Martial Law as a Pulling Mechanism and Civil Military Relations in Turkey

Background for the Introduction of Martial Law in the 1970s

Martial law was declared in the Republic of Turkey for the first time on February 24, 1925 in response to the Sheikh Said Rebellion – an uprising led by the Kurdish nationalist Sheikh Said. On January 1, 1931, the single-party regime then in place declared another period of martial law in response to a chain of anti-regime events known as the Menemen Incident. Another state of martial law in four Turkish cities was declared during the Second World War, lasting between October 20, 1940 and December 23, 1947. The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, or DP), which ruled the country between 1950 and 1960 as a single party, declared martial law twice. In 1955, when the police proved incapable of coping with protests, DP politicians called out the military to intervene⁶ before declaring martial law on September 7 (TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 1955, p. 668). Once martial law was established, the party used it primarily to suppress the opposition Republican People’s Party (RPP). Another period of martial law was declared in the wake of the events of April 28–29 when the DP made an aggressive response to increasing anti-government protests (Şen, 2016). This decision paved the way towards the 1960 coup d’état. The military justified the coup as necessary to establish law and order inside national borders at a time when civilian authorities were considered incapable of coping with repeated street demonstrations. As stated by Lombardi (1997, p. 204), in the Turkish case, “the trigger for the coup [of 1960] appears to have been the 1 May decision (by the DP in power) to use the armed forces in an effort to regain control of the situation.”

On June 15, 1970, the Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları (Revolutionary Workers’ Syndicats, or DİSK) organized a demonstration of thousands of workers in Istanbul. Unable to suppress the violent strikes, described as the biggest set of demonstrations in the history of the working class movement in Turkey, the leader of the Justice Party (JP), Süleyman Demirel, initiated the mechanism of pulling and ordered the military to quell the demonstrations.⁷ The decision for the declaration of martial law was contested by some segments of the military. According to some senior officers, the use of the military to support an unpopular government was a mistake (Lombardi, 1997, p. 205). For others, this was a window of opportunity for the military and the declaration of martial law had the potential to increase its bargaining power in relation to civilian authorities. Very soon after, senior military authorities such as Muhsin Batur would submit a memorandum to demand more power and autonomy for the National Security Council (Milli Güvelik Kurulu, or MGK; see Kars Kaynar, 2018). Finally, on 12 March, 1971, the TSK intervened in politics once more, forcing the Demirel administration to resign.

The historical analysis demonstrates that the TSK has taken on public order missions several times since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Throughout this process, the Turkish military proved its capacity to end instability and establish public order. When politicians faced political instability or any threat to their regime, there was little hesitation in calling out the military. Before the 1970s, the functional dimension of the TSK’s role conception had already begun to be strengthened. Despite the diversification of political parties in the 1970s, their capacity to maintain public order remained limited when they came to power. Under these circumstances, parliamentary requests for the use of the military started to build on each other, ignoring all ideological differences. The TSK, in turn, aware of its aptitude for the establishment of domestic security, asked for more political power.

In the immediate aftermath of the military intervention, a law was enacted on September 20, 1971 to regulate the scope of martial law in practice. According to the enacted legislation, the conditions for the declaration of martial law were extended and the military enlarged its authority to act, benefiting from increased autonomy: ⁸

The significant point about Law No. 1402 is that, although the decision to declare martial law still belonged to civilian authorities, the conditions were extended under the initiative of military authorities through the constitutional amendments realized after the 1971 military intervention (Çelik, 2008, p. 163). Moreover, on each occasion, the declaration of martial law was also discussed in the MGK meetings. As the official declarations available to the public demonstrate, during the official debates in the MGK, all protests and street demonstrations were described as movements contrary to the survival of the regime and the state. As a response, the MGK advised the declaration of martial law or the prolongment of the existing state of martial law (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975b, p. 174). During these discussions, military authorities underlined the fact that the police force, on its own, was not capable of suppressing street demonstrations or the general context of conflict in the country (Evren, 1990, pp. 197–198). As the MGK has long been defined as the primary instrument of the regime of military tutelage in Turkey, discussions on the extension of martial law prove that the military aimed to push its way into politics and that civilian authorities did not display any real opposition.

