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The Suwalki Gap, Kaliningrad and Russia’s Baltic Ambitions Cover

The Suwalki Gap, Kaliningrad and Russia’s Baltic Ambitions

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Open Access
|Aug 2019

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.21 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 111 - 121
Submitted on: Aug 14, 2018
Accepted on: Feb 1, 2019
Published on: Aug 21, 2019
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2019 Viljar Veebel, Zdzislaw Sliwa, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.