Table 1
Structural and Relational Properties of Security Networks.
| PROPERTIES (LEVELS) | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Structure | The design and development (adaptation) of networks, the (formal and informal) links between the constituent parts (or organizations), and how they are governed, for instance through shared or brokered forms of governance. |
| Culture | The culture in and of a network, including perceptions, norms and attitudes shaping a group’s (or organization’s) shared history, and their understanding and action in relation to specific problems. |
| Policy | Formal policies and procedures providing a framework for the network’s action; for example, the regulation of roles and responsibilities of actors, or the management of information sharing. |
| Technology | Infrastructure and protocols enabling information management and communication between security network actors and how it is used; for example, access to secure communication channels between actors or information security. |
| Relationships | Interaction between individuals, groups and organizations in security networks. Relationships can be formal or informal and require a certain level of (interpersonal or interorganizational) trust for them to work. |
[i] (Adapted from Whelan, 2012, 2017).
Table 2
Challenges and Potential Areas of Friction Identified.
| PROPERTIES (LEVELS) | CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL AREAS OF FRICTION IDENTIFIED |
|---|---|
| Structure | The imbalance in, or ambiguity of, power relations can hamper collaboration between organizations in total defence networks. Unsynchronized and asymmetric organizations, groups or processes in the network are seen to affect collaboration negatively. Planning, preparation and staffing can vary, and different parts of organizations and regions are at different stages of the process. Misconceptions of roles and expectations about each other and a lack of communication and clear governance structures risk negatively affecting the interaction between network actors. |
| Culture | Collaboration presupposes that professional identities and professions interact and are expected to act collectively; this can be hampered by (unfounded, inaccurate) perceptions of the “other”. Cultural differences in terms of implicit and explicit values and attitudes result in different perceptions of how to achieve goals and what needs to be prioritised and in what order. Different communication patterns and language use (jargon, gobbledegook, profession-specific terminology, etc.) lead to misunderstandings. |
| Policy | Civilian, military, regional and local conditions and working methods involve varying degrees of clarity and maturity; this facilitates neither collaboration nor collective action. Collaboration is hindered by organizations that have differing objectives, interpreted in various ways. Areas of collaboration are described as difficult to find when networking actors are at different stages of planning, organization and resource allocation. |
| Technology | Problems arise from the use of incompatible systems that complicate the necessary sharing of information. Information-sharing presents challenges concerning the question of authorization, which, in turn, makes collaboration more difficult. Problems arise in system security when classified or sensitive information needs to be shared with numerous actors from different organizations. |
| Relationships | Relational aspects of inter-organizational and inter-professional collaboration need to be improved. A key challenge lies in the differing perceptions of capability; the SAF has reservations about the effectiveness of civilian organizations, while civilians typically regard military authority with respect. A lack of (interpersonal and interorganizational) trust between actors affects their ability to collaborate. |