Storying Strategies in Russian Information Warfare Against Sweden: The Post-Ukraine War Narratives

Literature Review: Russian Information Warfare (IW)

Information warfare (IW) is conflict conducted through the protection, manipulation, degradation, and denial of information (Libicki, 1995). It influences enemy morale and planning through deception or subversion that can help achieve long or short-term goals of influencing the opponent. Russian information warfare, also termed “hybrid warfare” by Western nations, includes disinformation campaigns whose purpose is to confuse the enemy and to achieve strategic benefits at the least possible cost (Snegovaya, 2015).

Soviet and later Russian military and political strategies have long employed active measures. These were originally used in the Soviet era to suppress dissent by isolating populations from outside influence through means such as propaganda, deception, sabotage, and so on (Darczewska and Żochowski, 2017). As a set of politically-centralized actions designed to mislead, weaken, divide, and undermine rivals through ideological subversion, disinformation, and influence operations (Shultz & Godson, 1984), this forms part of the broader concept of IW.

According to Kragh and Åsberg (2017) the line between Russian diplomacy and active measures remains blurred, reflecting Soviet-era patterns in foreign policy. Covert and deniable active measures aimed at influencing decision-makers in a direction beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to the Kremlin remained the modus operandi (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). Such tactics are constructed with precision, inserting deceptive information into the flow of communications to influence the target audience, infiltrating media systems with strategic messaging. Soviet intelligence has always had great interest in Sweden, with around 160 Russian intelligence officers on Swedish soil during the 1980s (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017), infiltrating and seeking to influence Swedish decisions. Active measures in today’s Russia are conducted by the security services (Westerlund et al., 2019), mainly the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Supreme Board of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU).

General Valery Gerasimov (2016) published a widely-noted article that has drawn significant attention for its insights into contemporary Russian warfare. Emphasizing civilian operations, the article highlights that modern Russian warfare relies heavily on both military and non-military means, with the belief that non-military tools outweigh military tools by a ratio of four to one (Bartles, 2016). For Chekinov and colleagues (2013), meanwhile, future hybrid wars will always be founded on information operations.

A principal goal of Russian information warfare is to polarize the West, undermining the legitimacy of its democratic processes (Jonsson, 2019). For Akimenko and Giles (2020), this is pursued through the development of capabilities to access and control information – specifically, to extract, exfiltrate, manipulate, distort, and insert it. These objectives are achieved through disinformation, troll campaigns, official statements, public speeches, provocative images, and direct text messaging (see, for example, Akimenko & Giles, 2020).

Since disinformation often relies on misleading half-truths and repetition rather than outright lies, it appears more credible when linked to “trusted” Western sources – prompting Russia to pursue a strategy of prioritizing the infiltration of Western media as a means to spread disinformation (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). Thus, distinguishing between overt public diplomacy and covert active action when Russian information operations are successful can be quite difficult, as they are intrinsically linked. Wilson (2015) studies the phenomenon of “useful idiots” who spread and amplify the Kremlin’s slanted articles, thus giving such propaganda legitimacy and coverage. The article explicates how different target groups are fed with different types of news articles. For example, leftist and peace movements are targeted with NATO expansion content, environmental groups with warnings about genetically modified crops, and right-wing populist movements with narratives of a chaotic Europe following the migration crisis. In doing this, it is possible to nudge a target’s perception in a direction desired by the sender (e.g., Wolfley, 2021; Wilson, 2015).

Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021) describe the Russian state-controlled outlet Sputnik as a platform used to publish carefully-selected content as part of coordinated campaigns. Similarly, Ramsay and Robertshaw (2019) argue that Russia’s use of multilingual media is intended to frame information in ways that serve Russian interests. RT, Russia’s most prominent international broadcaster, plays a central role in this strategy. Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief, has openly described RT as a tool in the information war against the West, acknowledging its routine blending of propaganda and disinformation within news content (Redington, 2021). Simonyan also claims RT appeals to audiences looking for “the other side of the truth,” which helps foster its image as a credible source among a significant segment of viewers. Yablokov (2015) explores RT’s promotion of conspiratorial narratives that validate Russian domestic and foreign policy while casting U.S. policy as unfounded and illegitimate. RT’s populist, anti-elitist messaging constructs a fictional global community of “the people” to be set against the dangerous “others” constituted by the American establishment. It uses such rhetoric to highlight U.S. socio-economic issues and to question the legitimacy of American values typified by the American Dream.

