Incompatible Strategic Cultures Limit Russian-Chinese Strategic Cooperation in the Arctic

Ends: How does China describe its role in the world and in the Arctic?

Regarding China’s overall ends, in recent years Beijing has begun to assume the role of a great power. Whereas official documents and speeches have previously shown Chinese leaders focused on reassurances regarding the benign nature of Chinese intentions, and have generally gone to great lengths to emphasize how China is still a developing country, they are now increasingly emphasizing the country’s arrival as a great power. This development in the discourse among Chinese leaders and top-diplomats is led by General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, who, most forcefully in his report to the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2017, has underlined the profound changes visible in China’s position and role in the international system. Regarding the overall ends, Xi (2017) stressed that the aim is for China to become “a global leader in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence” by the “middle of the 21st century”. This is the core content of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴) – a notion or concept absolutely key to the CCP’s narrative on the development of China’s role in the international system (Xi, 2012; Xi, 2014; Yang, 2013; Yang, 2019). It is the U. S. and its allies, especially Japan and, increasingly, Australia, which are the hostile “other” seeking to prevent the realization of China’s national rejuvenation. Interestingly, Russia does not fill such a role, even though Imperial Russia was actually involved in the later parts of the Opium War, being both an ally of Britain, France, and the U.S. and a negotiator with the elites of the Qing dynasty (see, for example, Paine, 1996).

In official statements and speeches, there is often a strong emphasis on ensuring international respect for China as a great power. The strongest example of this is Xi’s (2021a) speech at the CCP’s 100th anniversary celebrations in Beijing in July 2021 in which he stated: “We will never allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China. Anyone who dares try to do that will have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people”. Such a statement demonstrates how the Chinese consider the process of rejuvenation to be an inevitable restoration of fairness rather than as the gaining of advantages over others (Qin, 2010). Xi’s speeches and statements further highlight how China increasingly wants to shape the international system – to increasingly become a “rule-maker” rather than a “rule-taker” (see, for example, Xi, 2021b). This reflects the development of a more confident China trying to take the initiative. This plays out differently in Chinese strategic approaches in the various regions, including in the Arctic, as discussed further below.

Regarding China’s Arctic ends, Beijing increasingly stresses the need to be respected and included in the Arctic as an important stakeholder. This is reflected in a number of policy paper and speeches by high-ranked Chinese decision makers. In late January 2018, China released its first Arctic Policy White Paper (State Council, 2018). It represents the development of a more confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the region over the last decade. The white paper states that “China is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. Geographically, China is a ‘Near-Arctic State’, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle” (State Council, 2018). Such an assertive Chinese posture in the Arctic is not an entirely recent phenomenon. In 2014, Xi Jinping had already openly characterized China as a “polar great power” and directly linked Chinese ambitions in the polar regions to the nation’s goal of becoming a maritime great power (Brady, 2017, pp. 3, 109; Martinson, 2019).

China’s main argument for why it is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs is that, since climate change in the Arctic has global implications, it is, therefore, not up to the Arctic states alone to establish the rules and norms for the future development of and access to the region and its resources. Non-Arctic states like China also have a role to play. It is noteworthy how the Chinese specifically highlight non-Arctic specific agreements and regulations:

In relation to our focus on Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation in the Arctic, given that Moscow insists on Arctic governance being a matter for Arctic states, Chinese ambitions to participate in Arctic governance and to promote “general international law” (State Council, 2018), so challenging Arctic-specific governance, are a particular cause of potential tension. Furthermore, Moscow is likely to be concerned by the way that Beijing defines the Arctic and the Antarctic, together with the seabed and outer space, as “new strategic frontiers” (战略新疆) crucial for advancing Chinese innovation and technology (Xinhua, 2015). In recent years, Beijing has made it clear through key strategic documents and policies that it aims to raise the level of its technological capabilities in the Arctic. With clear intentions for these capabilities to be dual use, i.e., for civilian and military purposes, it thus links up with Beijing’s ambition to develop a world-class military by 2049 (Sørensen & Hsiung, 2021).

Ways and means: How does China pursue its ends, in the world and in the Arctic?

Beijing principally employs three kinds of ways and means. The relative weight of each is adjusted to the particular state or region in question.

