Parast, 2021; Katsaliaki, Galetsi & Kumar, 2022; Maharjan & Kato, 2022). Following Shekarian and Mellat Parast (2021), this paper uses the following definitions:

• Flexibility: “the ability to respond to long-term or fundamental changes in the supply chain and market environment by adjusting the configuration of the supply chain.”

• Redundancy: involving “the strategic and selective use of spare capacity and inventory that can be invoked to cope with a crisis, such as demand surges or supply shortages.”

• Agility: “the ability to efficiently change operating states as a response to environmental uncertainty or volatile market conditions.”

• Collaboration: “the ability to work efficiently with other entities for mutual benefit in areas such as forecasting, postponement, and risk sharing.”

Barriers Related to the Transformation of Armed Forces

The transformation of armed forces is a key area of concern (S1; S2; M2; M7; L1; L3). A cluster analysis identified five aspects of this transformation: (a) changing objectives, shifting from participation in peace support operations (PSOs) to territorial defence; (b) changing constraints, moving from a focus on efficiency to resilience; (c) changing responsibilities, transitioning from reliance on commercial companies to self-sufficiency; (d) competence-related challenges; and (e) technological advancements (see Figure 2).

Interviewee S1 noted that changes in the geopolitical context have prompted many governments to refocus, shifting their objectives from PSOs to territorial defence. For armed forces, this shift entails a renewed emphasis on meeting operational requirements. After a prolonged period of cost-efficiency thinking and shrinking budgets, stated interviewee M1, many armed forces are now prioritizing fundamental needs, such as increasing inventory levels to ensure availability and preparedness, rather than addressing broader concerns like SCRES for long-term sustainability and mobility (S2, S3). Consequently, armed forces are in the early stages of this transformation.

Support for Ukraine is also a key driver, as supplies provided to Ukraine must now be replaced (M4), leading to a “stampede to restock simultaneously” (S4). Additionally, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the reality that ammunition consumption remains high in modern warfare. As a result, many armed forces are procuring ammunition in large quantities to assure availability and preparedness (M2).

As part of the transformation, armed forces are changing from focusing on cost-efficiency to focusing on resilience, which involves changing constraints. According to interviewee M5, both the political and the military-strategic level are now demanding resilient supply chains – but “what does resiliency mean?”, and “resilient to what?” (M4). “The problem with disruptions is that you can only prove your concept ex post the event” (M2). “It’s not about waiting for black swan events” (M7). “By definition, it’s something you can’t see coming” (L1). Further, “you can never predict exactly what will happen, but you can predict general trends, or the types of potential risk” (M4). Some nations started thinking about supply chain risk and reliability a few years ago, because of their participation in PSOs, but mostly regarding “the last mile”, not global supply chains (M1). Now re-orienting towards availability and preparedness, they realise that things are not going as smoothly as anticipated, since “we have been saving on those aspects of logistics solutions for so many years” (S2), and while military units receive their supplies, it is “late and in a non-transparent way” (M2). “Do I think that everyone is on the same page about what we need to do? No, it’s something that we’re trying to work on”, interviewee M8 said. Identifying that there is a problem is the first step – “then collaboration and discussion” (L3).

For a long period following the end of the Cold War, responsibilities for military logistics were largely handed over to the private sector. This is now slowly changing. But armed forces are still dependent on cost-efficient, global, commercial companies which “try to optimize their own supply chain, whereas the defence has to optimize in a way that optimizes the safety and security of the nation” (S3). Most interviewees agree that they have insufficient knowledge regarding what lies upstream in the commercial supply chains. However, in some countries, this is also changing:

The previously held belief that the military could transfer risk to companies is now challenged: “If that risk crystallises, it’s still ours” (M4). Another interviewee from the “Medium”-spending group stated: “I think it has taken time to work on identifying what some of the challenges are and what some of the focus areas should be” (M8), while an interviewee from the “Small”-spending group asked: “What is most urgent?” (S1).