Defending and Extending the Martial Law in 1974

During the Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974 (20 July–18 August), Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit defended a limited state of martial law as a provisional precaution within the context of a potential clash between Greece and Turkey (Üskül, 1997, p. 226). When the Cyprus Operation ended, the Ecevit government decreased the number of cities under martial law from 14 to 4. The state of martial law, however, remained in force. During parliamentary discussions, National Defence Minister Hasan Esat Işık stressed the need for the extension of the regime of martial law due to external threats. He added later that no internal conflict required the extension of martial law inside state borders (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1974a, p. 11). During the same parliamentary discussion, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil of the Justice Party stated that, notwithstanding the end of the Cyprus conflict, they would vote to extend martial law. An MP of the opposing Democratic Party held that, given its limited application, Turkish citizens did not feel the effects of martial law; given the risk of external conflict, they would vote in favor. In a similar vein, an MP of the coalition partner the National Salvation Party (NSP), Hasan Aksay, reaffirmed that ordinary citizens did not feel like they were living under martial law, which was a success for the governing coalition (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1974a, p. 16).

Thus, at the end of 1974, almost all political parties agreed to extend the period of martial law. Once politicians reached a consensus in parliament on the relevant issue, succeeding governments took the opportunity to repurpose the ongoing martial law according to their political interests, triggering the mechanism of political pulling. The military, in turn, extended its experience in public order missions and strengthened the practical dimension of its role conception as a public security provider.

The Changing Nature of the 1974 Martial Law under Successive Governments

The 1974 martial law regime continued under the following administration of Sadi Irmak. Although Irmak’s government lost a vote of confidence, it remained in power until the foundation of an MC government on 31 March. During parliamentary discussions on the extension of the martial law regime, National Defence Minister İlhami Sancar, citing military and political reasons requiring the extension of martial law, stated that there were legal and illegal organizations threatening peace and order in the country (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1974b, p. 43). He warned the TBMM against the threat of increasing street demonstrations and defended the extension of martial law as a preventive measure. In other words, starting with the Irmak administration, the ground on which martial law was defended changed; now, the rationale was that domestic threats required it. This transformation triggered the mechanism of political pulling.

Sadi Irmak emphasized that martial law commanders would utilize all power and authority they were given according to the appropriate legislation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1974b, pp. 44–54). An MP of the opposition National Salvation Party, İ. Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, defended the extension of martial law, citing increasing student movements as a threat to peace and security in the country (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975a, p. 70). Accordingly, martial law commanders directed the orientation of the regime of martial law towards internal order; it began to be used as a mechanism to cope with street demonstrations when an “unreliable” civilian government was in power.

One of the perceived primary duties of the succeeding MC Government (March 31, 1975–June 21, 1977) was to prolong the same regime of martial law for another month, until May 5, 1975. The new government proposed the declaration of yet another period of martial law on 27 March, 1975 in the regions of Hakkâri, Mardin, Siirt, and Diyarbakır, a proposal legitimized on the grounds of increasing tension and the threat of war in the Middle East. The extension was further defended on the ground that ethnic and communist dissident movements were rising in this region. The TBMM, however, refused to implement it. With his coalition partner the Nationalist Action Party, Süleyman Demirel (previously forced to resign as prime minister after the 1971 indirect military intervention), was the main political figure defending both the continuation of martial law and the military’s active participation in countering terrorism in the country. These civilian authorities aimed to re-establish an extended version of a martial law regime in the face of opposition such as street demonstrations and the labor movement (Üskül, 2016, p. 3). Demirel underlined many times that he insisted on the declaration of martial law to counter anarchy (TBMM Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, p. 779). Thus, under the MC government, martial law became a mechanism of political pulling.

The decision for the declaration of martial law was discussed many times in the TBMM between 1975 and 1979. The most serious debates unfolded on April 30, 1975 when the TBMM was obliged to reach a conclusion on whether or not it was necessary to extend the duration of the ongoing period of martial law. During these debates, the position of the Demirel administration was defended by the Interior Minister Oğuzhan Asiltürk. Many opposition parties critically pointed out that the minister was defending the martial law regime despite a previously accepted political tradition that the act of declaration should be the duty of the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs. For example, under the Ecevit administration in 1974, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Turan Güneş defended the extension of martial law for another month, emphasizing that it was directly linked to Turkey’s outcomes in external security (Üskül, 2016, p. 5). Later, during parliamentary discussions, the RPP parliamentarian Necdet Uğur warned that the declaration of martial law must not be defended by the Minister of the Interior (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975b, p. 180).

