Learning in the Force Protection Environment between International Operations: Last-Minute Learning

The Operational Context: Missions In Mali

Norway began support for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. The RNoAF’s contribution, consisting of a Hercules C130 transport aircraft with crew and other support personnel, comprised several deployments between January 2016 and May 2021. The total detachment from Norway consisted of approximately 60 to 70 women and men with backgrounds in various fields of expertise required to execute the mission; these were principally aviators, navigators, cargo masters, technicians, security personnel, and other support personnel. The Force Protection unit that is studied in this article is situated at Ørland Main Air Station. The Aircraft and support personnel is located at Gardemoen Airbase.

The force protection soldiers’ principal duties were to assure the security of the RNoAF’s bases and joint detachments. When force protection personnel operated in Mali, their objectives were primarily securing the base and establishing safe perimeters when the Norwegian Hercules C130 operated. This type of force protection aims to reduce the vulnerability of personnel, materials, and operations to ensure their own freedom of action and operativity.

Research Question and Theory

This article examines the following questions: What are the obstacles to learning in a military context? How did these obstacles manifest themselves in the RNoAF’s contribution in Mali? How effective were formal and informal learning processes, which took place in overcoming these obstacles? And what does this tell us about how learning in a military context might be improved?

According to NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, the acquisition of knowledge is a process requiring one to “learn efficiently from experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, to improve performance, both during the course of an operation and for subsequent operations” (NATO, 2019, p. 149). Several authors argue that military organizations need to address both formal and informal processes if lessons can be drawn through continuous learning (O’Toole & Talbot, 2011; Dyson & Pashchuk, 2022; Dyson, 2020; Maarten et al., 2022; Harig, 2020; Coticchia & Moro, 2016). Without repetition in training, exercises, and operations, these core competencies can quickly deteriorate with the risk of defeat in battle. For a recent articulation of this argument, see Gentile (2010).

It has been identified that the ability of the Israeli Defense Forces to successfully adapt to battlefield surprises in action was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organizational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organizational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialized commando units acting as “incubators” for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalize and disseminate lessons learned (Marcus, 2009).

A study from the Australian Army identified two learning systems: a formal learning system directly managed by the organization, and an informal system driven by the organizational culture and fostered through strong social networks (O’Toole & Talbot, 2011). The study’s authors advocate a social theory of learning process, encompassing the sharing of knowledge and experience through social interaction. Similarly, Catignani (2014) advocates applying social theory in adapting both informal and formal learning in the British Army. As the experiences of the British and American armies in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, by institutionalizing bottom-up learning through formal channels and battlefield knowledge management programs, modern militaries are increasingly able to learn and adapt on the ground at a more rapid pace (Foley et. al., 2011).

Learning can be hampered if the acquisition of knowledge through formal learning systems cannot take place in a timely fashion. It can also be impaired by being decontextualized in an effort to make the knowledge generally applicable. Military organizations can adapt in two ways to underperformance and environmental change: they can exploit core competencies to refine or modify existing tactics, techniques and technologies, and they can explore new capacities by developing new modes and means of operations (March, 1999).

In military organizations, memory is stored in doctrine, lessons-learned processes, and training. Good memory facilitates exploitation of core competencies; effective doctrine, lessons-learning, and training all contribute to the recall and appropriate application of core routines (March & Levitt, 1999). The second enabling factor is the degree of centralization in the organization. Centrally controlled organizations are efficient at exploitation because they can allocate resources as necessary to sustain a sufficient repertoire of competencies and ensure adequate application of competencies in operations.

Organizations in which authority and a degree of autonomy are delegated to component units are less efficient at the management of core competencies. They are, however, more sensitive to changes in their local environment. These two characteristics, less focused on centrally managed competencies and more focused on local conditions, more incline decentralized organizations to explore new alternatives (March, 1999). The third factor is personnel turnover. Ideas travel with people and organizations can lose old knowledge when people leave. But new appointments can bring fresh ideas and perspectives when they join organizations. This effect is most pronounced at the top – hence struggling businesses often try to turn things around by replacing their chief executives (March, 1999).