Firstly, the Chinese use their now-stronger economy to offer investments and attractive trade deals. Secondly, the now-stronger Chinese military is used in a more active way, both to project an image of China as a responsible and constructive great power (participation in UN missions or in anti-piracy operations, for example), and to deter and intimidate other states from challenging its interests (the comprehensive Chinese military exercises around Taiwan following the August 2022 visit of Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, for example). Thirdly, the Chinese have – as part of the focus on being a “rule-maker” instead of a “rule-taker” – increased their so-called lawfare activities, where they more directly question and challenge the legality and effectiveness of existing legal and institutional frameworks. This is evident on particular issues, such as non-proliferation, or in relation to the regulation of access and activities in specific regions such as the Arctic (as discussed further below). China endeavours to promote legal and institutional frameworks that better reflect its views and ensure its interests. As the nation’s political and diplomatic weight grows, it is easier for Beijing to win support for its suggestions and interpretations in institutions such as the bodies of the United Nations (see Carty & Gu, 2021; Gill, 2022, pp. 135–161).

Over the last decade, China has employed ways and means in a more “reward-and-punish” manner. Such a coercive turn is, however, presented by Beijing in terms of a defensive response to hostile U.S. or U.S.-led actions (Qin, 2023). China sees itself on the right side of history in restoring its position in the international system. A key point here is that the combination of a sense of rightfulness and growing confidence is likely to result in a decrease in both China’s willingness to compromise and in its focus on restraint and reassurance, which have so far been central as a precondition for developing Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic.

Regarding Arctic ways and means, Beijing is keenly aware that, not having Arctic territory, it is necessary that the Arctic states see benefits in having China involved. Its key focus is thus to establish strong and comprehensive relationships with the Arctic states and stakeholders, and to gradually increase China’s presence and influence in Arctic legal institutions and regulatory mechanisms. In the Arctic, Beijing has therefore prioritized employing its economic weight, including offers of access to Chinese scientific knowledge and technological advances, and lawfare activities (Sørensen, 2021). China thus seeks to gradually “knit” itself into the region on multiple levels by proposing benefits to the Arctic states and stakeholders.

In order to ameliorate concern among the Arctic states of an overly assertive Chinese approach, Beijing has so far been careful to balance proactiveness and reassurance. If the careful knitting tactics do not prove sufficiently successful, China is likely to become less patient and to adopt a more assertive line, as seen developing in the South China Sea in recent years (Mastro, 2021). Again, Beijing sees itself as a legitimate and important Arctic stakeholder.

A more confident and assertive Chinese approach to Arctic engagement is already discernible in its lawfare activities. China generally considers the Arctic governance regime to be provisional and unsettled, with opportunities for non-Arctic great powers such as itself to shape both its further development and the institutionalization of the rules and regulations in the region (see, for example, Pan, 2019; Zhang, 2019; Li et al., 2017). As stated in the Arctic white paper: “The governance of the Arctic requires the participation and contribution of all stakeholders” (State Council, 2018). Implicit here is a Chinese effort to promote legal and institutional frameworks in the region that would give non-Arctic states more influence. Beijing could arguably do this directly, using its role as an observer in the Arctic Council, for example, to obstruct from within by questioning the competence of the Arctic Council. It could also be done indirectly by supporting other groups with similar interests, such as Arctic Indigenous people or groups that also want a bigger say. There is a lively debate in China on the attractiveness of such tactics, and Chinese Arctic scholars often question the Arctic governance system, calling for revisions.

The current temporarily suspension of the Arctic Council – or Western boycott of Russia’s chairmanship following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 could give the Chinese more ammunition for their argument that the council, and the current legal and institutional framework privileging Arctic states generally, is not sufficient to deal with the challenges developing in the region. We have not, so far, seen Beijing use this pretext to openly challenge the Arctic Council – in contrast to Svalbard, where Chinese representatives have openly challenged Norwegian authority, for example during an exchange at the Svalbard Science Forum in 2019 (Hanger, 2019). Chinese Arctic scholars and experts often point out that Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard is limited due to the principle of non-discrimination, stating that signatory states, China among them, are entitled to the right of residence on the archipelago, and to fish, hunt or undertake any kind of maritime, industrial, mining or trade-related activity (Lu, 2019). If this is solely directed at Norwegian sovereignty, it is full in accordance with Russia’s position on Svalbard, who has also been questioning Norway’s sovereignty rights. If this, on the other hand, is the start of a broader Chinese challenge to Arctic governance, it will meet strong resistance among the Arctic states, including Russia.