In his speech to the TBMM on July 2, 1975, the Interior Minister Asiltürk stated that as there was a threat of war, and that it was necessary to keep the country safe, law and order must be assured inside national borders (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975b, p. 173). After citing the crisis in Cyprus as the primary reason behind the decision for the continuation of martial law, Asiltürk mentioned “other internal events and problems” and emphasized their potential to do harm to the regime. He later cited the existence of protests and the increasing number of demonstrations as reasons explaining why martial law must be extended to guarantee the security of the regime (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975c, p. 244). Moreover, Talat Oğuz of the other coalition partner, the Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party, or CGP) asserted the issue of internal security in a clearer way, equating burgeoning social movements with the danger of a communist revolution unfolding; this he saw as a possibility posing a signal danger to the state (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975b, p. 180). Another MP, şevket Kazan, argued that the real intention of student movements was not to fix the problems they encountered in their universities – they were movements threatening the very survival of the state. He concluded that if a movement rose against the Turkish state, then civilian and security institutions and elites must come together to suppress it (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975b, p. 189). Thus, under the MC government, the mechanism of political pulling became clearly visible, requiring the military’s direct involvement in political processes. The parliamentary consensus signifies politicians’ acceptance of their inability to achieve public order in the country, legitimizing the military’s role in public security. When civilian support achieved consensus and the military gained sufficient experience in public security, succeeding governments did not hesitate to use the military against movements opposing their regime, consolidating the mechanism of political pulling.

Despite wide support from politicians, there were nevertheless reactions against the extension of martial law. The Democratic Party MP Turgut Cebe criticized the Justice Party, stating that the government did not hold “political power” per se as it used martial law as a bulwark to internal and external threats (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1975c, p. 245). Significantly, the Ecevit government was against the continuation of martial law in the second part of the 1970s. Ecevit stated many times that his government considered the regime an extraordinary measure to assure law and order within national territory during the Cyprus Intervention, when there was a real threat. Echoing Ecevit in a parliamentary speech, the RPP MP Necdet Uğur declared his opposition to the impulse to extend martial law in the face of internal threats (Üskül 2016, p. 236). Another MP, Hasan Esat Işık, stated that the imposition of martial law under the Ecevit government was exclusively a response to external threats. While these were statements pointing out that martial law had become politicized in the hands of succeeding governments, the parliamentary opposition did not evince any reaction to the use of the military in public security, however, instead reaffirming the role of the military in the establishment of order.

While many different governments came to power in subsequent years, the debates on whether or not a state of martial law should be declared did not stop. When in 1978 Maraş Incidents happened under RPP rule, Demirel declared that his party would be voting “yes” to martial law. They would do this, he soon added, as they trusted the military more than they trusted the government in power. Here, it can be argued that civilian authorities verified once again the military’s role conception as the guardian of the state in the face of social unrest (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1978, p. 47). Since then, an agreement emerged among civilian actors according to which martial law was the primary instrument in the fight against terrorism (Beyribey 2022). This agreement strengthened the symbolic and practical dimension of the TSK’s role conception.

Ecevit, in an interview with the journalist Fikret Bila, declared the events of Kahramanmaraş to have been purposefully organized as to leave him no choice but to declare a state of martial law (Üskül, 2016, p. 54). Ecevit, who in 1974 had been defending a limited martial law (operational pulling), thought himself obliged to declare another period with an extended sphere of influence (political pulling). He was aware that the changing nature of pulling, when merged with the functional dimension of the TSK’s role conception, would pave the way towards the emergence of the mechanism of pushing – and a potential coup d’état in the long run.