In the RNoAF, several studies of learning processes have been done (see, among others, Antonacopoulou et al., 2019a; 2019b). There is currently a need for studies examining different areas of the RNoAF from learning perspectives. The RNoAF’s recent mission in Mali represents continuous participation in international operations. These operations offer the potential to illuminate what happens to experiences and knowledge after the completion of the mission.

Folland (2009) introduced the concept of the holistic debrief. Moldjord and Fredriksen (2017) point out that learning involves action, thought, and reflection, and that one must be conscious of this process in order to learn from it; they clarify that the act itself does not necessarily lead to learning – one must reflect on the act, asking questions and thinking actions through, if one is to create reflexive processes and conscious experiences. The purpose of debriefing has traditionally encompassed everything from the restitution and prevention of trauma to organizational emphasis on learning, knowledge sharing, and development for groups in practical contexts (Moldjord & Fredriksen, 2017; Haga & Maaø, 2018).

Learning is often described through two main approaches to acquire learning. The first is rooted in individual cognitive learning theory, where learning largely occurs as an individual cognitive information process, focusing on the individual learner. The second main approach looks at learning through practice and participation in social and cultural relations rooted in the concrete situation (Filstad, 2017). Mastery learning involves a master as an educator in an art, subject, or craft under a legal contract, describing the relationship between the master and the apprentice and the duration and conditions of the relationship (Nielsen & Kvale, 2009, p. 18).

Traditionally, this has primarily been in statutory institutional structures and through a written agreement between an apprentice and a master, often referred to as håndverkslæren (“learning the craft”), or situated learning (Nielsen & Kvale, 2009). Learning from a master cannot be understood like this in all contexts, however. Through a historical approach to the term, the authors emphasize that there are various forms of learning a craft.

In Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (2009) theory for situated learning, skill-appropriation is divided into five levels: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. While Dreyfus and Dreyfus claim that this way of considering situated learning perceives the pupil as a single individual isolated from the social context, they nevertheless believe that although any kind of learning obviously always takes place in a social situation, the situation does not necessarily affect the learning outcome (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2009, pp. 71–72). Although this does not exclude other ways of acquiring new knowledge, such as trial and error or imitation, the model uses formal teaching as the foundation to make skill acquisition as explicit as possible.

Lave (2009) has developed a theory of learning as socially situated (Nielsen & Kvale, 2009). This is based on the situated acquisition of knowledge through participation in communities of practice, where implicit knowledge also becomes a factor in the process (Filstad, 2017). Thus, situated learning is not conditioned to isolated educational institutions but is integrated in everyday practices. In doing so, the actual learning in situated learning is described as the social and bodily activities that take place in particular organized practices (Nielsen & Kvale, 2009).

Situated learning is understood here as decentralized rather than individual-centered, as the community of practice, and legitimate peripheral participation in this, contribute to learning in a master-apprentice relationship as well (Nielsen & Kvale, 2009).

Argyris & Schön (1978) argue that a learning organization will presumably never be able to achieve the goal of deutero-learning – that is, the organization itself learning to learn. Coghlan & Brannick termed this meta-learning (Coghlan & Brannick, 2010). But can these barriers to learning be overcome? Argyris & Schön (1978; 1996) have asked whether organizations are engaged in single- or double-loop learning, and whether the barriers to learning can be overcome (Morgan, 1986; 2011). To succeed, the people within the organization must be trained in understanding the assumptions and framework of a practice so that these may be challenged – what Schön (1983) calls self-reflective practice. By using one’s practical knowledge and challenging the existing learning processes in the organization, it may be possible to achieve such learning (Lien & Skarsvåg, 2012).

Polanyi (1967) introduced the concept of “tacit knowledge” – knowledge that cannot be expressed through language. He offers a more philosophical approach to learning through experiences – does the theory exist before the problem? For Polanyi, the problem awareness present in a discovery process is dynamic and intertwined with the assumptions of a solution guiding the work (Lien & Skarsvåg, 2012).

The SECI model formulated by Nonaka and colleagues (2005) is an attempt to understand the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. The acronym is formed of socialization (transfer of tacit knowledge), externalization (conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge), combination (the transfer of explicit knowledge), and internalization (the conversion of explicit to tacit knowledge). It is through socialization with others that one develops tacit knowledge, which is often based on an individual’s already existing tacit knowledge. By communicating this knowledge through externalization, knowledge can become explicit, and when this knowledge is available to others, it can be combined with theirs (Filstad, 2010).