Regarding Chinese military ways and means, there is no doubt that the Chinese military is seeking to gain more knowledge and experience of Arctic, or rather polar-specific, operations (Martinson, 2019). We are already seeing signs of how Chinese research facilities and activities in the Arctic play an important role in building knowledge and experience of navigating in the region, something also significant for the Chinese Navy. The Chinese research facilities in the Arctic also play a part in the rollout of China’s BeiDou-2 (北斗–2) navigation satellite system, and its space science programme and weather forecasting systems. These facilities, systems and programs evidently have dual-use character. While we have not, so far, seen any deployment of Chinese military capabilities in the region, the development of a world-class military by 2049 is a key component of Xi’s “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Involving the development of capabilities allowing the Chinese military to project power beyond the nation’s borders and coastlines, this will also likely play a role in the development of Chinese military presence in the Arctic.

China’s evolving strategic approach in the Arctic – summary

China sees itself as a great power. This includes in the Arctic. Beijing wants great power respect, status and influence, and sees the U.S. as increasingly hostile and not willing to accept it as an equal. It is thus the U.S. – with its allies and partners – that threatens the fulfilment of China’s great power ambitions. In the context of intensifying tension with the U.S, and a generally more critical assessment of China in the other Arctic states, China’s strategic cooperation with Russia in the Arctic will be increasingly important for Beijing. It is therefore likely that Beijing will continue to seek to advance Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic in the years to come. The question, then, is how such efforts will be met on the Russian side, especially as Russia begins to note China increasingly challenging Arctic governance through lawfare activities and both the extension of its economic, scientific and technological interests and the use of its dual-use facilities.

Ends: How does Russia describe its role in the world and in the Arctic?

In terms of Russia’s overall goals, the dominant objective, constant under the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is to ensure that Russia is a leading great power in the international system. The great power discourse can be seen in all major Russian strategy papers over the years; in Putin’s reign, it has evolved from being somewhat more than a “regional great power” to be “a leading world power” and “one of the sovereign centres of world”. Thus, in Russia’s foreign policy concept from 2000, Russia is referred to as a “great power, as one of the most influential centers in the modern world” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). The 2008 foreign policy concept states that Russia’s “increased role” in international affairs and “increased responsibility for global developments” make it necessary to “rethink the priorities of Russian foreign policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). This rethink is visible in the 2009 National Security Strategy, where Russia is referred to as a “world power” (mirovaya derzhava) (President of the Russian Federation, 2009b). The 2015 National Security Strategy states that Russia strives to be “a leading world power” (President of the Russian Federation, 2015). In the 2021 National Security Strategy, the leading world power notion has been replaced by the role of “one of the influential centers of the modern world” (President of the Russian Federation, 2021, p. 10). In the Foreign Policy Concept from 2023 Russia is labelled “one of the sovereign centres of the world” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

The great power discourse is also present in many of Putin’s speeches, and in speeches by other top figures in Moscow’s elite such as Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (Putin, 1999; Putin, 2007; Putin, 2014; Shoigu, 2018; Lavrov, 2016; Patrushev, 2014; Patrushev, 2015).

The great power discourse includes a whole set of perceptions of what the world looks like and how international relations should be understood. Thus, the Russian elite essentially has a “Hobbesian view of the world,” as Robert Legvold (2007) puts it: it regards the world as a dangerous place and the international system as anarchic, with each state having to take care of itself or otherwise perish. A great power position is thus the best way to secure survival of the state. Russia has been strongly critical of the unipolar world order led by the U.S., and even though Moscow argues that power is shifting towards the East – and they themselves have made an official pivot to the East – they do not regard the world as shifting towards bipolarity between the U.S. and China. Rather, they see the world as already being multipolar, with Russia as one of the poles or centres (President of the Russian Federation, 2009b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, 2016, 2023).

Another central feature of Russia’s strategic culture is its basic feeling of vulnerability and insecurity. Thus, in the Russian political and military leadership, according to Stephen R. Covington (2016, p. 16), there is a basic sense of geostrategic and technological vulnerability. The vast Russian territory – over 17 million square km, a land border of just under 20,000 km and a coastline of over 37,000 km, much of it in the Arctic – is, from the vantage of Russian strategic culture, basically impossible to defend, anywhere, at any one time. The sense of vulnerability is probably also a result of historical lessons learned from the two wars of existential significance in modern times in which Russia, including the Soviet Union, was involved. In both cases, the enemy came from the west across the Ukrainian and Belarusian plains: the armies of Napoleon between 1803 and 1815 and Hitler between 1941 and 1945. During the Cold War, the dominant threat came also from the West. An overarching Russian end is thus to seek to reduce its inherent feeling of vulnerability and insecurity by securing a sphere of “privileged interests” in its Eurasian neighbourhood, especially in its “near abroad”-facing west. Moscow thus essentially perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a major threat both to its security interests and its great power status.