The Practical Dimension of the TSK’s Role Conception: From Political Pulling to Pushing

Besides civilians’ positive approach to the declaration of martial law, its implementation under successive governments is also worth analyzing to demonstrate how the military increased its authority and power on the ground. With the experience it gained during martial law, the military found the opportunity to improve its political skills and to push its way into politics. Declarations of martial law were the main instruments of the military’s political articulation. They afforded the military the capacity to resolve political disputes and to regulate social relations and the everyday practices of citizens.

As the number and nature of declarations demonstrates, the Ecevit administration was careful to prevent the martial law regime from affecting the daily lives of Turkish society in significant ways. In July 1974, declarations made by the martial law commander Suat Aktolga were limited, concerning Adana, Hatay, and İçel. With these declarations, Aktolga informed citizens about the donation campaign for the military, then fighting in Cyprus (Üskül, 2016, p. 24) In a similar vein, in his official declaration No. 1, the martial law commander of İzmir, Necmettin Sönmez, explained how local populations should behave in the case of an air strike (Üskül, 2016, pp. 50–51). Thus, under the Ecevit administration, and during its initial phase, martial law appeared mostly as an example of operational pulling. While the military was pulled by civilian authorities, its involvement in politics remained, for the most part, limited.

On September 18, Prime Minister Ecevit resigned, ending the RPP-NSP coalition government. Between November 17, 1974 and March 31, 1975, the Irmak administration governed the country despite lacking a vote of confidence. During this period, martial law commanders began to release more detailed declarations and became increasingly involved in the daily lives of Turkish citizens. Declaration No. 22, released in November 1974, made the organization of protests and activities of associations subject to the permission of the martial law commander. Meanwhile, the martial law commander of Ankara, Arif Koçak, prohibited the publication of the journal Aydınlık; an assigned military prosecutor later initiated an interrogation concerning it. Martial Law Commander Koçak further declared that some students were to be expelled from Ankara and transferred to another city as they disturbed peace and order (Üskül, 2016, p. 35).

When the First MC government came to power on March 31, 1975, the political pulling mechanism became more evident, with a significant extension of the military’s operational autonomy. Thus, military commanders were more confident when implementing their duty and enjoyed a wider area of authority to intervene. Under the MC government, in one of his final declarations, Martial Law Commander Koçak declared that military authorities were aware of increasing criticism of their decisions. He soon added that they would use their authority in the context of Law No. 1402, regardless of the core reason for the declaration of the current state of martial law. During this period, martial law commanders also started to act as mediators in discussions between workers and employers. The negotiations were later settled collectively in the Istanbul Central Command (Istanbul Merkez Komutanlığı). Subsequently, some pulling mechanisms were triggered under the Demirel administration with the prohibition of the opposing party leader Ecevit’s speech during a meeting by martial law commanders (Üskül, 2016, p. 10). Thus, under the Demirel administration, martial law commanders enjoyed wide-ranging influence in almost every area of daily life and uncontested autonomy in the security realm.

Moreover, the complete absence of civilian oversight institutions appeared problematic in its own right, mainly under the Demirel administration. Demirel criticized the establishment of an intermediary institution, assuming that it would harm the autonomy of the military in the field. In 1978, he declared it was important to “let the commanders handle the martial law” – an attempt to secure the autonomy of the military on the ground and to secure its loyalty to his administration, but politicizing the military in a significant way (Cizre 1993, p. 151).

In August 1975, martial law came to an end. It took three years for the Ecevit administration, responding to violent clashes in Maraş, to declare another spell of martial law in 13 cities. This time, the main reason behind the decision for the declaration of martial law on December 25, 1978 was purely related to domestic politics and the internal situation of the country – the institution of martial law, that is, was another example of political pulling. With the declaration of martial law in 1978, military authorities who had already begun to increase their maneuver at the end of 1974 found the opportunity to become real decision-makers on the ground. This was when the practical dimension of the TSK’s role conception merged with the mechanism of political pulling to trigger the mechanism of pushing. As the theoretical section sought to demonstrate, when the positive attitude of civilian authorities to the declaration of martial law merged with the changing nature of military missions under martial law, the pushing mechanism was activated. The military did not hesitate to act in the role of decision-maker, assuming the status on behalf of political authorities. With the increasing action the military conducted on the ground, there were clashes regarding the decision-making process and the implementation of martial law. During the discussions in 1978, the Ecevit administration aimed at extending the state of martial law to include central cities where violent nationalist groups were intensely active. The Chief of General Staff Evren rejected this suggestion, principally citing the military’s incapacity, and further defending the extension of martial law to eastern cities such as Diyarbakır, where leftist and ethnic dissident groups were increasingly active. The military appeared in the role of decision-maker, capable of rejecting civilian decisions and suggesting the implementation of contrary ones (Üskül, 2016, p. 55). In 1979, the Chief of General Staff Evren declared that martial law commanders would not be subordinate to the Martial Law Coordination Command, rejecting any submission to civilian authorities (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 293). In the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’état, he did not hesitate in declaring martial law in 67 cities.