This theoretical section has presented different aspects and perspectives of learning to strengthen the problem formulation and being able to identify obstacles to learning in military contexts. The following section addresses impediments to learning in a military context, specifically the RNoAF’s contribution in Mali, and how effectively these were overcome with the formal and informal learning processes that took place, with the aim of better understanding how learning in a military context might be improved.

Methods and materials

The article focuses on defining the obstacles to learning in a military context, and how these obstacles manifest themselves in the RNoAF’s contribution in Mali. How effective in overcoming these obstacles were the learning processes which took place, both formal and informal? And what does this tell us about the ways in which learning in a military context might be improved? To answer the research questions, a method based on the hermeneutic research tradition was chosen. This implies that the researcher’s goal is to create more insight and understanding of questions or phenomena (Kjeldstadli, 2000).

In order to create more insight and understanding of the learning processes in the force protection community at Ørland Main Air Station, we have used a qualitative approach with open, individual, in-depth interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009; Patton 1990). We carried out a strategic selection (Johannessen et al., 2006) of informants with the criterion that they had to be part of the force protection group at Ørland main air station and to have participated in NORTAD 2 (the second deployment of the Norwegian Tactical Airlift Detachment). At the same time, we were more flexible about which departments the informants come from and serve in from day to day.

So that our findings were as representative of the group as possible, we interviewed seven informants in different positions and from different departments, representing different aspect of the organization. These include everything from specialists to managers at various levels. In this way, we had the opportunity to map the perception of learning and how learning is arranged and takes place at different levels in the force protection group. All informants were presented the study scope and agreed to participate. Informed consent was given and all participants were given anonymity.

Our analysis followed an inductive approach that identified a link between the data we collected and already existing theory. The theory was used to explain and partly predict the significance of our results. In addition to describing our results and seeing them in the context of relevant theory, we aimed to explain and understand the connection between our results and theory. According to Jacobsen (2015), such an approach is often naturally taken because description, explanation, and partial prediction are closely interwoven. This made it appropriate for our research to not only describe, explain, or predict, but also to illuminate aspects in our survey using all three methods.

To obtain data for our research, we chose a qualitative approach with open, individual, in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted by two of the authors with a background in the force protection community, assuming that their in-depth understanding of the occupation and the operational context would be beneficial. We also sought an analytical distance from the process, both so our biases and experiences did not impact the results, and in order to identify our assumptions (Repstad, 1993).

The qualitative research in-depth interview can be characterized as a structured conversation with a fundamental purpose; the intention is to bring out the informants’ descriptions of the subject in question so the meaning of the content can be interpreted (Johannessen et al., 2006).

Seven informants were interviewed; the longest interview was 84 minutes and the shortest 26 minutes. The average for all the interviews was 47 minutes. Due to Covid-19, we chose to not conduct face-to-face interviews so as to reduce the risk of infection. Three of the interviews were therefore conducted by phone. The other four were done on the online video platforms Teams and Zoom.

The interview template had a semi-structured design, in which the questions had been put in an appropriate order to distinguish between topics and focus areas for the interview. The sequence could nevertheless be varied to give the informants flexibility to jump back and forth between questions if necessary.

After the interviews were conducted, the audio recordings were transcribed. In our hermeneutical research design, we categorized conditions and findings through open coding (Jacobsen, 2015), also closely associated with categorization of opinions (Johannessen et al., 2006). We saw that saturation was achieved (see Boddy, 2016) and that the number of interviews was sufficient. Malterud and her colleagues (2015) argue that saturation is not the only principle guiding the sample size of qualitative research and proposes a practice of “information power.” This principle, similar to that of saturation, is based in the information density of the samples, meaning that the more information an interview contains, the fewer participants are needed.