RT and Sputnik’s Western political and social media coverage is characterized by an image of political dysfunction; themes of deterioration, conflict, and institutional failure define news agendas relating to domestic politics in the United States, the West, and Ukraine (Ramsay & Robertshaw, 2019; Hutchings and Szostek 2015).

While the West recognizes Russia’s extensive use of media to wage information operations through weaponized misinformation and strategic propaganda narratives (see, for example, Hellman & Wagnsson, 2017), democratic states face a dilemma in their responses – how are such assaults to be countered without the adoption of similar tactics if their integrity and reputation as democracies are to be preserved? The process of managing perceptions of information and propaganda can have unintended consequences for democratic states (Nincic, 2003); such perception-shaping strategies can in turn be used to achieve internal political goals that are then used to support national policy development (Nincic, 2003). Another unintended outcome is that when such strategies are directed at foreign national audiences with the goal of distortion, they can inherently become the basis upon which the local audiences form their own perceptions.

Bittman (1990) questions the ethics of using disinformation and propaganda, particularly during peacetime, as practiced by the Russian state. Conversely, Taylor (2002) argues that to protect democratic values, democracies must engage in some form of propaganda. Walker (2016) offers a more pragmatic perspective, emphasizing that democratic states should respond to disinformation warfare with principled and carefully considered strategies.

Even though consensus within the literature regarding what constitutes an adequate response to Russian information warfare remains unclear, Hellman and Wagnsson (2017) go further than most to bridge this gap by analyzing European responses to Russian aggression of this kind. They draw on empirical examples from European states bordering Russia – targets of its operations – and propose four ideal response models for democratic governments: blocking, confronting, naturalizing, and ignoring.

Developed along a continuum of engagement to full disengagement, the strategy of confrontation lies on the engaged “left” of the continuum, with the active creation and delivery of counter-narratives to challenge misleading or harmful portrayals of a Western state or its allies. An example is Estonia’s 2015 launch of a nationwide Russian-language TV network aimed at countering pro-Kremlin narratives within its borders, presenting an outward-looking approach focused on foreign audiences.

If outward-looking strategies primarily seek to target foreign audiences as recipients of its narratives, then inward-looking strategies focus on addressing domestic or local audiences. The strategy of blocking, then, while also engaged, is inward-looking, focusing on identifying and countering the constructed “other” – a process by which dominant groups define out-groups as fundamentally different. Blocking aims to defend domestic audiences by acknowledging adversarial narratives and taking measures to neutralize them.

The naturalizing strategy, outward-looking but less confrontational, avoids directly challenging opposing narratives; it seeks the development, rather, of alternative, self-affirming narratives to promote the state’s worldview and legitimacy in the international arena.

Finally, the strategy of ignoring is non-engaged. It focuses inwardly, trusting in the resilience of democratic systems and civil society to withstand external disinformation. This includes educating citizens on media literacy, disinformation awareness, and preparedness for broader asymmetric threats such as cyber-attacks (e.g., Missiroli & Rühle, 2020). Developing and offering narratives with the aim of opening debate is also encouraged within this strategy.

The next section discusses pre-war narrative descriptions of Sweden.

Russian descriptions of Sweden: The pre-Ukraine war narratives

In a study of news articles from the Russian state-controlled broadcaster Sputnik disseminated between 2014 and 2018, Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021) identified an overarching narrative of Sweden as a once-admirable and prosperous country that has now been divided, weakened and may be characterized by social chaos. Analyzing 208 articles over a period covering 5 years, authors describe a principal Russian narrative, supported by a number of sub-topics subsequently used to develop antagonistic strategies employed within the collected material, seeking harm. These strategies include suppression, destruction and direction.

Status is important within foreign policy and international relations; suppressive strategies aim to diminish it. Suppressive narratives may depict the antagonist positively and the other negatively; attacks on the target’s character, for example, are conducted to lessen its status.

Destruction strategies are discussed from within the logic of the zero-sum game in international relations, as the balance of power rests on the finite commodity of security (see, for example, Jervis, 1999). Using material and non-material means, the aim is to impair a target’s capacity for deterrence, damage its military reputation, and its potential to be a reliable partner in military cooperation (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2021). This may be purused through narratives describing a weak and unreliable actor without the capacity to defend itself.