There is a belief that the major challenges are upstream in the commercial supply chain (M1), and the key is to “determine where the biggest vulnerability of our suppliers is and for what reason” (L3). The two systems, commercial and military supply chains, are interconnected, an area “where we have to put a lot of effort” (M1). The next five years will be a time “to learn about, develop, and to establish contingency plans” (S1), because currently, “disruptions over a certain degree are going to be difficult to handle” (S2). Global disruption scenarios are, however, not defence-specific but general (M1).

Two important aspects of the transformation not elaborated on by the interviewees relate to competence and technology. The workforce required for building resilience in territorial defence requires a different set of knowledge and skills to that required to implement cost-efficient PSOs. This in an issue that remains to be fully addressed (S2; S3; M6; M7; M8). Regarding technology, meanwhile, ageing equipment, including the obsolescence of spare parts, is a matter affecting resilience closely (M2). Another issue relates to levels of technology. Western countries have been focusing on expensive high-tech solutions, in limited numbers, which may not be optimal for territorial defence, considering the lessons to be learned from the war in Ukraine (S2).

Barriers Related to the Governance of Armed Forces

Many of the barriers to enhanced resilience addressed by the interviewees relate to the governance of armed forces. The cluster analysis categorized these barriers into five areas: (a) bureaucracy, (b) financing, (c) organisation, (d) legislation, and (e) culture (see Figure 2).

Several interviewees regard internal bureaucracy in the public defence sector as a major impediment for the deepening of resilience (S1; S2; S3; M1; M8; L1). This includes the lack of a holistic perspective on resilience, “the interrelations between the different decisions” (M1), and the division of responsibilities, or fragmentation of decision-making, between the political level and the military, between the DPA and DLO, and between the different branches of the armed forces. These different responsibilities must be aligned to enable increased resilience (S2; S3; M1; M2) – but “there is no central staff for resilience in supply chains” (M2). What is required is “an integrated decision-making system” (M1), and “a plea would be to bring resilience, by far more, into your procurement decision” (M2). One aspect of the problem is that “information is polished, so the details disappear in communication upwards in the system” (S3).

Money is a prerequisite for heightened resilience – but “how do we really pinpoint stuff that has real military value in a space where there’s a million things that can go wrong?” asked the interviewee L3. Another, L4, questioned the specific benefits of investing in resilience, and where such investments might be best made. The absence of sufficient funding, meanwhile, was highlighted by several interviewees as a significant impediment to enhanced resilience (S2; S3; L3; M2; M4; M5; M8). Even before the Russian war in Ukraine, the issue of rising costs for raw materials, components, subsystems, logistics, and wages, were high on the agenda for armed forces (M8). Inflation since then has only exacerbated this problem; now supply chains must be resilient, thus driving cost even more.

While money is also essential if global companies are to be persuaded to invest in resilience beyond base commercial motivations (M8), there is an emerging discussion regarding “whether we really need to focus on a lean supply chain”, or if “thinking about national security issues” should be higher on the agenda, “even if we may not be able to get the products as cheaply” (L1). Is a strategic raw material stock necessary? And if it is, “who has the means, the resources, to afford war material stocks?” (M2). We may have to accept paying more (M1) – and “the main question is, how much money you are willing to spend on the problem?” (L3).

The current organizational structure is seen by many interviewees as a barrier to the enhancement of resilience (S1; S2; S3; M1; M8; L1). Several interviewees divide the defence supply chain into internal (the military part) and external (the commercial part), or logistical and contractual. In many countries, procurement is performed by a defence procurement agency (DPA), and logistics operations are performed by a defence logistics agency (DLO). This division is seen as problematic by several interviewees. Military personnel at the DLO are responsible for the military part of the supply chain, while civilians at the DPA are responsible for the relations with external suppliers – the commercial part of the supply chain. The DPA makes the contract and the DLO does the physical transportation, but “the link is missing” (M1).

Contemporary interpretation of procurement legislation is seen by some European interviewees as an important barrier to enhancing resilience (S1). Security of supply is the domain of the DPA, which in Europe is restricted by regulations and legislation derived from the European Union law on public procurement, including specific procurement rules for the defence and security sectors (M1). For European countries, the rigid interpretation of procurement legislation has led to short-term contracts with arms-length relations with suppliers. In theory, contracts should, according to the legislation, be based on “best-value-for-money”, including resilience and security of supply; while this “could be an award-criteria”, in practice the interpretation is “value-for-money”, construed as lowest cost (M1).

