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China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry Cover

China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry

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Open Access
|Dec 2023

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.196 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 239 - 253
Submitted on: Jan 10, 2023
Accepted on: Dec 4, 2023
Published on: Dec 26, 2023
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2023 Matti Puranen, Sanna Kopra, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.