The strategy of direction works by leading readers away from what are, for the antagonist, undesirable attitudes and behavior; both “carrots” and “sticks” serve. Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021) believe that tacit encouragement, within the framework of strategic narratives, is used to lead or steer an adversary away from negative behavior and stimulate “better” behavior”: the presentation of a possible future solution, for example.

Ramsay and Robertshaw (2019) show that RT reports on Western political dysfunction, including that of Sweden, with a narrow focus on migration and culture. The outlet problematizes migration, emphasizing the cultural tensions it creates. Havlicek and colleagues (2018) identify the production of a negative image of Sweden that emphasizes immigration, Islamization and criminality; Russian state television highlight Swedish politicians as American agents, fabricating interviews with journalists and diplomats working in Russia (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). Prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish-language Sputnik outlet mainly published articles criticizing the EU and NATO and less about Sweden (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). This may be, we suggest, because Sweden itself was not then a priority, and that a negative image of the EU and NATO was the primary message to the Swedish-speaking audience.

To put it concisely, the narrative generated of Sweden is of a nation in decline, divided, weakened, and chaotic; strategies of suppression, destruction, and direction were used to undermine its status and to emphasize issues of cultural conflict, the dangers of migration, and political dysfunction.

Theoretical Framework: Narratives

Narratives have been widely used within international relations and security literature (see, for example, Wibben, 2014; Lind, 2020; Musliu and Orbie, 2015). Within global politics, communication, especially in the new media environment characterized by social media, internet access and data and information obfuscation, is recognized as crucial (Miskimmon et al., 2013). Through narratives, it is possible to both construct perceptions of reality and to consolidate social identities (Somers, 1994). By positioning stakeholders to create mental maps along specific lines, narratives have the ability to help people learn about their own location and the place of “others” in the world (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2021, 241). But narrative is intrinsically affective, capable of evoking emotions in the target that can weaken their ability to make a sound assessment of a story’s content.

According to Krebs (2015), narratives are coherent stories with clearly-defined characters; the plots of these stories can be created by weaving together the challenges of the present, successes and failures of the past, and the promises of a potential future. In other words, narrative serves the presentation of social and historical knowledge (Somers, 1994). Where history can be understood, for example, through description of the relevant time and context of a given situation or event, the reception of the knowledge transmitted can be finessed by the details and tone that frame it; within narratives, such creations of past, present and future are undertaken through the manipulation of elements such as conflict, the protagonists responsible for the events, even prophecy (see, for example, Lind, 2020). Those narratives portraying a specific conflict and offering prediction of an outcome conveniently obscure challenges to the narrative itself. Keeping to its prediction tendency of foreshadowing a vision of the future by predicting how conflict must be resolved, stakeholders (characters) obstruct or facilitate such resolution and hence the future state of the facilitated resolutions (see, for example, Bai, 2005). Finally, narratives gain power through imagery – nationalistic, heroic or tragic images of flags, for example; leaders, victims, and so on.

Narratives may be analyzed along a number of lines, determining the extent to which they are, say, gendered, racialized, and postcolonial (Lind, 2020). Wibben (2014) argues that the development of narratives through metaphor and event framing is important within political and security policy contexts. Through narratives, people find value in their experiences; narratives can be used to highlight certain experiences as more important than others. The experience and memory of an event is shaped by perceptions and expectations. But the understanding of an experience can be greatly influenced by narrative – shaping how we see the world and what we understand to be possible or impossible (Wibben, 2014). As such, narratives about security can serve to legitimize modern state-centered security politics, limiting one’s ability to think about security, including issues such as whose security is important, and how security can be achieved (Wibben, 2014).

Narrative studies in the field of social science focus on four analytical components: the relationship between different parts of the story; the causal development of events; the selection of events; and the temporal, sequential, and spatial qualities. These factors explore how events are connected across time and space, forming an internal logic. Rather than compartmentalizing events, narratives provide a coherent explanation by linking elements and showing how they relate (Somers, 1994). Researchers use narratives to identify interwoven storylines that reflect the context in which individuals act.

In the logic of narrative, selected events shape the plot, plots create thematic meaning, and meaning helps shape the overall significance. This paper employs a narrative approach because of its capacity to integrate temporality, social context, and complexity – ultimately allowing for the development of a coherent, evaluative conclusion.