Under the martial law of 1978, numerous curfews, permissible only if there were a state of martial law according to the Turkish legislation, were declared. According to declaration No. 2, curfew would be adopted between 18.00 and 05.00 in Kahramanmaraş. During the implementation of this period of martial law, military authorities were also granted the permission to use weapons according to the TSK Internal Service Law No. 87 and Law No. 1281 (Üskül 2016, p. 67).

The martial law commander of Adana, Nevzat Bölügiray, claimed in his memoirs that he appointed the commander of the gendarmerie to replace Adana’s assassinated police chief Cevat Yurdakul. Although this assignment was temporarily realized, the Ministry of the Interior, according to Bölügiray, did not appoint a new civilian police chief for a long time; the head of the gendarmerie continued to serve as the chief of police under the direct control of the martial law commanders. In other words, civilian decision-makers were either late to respond to fundamental security issues or they seemed to leave the responsibility to the military (Bölügiray, 1989, p. 125).

Furthermore, under martial law, the military is charged with the control and observation of prisons. Bölügiray, in his memoirs, stated that he compared civilian and military prisons and concluded that prisons under military control were better than their civilian counterparts (Bölügiray, 1989, p. 75). This simple statement demonstrates how martial law strengthened the role conception of the military and made politicians believe that everything under military control was better than when it was fully under civilian control. The military were thus persuaded to believe they should push to put things in order.

On occasion, the accumulation of discourses affirming positive images of military control led to radical decisions. For example, in Adana under the martial law regime, the declaration of martial law No. 26 ruled that military personnel were authorized to kill any person who did not respect his orders. Criticized by some of his own personnel on stating that this declaration was actually contrary to current legislation, Bölügiray gave a noteworthy response: after the 1980 coup d’état, he argued, illegal declarations of this kind had become a legal norm per se (Bölügiray, 1989, p. 160).

Under martial law, military commanders were granted control of intelligence gathering, considering themselves to be acting in the name of the police; thus a Special Team was created in 1979. Bölügiray stated that the Chief of General Staff and the subsequent leader of the 1980 coup d’état Kenan Evren visited him several times to ask whether any resistance would occur in the region should a coup be declared by the military (Bölügiray 1989, pp. 577–579).

Another significant outcome of these periods of martial law was the establishment of military-led martial law tribunals. According to Law No. 1402, military authorities began to judge civilians. For example, martial law commanders of Ankara, Çankara, and Kastamonu prepared indictments of both Idealist right-wing organizations and socialist/communist parties (T. C. Çankırı-Kastamonu İlleri Sıkıyönetim Komutalığı Askeri Savcılığı 1981). In 1979, some police officers were detained by martial law commanders and judged by military prosecutors. Moreover, participants in many violent events in the 1970s – among them those of Malatya and Kahramanmaraş – were to be judged by martial law tribunals (TBMM Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, pp. 753–757).

Finally, but no less significantly, it must be noted that the well-known Flag Operation, a step prior to direct military intervention on behalf of the TSK, was prepared by the Second Chief of General Staff and first presented during a meeting of martial law commanders. Martial law commanders and force commanders discussed this plan to decide on the details of the upcoming military coup in 1980 (TBMM Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, pp. 753–757).

As all these examples demonstrate, many practices and procedures under a state of martial law enlarge the authority and autonomy of the military on the ground. The military, after being repeatedly pulled into the realm of politics, discovered itself free to use its extensive domain of influence to trigger the mechanism of pushing. This was demonstrated in 1980 – a year the military decided to intervene in politics on its own initiative alone.