The inertia in large organisations regarding change is a barrier to building resilience, and several interviewees see the institutional culture as a barrier when it comes to refocussing the armed forces (S1; S2; S3; M1; M8; L1).

Barriers Related to the Defence Marketplace

The cluster analysis divided issues related to the defence marketplace into seven barriers: (a) supplies of raw materials and critical components; (b) oligopoly; (c) opacity of supply chains; (d) contracts, (e) limited production capacities; (f) lack of trust, (g) dependence on functioning critical infrastructure; and (h) the information domain (Figure 2).

The means by which supplies are to be acquired is a general concern for many of the interviewees. As for replenishment of missiles as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, the initial debate among NATO countries was that, “we’re fine, because we all buy different missiles from different manufacturers” but when you start following the supply chains, you realise that there may only be one or two suppliers of critical products, and they are the same for all supply chains – which is “where the bottlenecks are in the supply chain” (M4). The dependency on global supply chains, with components from a small number of suppliers and raw materials such as rare earth metals from a comparably small number of nations, is a concern shared by several interviewees (as interviewee L4 stated: “I am always concerned when there is a sole source of something”; the “availability of rare earth metals is a huge concern for the Department of Defense”). Another concern is the availability of microchips, where many defence supply chains are ultimately dependent on a few manufacturers in Asia, often single sourcing (M2). “When it comes to sort of political stability in natural disasters and things, it’s an issue that’s not been addressed” (M7). But this is an issue of the utmost importance: “Is it wise for Western Europe and the U.S. to have 70% of chip manufacturing in Taiwan given what we’re concerned about?” (L1). However, instituting a full-spectrum manufacturing capability is something that even medium-sized countries find too expensive (M7). The key is to “determine where the biggest vulnerability of our suppliers is and for what reason” (L3).

The defence marketplace is dominated by a sufficiently small number of global companies to constitute an oligopoly (M7). Even medium-sized countries realise that they are buying at such a small scale that it is not justifiable for the suppliers to take resilience into consideration (M1; M5). Noting the perceived relative strength of buyers versus suppliers, interviewees said: “It is tough, because we’re dealing with really big companies, global companies” (M7); “We are too small” (M1); “We are a small fish in the pond” (M6). Being small is also problematic when it comes to ordering spare parts for ageing military equipment (M2). Obsolescence is a major problem.

A major concern lies in the opacity of the external part of the supply chain: there is a dependency on global commercial supply chains, considered by one interviewee to be anorexic (S1), by another to be a source of anxiety as potentially subject to major disruption somewhere in the world (S2), and as subject to a lack of information-sharing between the military and the companies (M2). Associated to that is the concern, according to interviewee M1, that “we often do not have a clue which supply chain is behind the OEM” (original equipment manufacturer), which means a lack of knowledge of the upstream part of the supply chain (M1; M4) even though OEMs are sometimes given responsibilities regarding obsolescence and availability (M2).

The complexity of global supply chains is a major barrier: “At the core, it’s an epistemic problem, the knowing what it looks like and how to find out what it looks like and mapping it. This is really complicated for many of the prime contractors” (M7). In addition, the supply chains are, in fact, evolving supply networks; while it is not possible to control the lower tier suppliers, “understanding that your network is going to change is key” (L1). Since it may prove impossible to know everything about the global network of suppliers, it is crucial to ask the right questions, to unearth the relevant information, and share responsibilities for dealing with issues between suppliers and the government (L3).

The lack of knowledge regarding participating companies and countries in the supply chain includes a concern regarding this lack of knowledge, especially when something like the obstruction caused by the Ever Given in the Suez Canal occurs (S2; M7); as interviewee M7 said, “disruptions have added to the massive lead times that everyone is worried about.” Such “force majeure events, external environmental crises, disruptions … occur less often but have a very high impact on how we can operate” (M2). Interviewee M5 stated: “We don’t know what we don’t know but hopefully thinking about risks more will make us better at dealing with risks when they do arise” – although, as interviewee M4 stated, “I don’t think we really thought that through in a systemic way.” This was similarly true for an interviewee from the “Small” cohort, who stated: “I think that we do not learn those things before we are knee-deep into it” (S2).