Research Design

This research applies narrative analysis to news articles from the Russian media channel RT disseminated over a specific period. For Hjerm and collegues (2014), narrative analysis is a qualitative method that focuses on identifying the underlying stories giving structure and meaning to a text. It emphasizes contextual interpretation, often guided by an interpretivist framework. Given (2008) proposes that narrative analysis pay particular attention to the temporal sequencing of events within stories, focusing not only on what is said but on how and why events are linked in a narrative form. Unlike other qualitative approaches, this prioritizes the structure and logic of the storyline over surface-level content; as such, researchers using this method must attend closely to the context in which actions occur and how those actions are conveyed through narrative.

For Noblit and Hare (1988), all social science explanations are comparative and researchers interpret previous studies according to their own worldview – that is, their studies of any given subject or phenomenon are recursively interpretive. Narrative analysis tends to shift the focus from “What happened?” to “How do people create meaning in what happens?” (Noblit and Hare, 1988). Every story is told, that is, with the intentional purpose of creating a specific effect.

Data Search and Selection

In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, EU sanctions meant most of the content served by the websites of RT and Sputnik were blocked at the ISP and access to articles via the regular databases was not possible. The authors were, however, able to read articles on the RT website.

On August 22, 2022, we conducted a search on RT’s website with the keyword swed*. This generated 300 news articles for the period March 29 to August 22 that year. All articles were saved and coded according to the principal subject content. In order to identify articles that were primarily about Sweden alone, we conducted a new within-results search for articles including the words “Sweden”, “Swede” or “Swedish” in the title or in the heading of the article. This resulted in 109 articles; of these, 10 with video content were identified and excluded on the grounds that the risk of researcher bias from the further analytical treatment required was an issue. This article addresses the 99 articles remaining (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

All included articles were subsequently linked to five-digit ID. The first two numbers represent the month the article was published and the next two, the day; the fifth number distinguishes different articles published on the same day. “03302”, doe example, designates the second article mentioning swed* published on March 30, 2022 see Figure 2.

Figure 2

Coding

Following the framework of Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021), this deductive study seeks to identify particular assumptions and frameworks to which identified narratives can be tested against previous study results. Analysis involves the identification of (already known) themes from the original study, as these themes are important to our understanding of how this phenomenon changes. Given these themes, new data articles were textually analyzed via thematic inquiry (see, for example, Braun & Clarke, 2006), by examining how those relevant themes occurred in the current data articles – an interpretative analysis. The process was undertaken in two main stages (Figure 3). The first stage sought to identify both principal narrative and sub-plots about Sweden and the sub-plots within the selected articles. Also described as the thematic form (Given, 2008), this stage seeks to interrogate the purpose of a story or group of stories.

Figure 3

The second analysis stage probes the intended purpose of the underlying strategies as associated with the identified narrative (causing harm, for example). In the first stage, the unit of analysis remains the main narrative (that is, the focal storyline during the studied period); in the second stage, the focus is the antagonistic narrative strategy exploited by the antagonist.

As illustrated in Figure 4, the analysis focuses on the means by which the narrative is constructed – the act of storytelling. For each and every theme, we identify statements within the data related to, or otherwise supporting, the pre-conceptualized themes from the original study.

Figure 4

First, we begin by probing into the nature of the problem and how it specifically arose. This section also identifies both those characters involved in creating the problem, and those working to find possible solutions (if any). The next step addresses the selective nature of the events that constitute the story: they have been specifically chosen to further an antagonistic focus on things that occurred after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dates and locations focus mainly on the Swedish state, what happens within its borders, and how it deals with such events.

Next, these relationships and connections are deconstructed so that the narratives can be reduced to their components; the data and literature are put to the service of connecting the identified stories, contextualizing actors and events in a logical and systematic way. We treat the sum of the data as a single set which, finally, permits a holistic interpretation of the narrative. We identify and acknowledge both the relationships and links between the actors and identify events that shape, or are tied to, them. Here, we see the Russian state’s notion of itself as a protagonist whose problem arises from potential changes in the balance of power in the Baltics; these changes are driven by Sweden.