To focus on the Arctic, it is clear that the region is central to Russia’s great power vision, not only because Russia actually stands as the largest power in the region, measured in both the extent of its territory and the size of its military and economic presence (Grajewski, 2017, p. 142), but also because the Arctic continues to play a historically significant role in Russian identity. Whereas Greenland is geographically separated from Denmark, as Alaska is from the contiguous U.S., the Arctic is an integral part of Siberia and an integral part of Russian politics and worldview. Just as the discovery and conquest of Siberia have played a central role in Russian (and Soviet) identity over the centuries, so have the great voyages of discovery in the Arctic. As Marlene Laruelle argues, the elite-driven narrative of the Russian Arctic “cultivates the national imagery of regeneration of great Russian power through a kind of Arctic rebirth” (see Grajewski 2017, p. 146). In the best heroic style, the Russian press regularly reports on Arctic expeditions, on the development of new military bases in the Arctic, or the testing of new weapons systems specifically developed for the difficult Arctic conditions (see, for example, Karnozov, 2020). The essence of these debates is that the Arctic plays a special identity role for Russia in two ways.

Firstly, the Arctic is seen as the place where Russia can recover from the derailment and humiliation of the 1990s, securing its greatness by exploiting the enormous resources expected to be found underground, essentially establishing the Russian Arctic as a means to retain or regain its great power status. Thus, in Russia’s Arctic Strategies from 2008 (President of the Russian Federation, 2009a) and 2013 (President of the Russian Federation, 2013) Russia’s interests in the Arctic are boiled down to using “the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base”. First of all, this concerns oil and gas exploration. Since most of the known reserves are located within Russia’s 200-nautical mile limit, Russia has a marked interest in securing the stability of the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gives it the sole right to exploit these fields. Russia is a strong supporter of the UNCLOS rules (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023) and interprets it in the same way as the other Arctic coast states, arguing that it is a region, unlike Antarctica, where coastal states have an exclusive right to use resources under the seabed and the water column to the 200 sea mile limit – the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Although it has not yet been an issue of great importance, in essence this is an area where China and Russia have divergent interests.

Secondly, sovereignty has become a priority for Russian central elites in discussions of the Arctic, where the risk of losing control of the region is considered nothing less than the risk of the loss of a central part of Russia and of Russian identity. The establishment of control over the Russian Arctic is thus an important end in itself. This is reflected in Russia’s Arctic Strategy from 2020, where the question of sovereignty was moved to the forefront. This further connects with the growing Russian emphasis on ensuring military superiority in the Russian part of the Arctic, including an intact second strike capability. The focus on national interests and sovereignty gained additional weight in March 2023 when Russia amended its 2020 Arctic strategy. In the 2023 amended version of the strategy, the focus on strengthening cooperation within Arctic multilateral fora such as the Arctic Council (formerly termed the “leading regional association”), the Coastal Arctic Five and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, was thus replaced by a focus on “development of relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis” … “taking into account the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (President of the Russian Federation, 2023). The same position can be seen in the new version of the Foreign Policy Concept (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

Taken together, these propositions underline the need to increase cooperation with China in the Arctic, while simultaneously setting limits as to how much, and under what terms, Russia can enjoy such cooperation.

Ways and means: How does Russia pursue its ends in the world and in the Arctic?

In order to fulfil its great power status aspirations, Russia has pursued a policy of internal balancing (Waltz, 1979, p. 168). In other words, it has been building up its military. After the war in Georgia in 2008, which Russia won but which showcased a number of fallacies within the Russian armed forces, Russia started a comprehensive military reform and rebuilt and modernized its military capabilities. In several respects Russia has for some years now been seen as a match for NATO, at least on European soil. A view which is being challenged by Russia’s lacklustre performance in Ukraine since 2022. Much of this build-up is a result of Russia’s sense of vulnerability and due to the Hobbesian world view of the elite. Therefore, Russia places great importance on spheres of influence and on establishing buffer zones, – which some scholars use to explain Russia’s war in Georgia and Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2014; Götz & Staun, 2022), and Russia’s enduring emphasis on securing control over Belarus. However, the buffer zone emphasis also plays a role in Russia’s policy in the Arctic including when it comes to its views on a growing Chinese presence and influence in the region.

