Causal Theories of Threat and Success – Simple Analytical Tools Making it Easier to Assess, Formulate, and Validate Military Strategy

THEORIES		OFFENSIVE REALISM (Mearsheimer, 2001)	DEFENSIVE REALISM (Taliaferro, 2000–01)
Theory of threat	Decision making assumption	Rational actor basing decisions on cost-benefit calculations	Rational actor basing decisions on cost-benefit calculations
	Intentions assumption	Actors are expansionist	Actors are status quo oriented
	If-then-because hypothesis	IF opportunity for cheap expansion, THEN Russian attack, BECAUSE Russia wants to maximize security and will expand territory until costs > gains	IF NATO expansion stops, THEN no risk of Russian attack, BECAUSE Russia wants to prevent loss of security and primarily uses force to protect its sphere of influence
Internal validity – conceptual clarity and logic		– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by offensive realism – Logical and internally consistent argument	– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by defensive realism – Logical and internally consistent argument
External validity – empirical testing and comparison with similar historical cases		– Expansion in Georgia, Ukraine, Libya, Mali and Syria – Putin promise to protect Russians abroad with force if need be – Military build-up and exercises emphasizing offensive operations	– Use of force reactive and focused on protecting Russia and its allies and maintaining influence in its ‘near abroad’ – Limited objectives in Georgia and Ukraine (2014–15) – Cooperative Russian approach in the Arctic
⟹ Threat assessment		High risk of conventional attack	Low risk of conventional attack
NATO end		Prevent conventional attack	Prevent conventional attack

Table 2

Competing theories of success concerning NATO’s choice of ways and means in the Baltics.

THEORIES		DETERRENCE BY DENIAL (Mazarr 2020)	DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT (Mazarr 2020)
Theory of success	Decision making assumption	Rational actor	Rational actor
	Intentions assumption	Actors are expansionist	Actors are status quo oriented
	⟹ Threat assessment	High risk of conventional Russian attack	Low risk of conventional Russian attack
	NATO end	Prevent conventional attack	Prevent conventional attack
	If-then-because hypothesis	IF NATO demonstrates capacity to deny cheap gain (fait accompli), THEN Russia will not attack, BECAUSE the benefits of attacking only exceed the costs if cheap fait accompli/quick success is likely	IF NATO signals willingness to fight if attacked and ceases from further eastern expansion, THEN Russia will not attack, BECAUSE Russia only attacks to prevent loss of territorial buffer/influence
Internal validity – conceptual clarity and logic		– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by deterrence by denial theory – Logical and internally consistent argument	– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by deterrence by punishment theory – Logical and internally consistent argument
External validity – empirical testing and comparison with similar historical cases		– Russian use of force in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria driven by expectation of quick decisive success – Regional balance of power favouring Russia, proximity and terrain enable offence – Military modernization enabling offence	– Russian use of force in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria sought to prevent loss of influence – Limited objectives in Georgia and Ukraine (2014–15) – general balance of power favouring NATO reduces risk of war – Military modernization enabling defence
⟹ Best ways and means		Deployment of 7 brigades in the Baltic region	Deployment of tripwire force in Baltic region
Risk		Moscow fear of NATO surprise attack triggers Russian pre-emption	Russian conventional attack overrunning tripwire force creating a quick and cheap fait accompli.

Sphere of influence explanation of Russian use of force in Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2014).

Table 3

Realist Balance of Power Theory (Mearsheimer 2014).

THEORIES
Theory of threat	Decision making assumption	Rational actors basing decisions on cost-benefit calculations
	Intentions assumption	Actors balance military threats to their national security by all means necessary²
	If-then-because hypothesis	IF Russia perceives Ukrainian membership of NATO as likely, THEN Russia will use force to prevent it, BECAUSE Russia views NATO expansion as a threat to national security and wants to maintain/maximize its power and influence
Internal validity – conceptual clarity and logic		– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by realist balance of power theory – Logical and internally consistent argument
External validity – empirical testing and comparison with similar historical cases		– Repeated Russian warnings that Ukrainian NATO (and EU) membership was unacceptable – Russian threats to use force to prevent this outcome – Russian use of force against Georgian in 2008 in response to NATO promise to admit Georgia and the Ukraine to NATO sometime in the future
⟹ Threat assessment		High risk of Ukrainian NATO membership
Russian end		Prevent Ukrainian NATO membership and loss of sphere of influence
⟹ Best ways and means		Quick use of force (fait accompli) to prevent Ukrainian membership of NATO

Table 4

Three theories of success indicating how NATO-Russian relations can be improved.

THEORIES		SPHERES OF INFLUENCE THEORY (Allison 2020)	REASSURANCE THEORY(Stein 1991)	POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT THEORY NINCIC (2010)
Theory of success	Decision making assumption	Rational actor	Rational actor	Rational actor
	Intentions assumption	Russia seeks to maintain a sphere of influence close to home	Russia seeks to maintain a sphere of influence close to home	Russia seeks great power recognition and partnership with NATO on equal terms
	NATO long-term end	Peaceful co-existence	Peaceful co-existence; reduce risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation	Transform Russia from enemy to friend
	If-then-because hypotheses	IF NATO refrains from expanding further East and from interfering militarily in the Russian sphere, THEN Russia will cease its use of (hybrid) warfare, BECAUSE it is motivated by fear of NATO expansion/aggression	IF NATO signals restraint and lack of hostile intent, THEN Russia will reciprocate thus paving the way for diplomatic negotiations, BECAUSE Russian hostility is motivated by fear of NATO expansion/aggression	IF NATO offers Russia inducements for cooperation, THEN Russia will reciprocate and initiate a virtuous spiral of cooperation, BECAUSE the gains involved will have a transformative impact on Russia-NATO relations in the longer term
Internal validity – conceptual clarity and logic		– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by sphere of influence theory – Logical and internally consistent argument	– Clear logic and concepts underpinned by reassurance theory – Logical and internally consistent argument	– Clear logic and concepts underpinned engagement theory – Logical and internally consistent argument
External validity – empirical testing and comparison with similar historical cases		Mutual recognition of Western and Soviet spheres of influence stabilized Western Europe after 1945	Western reassurance helped to stabilize Soviet-US relations during the Cold War and prevent inadvertent escalation	Western use of inducements improved relations between Russia and the West in the 1990s
⟹ Best ways and means		Stop of further NATO expansion to the East	– Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) – Agreements aimed at preventing dangerous military incidents	– Offer of inducements in return for cooperation on various issues of Western interest – Support for actors and organisations interested in rapprochement with the West
Risks		– Escalation of tensions where zones of influence overlap; – Undermining of liberal world order; – Invites further Russian expansion (Brands 2020)	Restraint may be mistaken for weakness	– Russia regards Western support for Western values inside Russia as hybrid warfare – No prospects for democratic reform in Russia in the near-medium term