Having constructed a principal narrative, the aim of the second stage of the analytic framework set out by Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021) is to clarify the basis of the narrator’s underlying strategies using developed narratives. The unit of analysis here, the antagonistic narrative strategy, aids a consideration of the overarching narrative identified in the first stage. After further analysis from new and different perspectives emphasizing actors, events, and stories, malicious strategies can be identified. The methodology operationalizes actors, events and history by probing the role and status of actors, determining the temporal characteristics of the events that occurred, and finally ascertaining the history underlying the narrative strategies and its relationships to the overarching narrative (see Figure 5).

Figure 5

In this stage, the analysis centers on the way in which the narrative antagonist causes harm by portraying the actor negatively, usually as the antagonist itself, while portraying others as heroes or as innocent victims. More specifically, the focus is on the narrative’s structural form, largely a matter of logic and the temporal relationships of events (Riessman, 2007) – the foundational basis of narrative analysis itself. Stories within the main narrative focus on the drama and intrigues that build and strengthen the main narrative; analysis of these stories explores possible contradictions in the material and the relationships between the stories.

In the next section, we present the results and findings of the analysis carried out.

Main Story and Sub-Plots

Analysis of underlying narrative strategies

The analyses made in the first stage revealed the main story with sub-plots serving to reinforce the principal message. In this section, we apply second-stage analyses to the principal and sub-narratives to identify underlying antagonistic strategies used against Sweden. We do this by focusing on the actors in the main story, the events that occurred, and, finally, the sub-plots within the main story (see Figure 5).

Principal narrative stories: Swedish incompetence

The final analysis of the second stage focuses on the sub-plots presented. These build and strengthen the main narrative by making the links between the sub-plots more coherent (Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2021). The underlying narratives identified in the section “Main story and sub-plots” above tell the stories within the main narrative. The underlying strategy of destruction can be linked to the notion of “Swedish incompetence”, seen here as the government’s inability to lead and control the country internally and its inability to make sound decisions in foreign policy. It devalues Sweden’s position of power as an important party in the international community and it calls into question its credibility as a reliable and capable nation.

We locate the suppressive strategy within the subplots “Russophobia” (associating Sweden with a childish form of bullying, lacking complexity and proportion) and “strange phenomena” (drawing attention to various novel and surprising events with the hope that the reader will draw hasty conclusions of Sweden as a peculiar nation where liberalism has failed).

We link the directional strategy to the stories we label “Swedish culpability for potential Russian action”. By portraying Swedish decisions as inciting the type and kind of measures Russia may be obliged to take, it implies incentives to consider other choices that might lead to “more positive outcomes”. This strategy can influence both public opinion and decision makers.

The underlying plot identified as “the Swedish freedom of alliance” can be identified within all three underlying strategies: the strategy of destruction, by highlighting that a once-credible and reliable nation, Sweden, is now abandoning the foundations of its power; the suppressive strategy, used to bring the status of Sweden to the same, diminished, level as other NATO countries – puppets for America’s aggressive foreign policy tool; and the direction strategy, observed in the switching of strategies in reaction to running events, as exemplified with the period before and after Sweden’s decision on NATO membership. In the period before, the undesirable security consequences of membership were highlighted; afterwards, relegation and downplaying of the consequences in the period after the decision.

In Figure 6, our model shows the relationships between the main plot, the subplots, and the identified strategies embedded within the narratives. Here, the focus remains the main plot; identified first, it forms the basis upon which the sub-plots are formed. The strategies are identified last. Given the new context within which the study was undertaken (i.e., after the invasion of Ukraine), we identify a new strategy from the data which was not identified in previous literature: that of exploitation.

Figure 6

In this strategy, a narrative-shaper seeks to make use of a given situation, creating narratives in response to the circumstances, events, and environment out of which another actor’s narrative is formed. The strategy is situational, since the two narratives may not be related or linked. Mayer (2007) describes exploitation as gain produced at the expense of another by exacting relative harms and losses on disadvantaged parties. This was evidently the case with Turkey and Russia, whose complimentary stances may be said to have served as a collaborative production of narratives related to Sweden. Here, the Russian narrative of Sweden exploits disagreements between Sweden and Turkey on issues surrounding Sweden’s NATO membership. By incorporating various other narratives, Russian narrative-formers assume a central, opportunistic, role in guiding this process of narrative co-production. The strategy identified here functions through the deliberate omission of facts necessary to paint an accurate picture of context, without which an accurate interpretation of events cannot be made. For example, RT failed entirely to report on the preparations and build-up to the Swedish parliamentary elections, testament to the country’s democratic values; the disagreement between Turkey and Sweden regarding the NATO application, meanwhile, received continuous attention.