Some countries use standards for contracts (M2; M7) to force suppliers “to guarantee that they are able to supply” (M1). Although these contracts are also supposed to force companies to “declare your supply chain down to tier four … it requires a lot of work”, and industry isn’t happy “because they have less control of their tier threes and fours” (M7); in fact, they “might not know what’s going on with lower tier suppliers”, since “it’s really hard”, even “almost impossible” (L1). In addition, “to contract something and to bring it to life are two different things” (M2). Furthermore, it will cost money, and suppliers may be reluctant – increased costs can affect their competitiveness towards other customers who may not be focusing on resilience (L3).

Another barrier is the realisation that manufacturing capacities in the supply chains act to limit the strengthening of resilience at speed (M2; L4). This goes against the prevailing idea “that the capacity of supply chains can be completely switched on and off” (M4).

Collaboration enhances resilience across the board. However, and associated with collaboration, the issue of trust was highlighted as a barrier by several interviewees. One aspect of the dependency on commercial companies is that armed forces have “put a lot of trust in our major suppliers and companies to do all that work for us” (M5). The level of trust among organizations in the supply chain continues to be a key element (L4).

Another consideration regarding barriers to resilience is the dependency on critical infrastructure – fuel distribution and information handling systems in an electrical blackout, for example (S1). In addition to the dependency on commercial supply chains, the dependency on critical infrastructure has not been adequately discussed (S2; M8). Russia is currently attacking these kinds of targets in Ukraine, although, as interviewee M8 stated, “with the geopolitical challenges that we’ve seen more recently, no one was prepared for all the supplies out of Ukraine to be challenged” (M8).

The information domain, and its vulnerabilities, is an area of particular concern to some interviewees: “The thing I’m scared about most is all the cyberattacks”, stated interviewee L4. Military capability to handle “a computer system breakdown, when all digital information is lost” cannot be taken for granted (S1).

Generic Enablers to Enhance Resilience in Defence Supply Chains

Regarding generic enablers (Figure 2) for the enhancement of defence SCRES, redundancy, flexibility, agility, and collaboration are the most frequently discussed in the literature; learning, also, is often considered important. While the study decided against explicitly including this terminology in the interview protocol, the interviewees cited all of them, although their interpretations are not consistent with common definitions.

A very common way of dealing with disruptions in the military is to buy and store supplies pre-stored and pre-positioned in a fashion related to operational planning (S1; S4; M1). This example of redundancy is also one of the most frequent tactics used in commercial supply chains to aid resilience. A supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link – bottlenecks, for instance, “weaker points” which (as interviewee L4 pointed out) will be specifically subject to attacks. Some of the interviewees see the supply chain not as a chain, however, but rather “a complex network, that kind of, in itself, brings some resilience to it, and some redundancy also” (S2). They thus rely on companies since they have been “trying to create supply chain resilience as long as firms have done business” (L4), and will, in the end, “provide us with resilience, because resilience for them is resilience for us, it is all connected” (S2). As for the dependency on critical infrastructure and the consequences of Russia targeting infrastructure in Ukraine: “No one was prepared for the impact that had on energy prices” (M8). But, similarly, as to addressing disruptions in commercial supply chains, pre-storage and pre-positioning of supplies may also mitigate against disruptions in critical infrastructure (S1).

Dual sourcing, another tactic commonly used in commercial supply chains to the benefit of resilience through increased flexibility, is similarly employed in defence supply chains (M1). According to interviewee M5, “a resilient supply chain is a flexible supply chain, one that can sustain some shocks and issues and adapt quickly”; this entails both proactivity and reactivity (M2; M7). However, dual-sourcing is, even for a medium-sized country, difficult: contracts are generally small, even for single-sourcing (M1). One interviewee makes an interesting distinction between flexibility and adaptability, stating: “We need to be flexible in the short term, and adaptable in the long term” (L4).

