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David vs. Goliath: Kaliningrad Oblast as Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubble’ Cover

David vs. Goliath: Kaliningrad Oblast as Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubble’

Open Access
|Aug 2019

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.20 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 95 - 110
Submitted on: Dec 18, 2018
Accepted on: Jan 31, 2019
Published on: Aug 21, 2019
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2019 Sergey Sukhankin, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.