Evolving Description of Sweden Post-Ukraine War

By examining the nature of the information narratives directed at the country, this study sheds light on the underlying strategies employed in the RT narratives of Sweden after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Prior research demonstrates the Russian state’s use of strategic flexibility in justifying incursions into the sovereignty of other nations, including its invocation of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect principle to legitimize invading Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 (Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021), while simultaneously undermining the targeted parties’ rights to protection. The narratives forming the focus of this paper are largely justifications of the Russian insistence notion that Sweden and the West are to blame for the deteriorating security situation in Europe.

The model (Figure 6) shows that the strategies used in the execution of information warfare have remained largely consistent, before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – albeit these strategies are continuously being adjusted and modified to fit prevailing events and circumstances (Ajir & Vailliant, 2018; Van Herpen, 2015). It is also true that these adaptations have prompted the development of new strategies altogether, including that of exploitation, a narrative tactic that apparently emerged in response to the security community’s focus on Sweden and Finland’s decisions to join the NATO alliance. Adapting narratives from third parties in this way saw the development of the strategy of exploitation; RT can use this to support any or all of its established strategies, including those attacking cultural and democratic values.

Sohl (2022) shows that Russia employs information warfare strategies that accentuate contradictions in traditional values, aimed at undermining democratic systems; an emphasis on freedom of expression as a cause of chaos, for example, seeks to depreciate a fundamental pillar of a democratic system. RT’s reporting on the Swedish process of joining NATO may not constitute active measures, if we understand the term to signify persistent, centrally-controlled activities aimed at misleading, weakening, dividing and undermining competitors and potential adversaries (Shultz & Godson, 1984). The sequencing of the antagonistic descriptions behind RT’s reporting establishes the narrative nature of the full process, however – and this we may understand to constitute an example of active measures.

Lastly, our model indicates that relationships between established and emerging strategies are possible, and that, given the level of flexibility and adaptability required, emerging strategies would most likely to develop as offshoots of the main strategies.

Theoretical and practical contributions

Our study makes certain useful contributions to the literature.

First, following the analytical approach developed by Wagnsson and Barzanje (2021) for their investigation of the state-controlled Russian media outlet Sputnik, we contribute to theory by identifying a new strategy, that of exploitation – an adaptation of the ego narrative to incorporate other non-ego narratives in order to develop a structure of stories relating how and why events occur. With a focus on content deliberately composed and sequenced to communicate a specific complex of ideas, the strategy aligns with the structural view of narrative as set out by Riessman (2007; see also Pentland, 1999).

Second, results reveal the strategy of suppression to be the most used in all the stories and sub-plots identified in Figure 6. Direction, applied both before and after Sweden made the decision to join NATO, was the most salient.

Finally, the study’s results indicate something worthy of note. Given the fluid nature of information warfare strategies as executed by the Russian state, responsive strategies such as those proposed by Hellman and Wagnsson (2017) become difficult to employ when hostile strategies are continuously evolving. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the nature of this development by demonstrating the way in which outcomes are a product of the specific actors and the history they share and of events as they occur.

Practically, the study highlights the horizontal integration of the identified strategies: the antagonist’s narrative develops through the incorporation of similar narratives from other narrative-shapers storying in the same or comparable topics. In practical terms, acting on this study’s results may prompt consequences for military and societal norms, practices, and policy. The evidence is that the dynamic properties of the information warfare waged against Sweden change frequently through the co-opting of narratives and actors to develop compelling narratives; the study presents an opportunity for policy makers and decision makers, military staff, and the public alike to better understand and respond to the continuously-adapting frameworks of Russian information warfare.

Limitations and future research

This study was motivated by the need to increase our understanding of the strategies of information warfare used by Russia following the Ukraine invasion. Understanding how these strategies operate and how they develop over time is crucial to helping the subjects of weaponized narrative understand and respond satisfactorily. They were certain limitations to our study, however. While we have only considered data from a single source, the links between the strategies, as identified here, suggest that developed narratives are nested within a broader context that includes other Russian, non-Russian and third-party sources. As such, future work could extend the scope to evaluate the value of information sources not currently accounted for here, in which both established and alternative Swedish media are studied in parallel with Russian state-controlled media.