Several interviewees divide possible disruptions into internal (the military supply chain) and external (the commercial supply chains), or logistical and contractual, and state that while the military is competent at dealing with internal disruptions, preparedness for external disruptions could be improved (S1; S2; M1). For some interviewees, making a similar distinction, resilience is a matter of “resources for agility and resources for robustness”, where “robustness” refers to stocks in the internal supply chain, and agility is dealt with by the commercial supply chains, in accordance with contracts (M2).

Collaboration with companies and other countries is mentioned by several interviewees as a possible means to enhance resilience. Regarding collaboration with business, this enabler is very much associated with the barriers connected to legislation and the issue of trust. As for collaboration with other countries, even a medium-sized country “cannot do everything on its own” (M5). Country-specialization, multinational solutions within Europe or NATO, could be a way forward (M1) – however, here, also, the issue of trust is mentioned by several interviewees.

Some interviewees highlight the importance to resilience of an organizational culture of learning. “Some research suggests that the companies that are best at managing disruptions … are very proactive and do lots of scenario planning” (L2). The successful companies learn from their experiences, while the “laggard companies” go back to business as usual, and “do not improve their processes” (L2). However, not all interviewees have much faith in the literature on commercial supply chains (one interviewee, L1, thought the literature “somewhat disconnected”), suggesting a divide between academics and practitioners. “There is a conceptual challenge when it comes to introducing concepts and terminology from the commercial sector into the defence sector, I am very careful with just taking over commercial approaches into the defence sector’, since “there are fundamental differences” (M1). Further, as interviewee S2 stated, “I do not think that the armed forces are going to gain so much from some of the theoretical discussions going on regarding supply chain resilience. I think that we need more in-depth analysis of what happened, and what went wrong and why, or what went right, also” (S2).

Indeed, while academic research in SCRES is predominantly based on commercial supply chains, “lots of the papers talk about increasing flexibility or adaptability, but it is unclear what the measures are, and how you would improve that” (L1). M8, meanwhile, noted that “no one has ever pinned down what the best metrics of measurements are in the defence sector, which makes assessing progress and enhancing resilience more challenging.” Although there is no general agreement on the practises to use and when they should be used (S1; S2; M1), there must be solutions for “securing supplies of spare parts also during disruptions.” Studying the Ukrainian lessons-learned may be a way forward (S1).

Specific Enablers to Enhance Resilience in Defence Supply Chains

In addition to the generic enablers, some of the interviewees also highlighted other issues as potential enablers. Referred to as “specific enablers” in the cluster analysis, they include (a) contingency planning; (b) sourcing; (c) intervention by the government; and (d) legislation (Figure 2). The first two are seemingly analogous with discussions in commercial supply chains, although the content is context specific. Interestingly, legislation is identified as both a barrier and a potential enabler.

There is an “ongoing internal awareness” regarding the dependencies on global supply chains for critical raw materials and components, while “for some of the key components that we need, there will be back-up plans already tested” (M7); research is also being conducted into alternatives for certain raw materials (M8). Scenario-based war gaming and contingency planning workshops, as long-standing strengths of the military, could be effectively applied to address challenges in global supply chains (S2). Some interviewees set their hopes on “big data and simulations” (M2) – although an understanding of the challenges is a prerequisite before any discussion of potential solutions begins, and, as interviewee S2 stated, “I do not think that we know many of the challenges” (S2). Some of the interviewees refer to the use of contractors, universities, and researchers for these tasks (M2). But, speaking of how much we know of the appearance of supply chains, the members of these supply chains, dependency on the defence sector and stocks at the suppliers, interviewee M1 explained “my assumption would be we do not have that data. We do not really have the big picture of what is really going on in supply chains.”

There are currently discussions in some countries regarding the possibility of repatriating production – “onshoring” – because “they are worried about quality and reliability” (M4). In addition to onshoring, “friend-shoring” and “ally-shoring” are also possibilities. “In an ideal world, we’d all be supporting one another”, said interviewee M3. “We don’t like being dependent on certain countries for certain materials” (M4), so ally-shoring may be an option. While “there’s a confidence-building element to ally-shoring” (M4), that may be addressed by creating interdependencies between allies (M5). Even so, onshoring, outright privatization, or golden shares “still [do not] solve your supply chain problem”; they give, rather, only “an illusion of control” (M4). Domestic partners for maintenance may reduce the dependency of global supply chains (S1), but current practises are, “if I am frank and open, not very effective” (M1), so further research “to identify the critical parts and to define how they can be handled” is required (S1).