In order to develop the Arctic as a resource base for oil and gas extraction, Russia has to invest heavily – or attract investment from the outside – in infrastructure in the area, so that the oil and gas can be processed and transported to consumers. This is politically most visible in the ambition to enhance the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Putin in 2018 publicly set a goal of increasing the commercial traffic ten-fold to 80 million tons before 2025 (Putin 2018). Later it was enhanced to 130 million tons before 2030 (Staalesen, 2023).

The notion of the ‘Arctic as a resource base’ gives Russia a strong interest in securing the Arctic as an area where it can trade in peace and harmony and where access to subsoil resources fllows UNCLOS rules. Resource extraction in the Arctic requires long-term investment and this requires certainty about financing. In addition, a number of known fields are located in areas offshore which are difficult to access. As a result, Russia initially invited Western energy companies to participate in the development of the fields as can be seen in the Arctic strategy from 2013 (President of the Russian Federation, 2013). However, following the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, which prompted Western sanctions, there have been restrictions on what Western companies can participate in, and many of the previous cooperation agreements have been scrapped. Instead, Russia for a long time sought to replace Western companies with Chinese energy companies and companies from other Asian countries. Russian cooperation with China on resource extraction and infrastructure development in the Russian Arctic plays a critical role for Russia in these efforts. Chinese companies have been able to purchase stakes in the two LNG projects on the Yamal Peninsula and cooperate with Russia on several other related projects (Wishnick, 2021). However, Russia has also sought to promote stronger relations and involvement in resource extraction and infrastructure development in the Russian Arctic from other Asian countries such as India, Japan and especially South Korea.

In this respect Russia’s sense of vulnerability sets distinct limits to the level of cooperation with other states in the Arctic, including China. Thus, the idea that Russia is best protected if it is surrounded by friendly states (under political control) or military buffer zones has profoundly influenced Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. Moscow has been reopening old Soviet bases and building new ones with military runways, as well as short-, medium- and long range air defence systems along parts of the northern shores. Furthermore, Russia has been deploying long-range missile systems on land and on navy vessels – primarily corvettes and frigates – rendering the Northern Fleet, which nowadays is basically a coastal fleet, more long range and offensive. This is mainly directed at the U.S. and NATO, but if China at some point wants to deploy for example nuclear submarines to Arctic waters, this will also concern them. The essence of this is that Russia wants to be in control of whom travels the NSR (and adjacent waters) and with what purpose. Therefore, Russia wants parts of the NSR – straits like the Kara Gate, and the Vilkitskii, Dmitry Laptev and Sannikov straits – to be internationally recognized as “internal waters” partly so the Russian state can better tax it, but mainly so Russia can better legitimately control who uses the shipping route (Overfield 2021). Something which, incidentally, the U.S. is strongly opposed to and says it will challenge at some point (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Russia has introduced a law requiring ships to give 45 days’ notice and accept a Russian pilot on board for passage along the NSR (Staalesen, 2019). So far there has been no strong reaction or clear position from China on this issue, but as Chinese interests in using the NSR increase in the long term, it is likely that China will also come to question this position.

Russia’s evolving strategic approach in the Arctic – summary

Russia wants to be a leading power in a multipolar international system and to be the leading power in the Arctic. To support this, the Russian government wants to use the Russian Arctic as a resource base for its economy and to exploit the vast resources of oil, gas, minerals and fish. Here Russia has common interests with China and has, to some extent, become dependent on Chinese support because of Western sanctions. Russia has a general interest in promoting partnerships with non-Western (including Chinese) energy companies and financial institutions to develop the Russian Arctic. In addition, Russia has promoted transnational shipping in the Arctic with a view to developing the NSR commercially to support energy extraction policies.

On the other hand, an inherent sense of vulnerability is ingrained in Russia’s strategic culture. To counter this insecurity and to underpin its great power role in the face of growing great power competition, Russia has been placing more emphasis on sovereignty. First of all, Russia wants to secure its sea-based nuclear second strike capability in the Arctic. To this end, it has built what is essentially a buffer zone along parts of its northern shores. Moscow also wants to have parts of the NSR recognized as “internal waters” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023, #50,3) thus securing control over it. In particular, it wants to keep the inner parts of the Barents Sea – where most of Russia’s surface vessels and submarines with nuclear weapons are based – free of foreign naval vessels, including Chinese vessels. This could eventually clash with China’s desire to become a maritime great power, including in the Arctic. Another point of contention with China is Russia’s deliberate use – along with the other Arctic coastal states – of UNCLOS rules as the main international framework for Arctic governance, to keep influence from non-Arctic countries to a minimum.