It is possible for governments to address the lack of manufacturing capacity in supply chains. But even medium-sized countries show signs of reluctance: “I don’t think that we’ll ever be in the business of creating excess capacity or spare factories” (M4). More, “we hardly plan our industrial capacities” (M2). Short term, factories can run multiple shifts, enabling production around the clock, if raw materials and components do not set additional constraints; longer term, automation could help, “but you still run into issues with components and subassemblies” (M4).

Round-the-clock production naturally leads to additional pressure on suppliers, who may be prompted to leave the defence market (L2). But exploring opportunities to increase capacities and capabilities in different parts of the supply chain may be the only possible avenue towards increased resilience (L3). The first step is to answer the question “Is it worth having a strategic capacity in place?” (M2). Perhaps so. But “resilience brings no voters, brings no votes”, requiring nothing less than a cultural shift in society – “the biggest hindrance” to enhancing resilience (M2).

Legislation, or at least the ways in which it is interpretated, is seen by the interviewees as constituting both barrier and a potential enabler of defence SCRES; a less rigid interpretation of procurement regulations, for example, would enable joint contingency planning to enhance resilience (S1). For some interviewees, European procurement legislation could be used more creatively: long-term contracts and partnerships, for example, would serve to enable joint contingency planning. As interviewee S1 put it, “the previous understanding and interpretation of legislation required short-term contracts and competitive bidding in more or less all cases.”

What are the Barriers to Defence Supply Chain Resilience?

There is no indication in the findings that the size of a nation’s armed forces influences the barriers they face. In addition, since military supply chains are still dependent on commercial supply chains, many of the barriers facing a military force are like those facing commercial companies, including the vulnerability and opacity of global supply chains. But a military force also faces barriers unique to it, particularly regarding the potential consequences of these barriers. This study identified three sets of impediments, related to the ongoing transformation, to governance, and to the defence marketplace characteristics.

The ongoing transformation involves barriers regarding the new focus on territorial defence, requirements on enhanced resilience, and reduced dependency on commercial supply chains, as well as issues concerning competence and technology. Many armed forces in the early stages of this transformation are currently focusing on ensuring preparedness and availability – which is difficult, given they have contributed much of their supplies and advanced equipment to Ukraine and must now replenish them rather than concentrate on sustainability and mobility. They have also realised that storage of ammunition is still a very important aspect of readiness. When many armed forces today try to acquire large quantities of ammunition and advanced equipment at the same time, they realize that the defence industry has insufficient production capacity to meet their current requirements, even with round-the-clock if production. This leads to significant increases in costs; new production lines are required, which involves a comparably significant increase in lead-times.

In addition, the issues both of financing of such investments and the guarantees that can be given for future demands remain to be resolved. As for sustainability, armed forces remain dependent on commercial supply chains. This dependency is an area of concern since armed forces regard these cost-efficient supply chains as especially vulnerable to disruptions. The extent to which commercial supply chains can be trusted to deliver as promised is the subject of much discussion.

Another set of barriers relates to the governance of armed forces, which can be divided into bureaucracy, financing, organization, legislation, and culture. Increasing costs for raw materials, components, subsystems, logistics, and wages, have been high on the agenda for armed forces for many years. This development has now been exacerbated by high inflation, the fact that many armed forces must replenish supplies simultaneously, and the expectation that resilient supply chains are likely to be more expensive than those prioritizing cost. Political and military processes for decision-making are seen as fragmented and cumbersome, and unsuited for the current geopolitical situation.

Further, even if many countries are now increasing their military budgets significantly, issues of compensation for increased costs for replenishment, inflation, and resilience remain unresolved. The division of responsibilities between national DPAs and DLOs is set out as an area of concern, particularly because of the rigid interpretation of the legislation and regulations that dictate the behaviour of DPAs in many European countries. This is regarded as largely unsuited to military operational priorities. An increased focus on resilience in procurement and contracts is required – but the institutional culture is not conducive for the realization of change at speed.

The third set of barriers is related to the defence marketplace. This includes the availability of supplies of raw materials and critical components, oligopoly, the opacity of supply chains, contracts, limited production capacities, the issue of trust, a dependence on functioning critical infrastructure, and the criticality of information. Armed forces, no less than commercial companies, are concerned about the complexity, opacity, and vulnerability of global supply chains and being dependent on certain raw materials and critical components obtainable from only a few suppliers. While production capacities are limited in any supply chain, the consequences of these limitations are quite different for commercial companies and armed forces. Where companies may face lost business opportunities, for armed forces and nations, these limitations can have implications for national security; consequently, they must be addressed differently than they would be in the private sector. For some military-specific supplies such as advanced military equipment and qualified ammunition, the defence market is an oligopoly, with a small number of dominant suppliers. Even large countries consider themselves as small buyers in comparison to these multinational, global suppliers of defence equipment, which makes it difficult to have an impact on supply chain design, and, thus, on SCRES.

Finally, all supply chains are dependent on functioning infrastructure systems. Failing infrastructure systems may impact national security and must therefore be addressed differently in the public sector. Cyber-attacks on information systems are regarded as particularly problematic.

How can Defence Supply Chain Resilience be Improved?

Flexibility, redundancy, agility, and collaboration, which can all be applied proactively, concurrently, and/or reactively, are the four most common SCRES strategies. Learning is also frequently highlighted as an important aspect of SCRES. Although the interview protocol did not mention any of these elements, depicted in Figure 2 as generic enablers, the interviewees mentioned them all – as well as other terms such as robustness and adaptability. They also added discussions regarding the nature of resilience, and what constituted a resilient supply chain. While proactive strategies for resistance, and reactive strategies for recovery, are the most discussed SCRES strategies (Katsaliaki, Galetsi & Kumar, 2022; Maharjan & Kato, 2022), there remains an emphasis on the state of disruption itself and the period after disruption, with less attention being paid to the period before a disruption, and what might be learned from the event (Ali, Mahfouz & Arisha, 2017; Hohenstein et al., 2015).

The findings show that, much like both commercial companies and previous studies in the defence sector suggest, the interviewees accentuate different tactics for redundancy and flexibility – among them dual sourcing, pre-storage, and pre-positioning – as the most common ways of enhancing defence SCRES.

The military currently largely focuses on proactive strategies. This is in line with the observation that they now focus on availability and preparedness rather than on sustainability. Collaboration is underexplored in academic research (Pires Ribeiro & Barbosa-Povoa, 2018), but many interviewees foreground collaboration as an important strategy to enhance defence SCRES. This is to be expected, since all interviewees represent nations that are members of NATO. Collaboration is suggested not only for multinational organisations, such as NATO, but also with commercial companies and bilateral agreements. The issue of trust, even among nations, is however highlighted as a barrier to collaboration. Interestingly, and contrary to previous findings, many interviewees emphasize the issue of learning as an important aspect of enhancing defence SCRES. This is in line with the ongoing transformation. Coming from a long period of focusing on PSOs, cost-efficiency and being dependent on commercial companies, armed forces must now go through a period of re-learning how best to organize for territorial defence.

Armed forces are part of the public sector, which uses money to produce collective goods and services such as defence. In the private sector, commercial companies produce goods and services to make money for their shareholders. Several interviewees highlight this difference as problematic. In addition to the generic enablers, many interviewees therefore also emphasize specific enablers (Figure 2) as part of potential solutions, including contingency planning, sourcing, governmental intervention, and legislation. Wargaming and research are suggested to be components of contingency planning. Variants of sourcing, such as friend- and ally-shoring are also suggested to be enablers. While some interviewees foreground governmental intervention as a potential enabler, they also state that this does not seem to be a likely solution. European interviewees agree that they will have to address the limitations of the current interpretation of European procurement legislation as part of enhancing SCRES. Long-term contracts and partnerships are some of the potential solutions suggested.

Whatever the solution, it is agreed that it will cost a lot of money. The question is who is going to pay for what.