For the data analysis, we printed the transcribed interviews and categorized the information using colour-coding. This involved categorizing specific topics found throughout the interviews. The categorization was done based on what the informants described in their own language; words and phrases formed various factors that were given different colour codes. Subsequently, the various factors were grouped in the following categories: technical/tactical focus, holistic debrief as a tool for learning and reflection, practice communities, tacit knowledge, situated learning, focus on new missions, and personnel management. The similarities and differences of the topics resulted in three results we have chosen to call “formal skill acquisition,” “learning through practice communities,” and “last-minute learning” (skippertakslæring).

To avoid misquotations, the transcribed interviews have been sent to all informants. We have accommodated the few corrections that two of the informants made. None of the informants made any corrections of the citations relevant for the study.

Communities of practice

In addition to the formal processes described earlier in the article, we also see that the force protection group learns through communities of practice. These communities emerge through informal, but often technical, conversations: during breaks, for example, or work-related conversations in the office or in the lunchroom. In the theory section of this article, communities of practice are described as both a formal and informal learning process, but the results from Table 3 shows that the informal side of the community of practice is most prominent.

Several other informants describe such processes in a similar way. As a result of the social network of some people in the force protection group, people bring job-related discussions home and air these during social gatherings in their spare time. This is in line with the theory of learning process, which encompasses sharing knowledge and experience through social interaction (O’Toole & Talbot, 2011). Similarly, Catignani (2014) advocates applying social theory in adapting both informal and formal learning. In this manner, the communities of practice also unite outside the workplace. One reason for this may be that learning and transferring tacit knowledge primarily happens in informal settings (Filstad, 2017); given that much learning is tacit in nature, this form of learning and transfer of competence most often occurs in the practice arena (Polyani, 1966; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).

It is important to both acknowledge the kind and amount of tacit knowledge affecting the organization so as to increase the potential for development and learning (Moldjord, 2007). Acknowledging both the technical and cognitive tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), and how these may be transmitted and externalized according to the SEKI model (Nonaka et al., 2000), may be of benefit to ensure experience transfer from NORTAD 2.

Moldjord (2007) finds that while tacit knowledge can be positive for an organization, it can also be inhibitory, even inimical, to learning and development; a group’s culture may serve as an obstacle to the transmission of tacit knowledge through conversation, leaving it withheld and hidden, if individuals within a group are afraid of losing face, status, or influence. Moldjord designates such cultures “high-performance,” having a prominent focus on results and skills.

Informants report, meanwhile, that seeking an expert’s advice does not necessarily mean looking for advice further up in the system or hierarchy, but, rather, from the one with the most experience or expertise in the given field. This resonates with the thinking of Foley et. al. (2011); such experiences may imply that the community of practice facilitates learning and knowledge being exchanged across the hierarchy of grades and positions.

We observed that experience and learning from NORTAD 2 are primarily shared through a form of situated learning in which the most experienced in the units provide experience-sharing through various communities of practice. Several of the informants are careful to imply this when they point out that the experiential transmission between, for example, NORTAD 2 and NORTAD 3 is not rooted in the organization, and therefore knowledge and experience are shared individuals who think it important.

Last-minute learning

The results (Table 4) shows that while the force protection group learns through experience-sharing when facing new missions, the organization has not implemented good routines for doing so. The reason for this is that there is not a continuous focus on learning in the force protection group. The group’s focus on learning, on the other hand, manifests periodically, often in conjunction with new setups and preparations for new missions and operations. This implies that a focus on learning gradually fades away after the completion of a mission, reappearing only when preparing for new missions.

We have chosen to call this phenomenon last-minute learning. In our analysis, we have found two main reasons why a focus on learning is periodical rather than continuous. The first is that new chores and tasks require the immediate attention of personnel who do not prioritize reflection on what they have learned from the newly completed mission; the second is uncertainty over the status of positions, arising from the dismissal of personnel. We will now examine how these two aspects contribute to the occurrence of last-minute learning.

The first reason for the discontinuity in the focus on learning may be owed to the extent to which new tasks and new missions are prioritized, affecting the potential of gaining insight from NORTAD 2.

In order for learning to be called “organizational,” knowledge must somehow manifest itself within the organization so that it is not limited to individuals (Argyris & Schön, 1978; 1996; March, 1999). However, we see little evidence of organizationally entrenched processes to share competence and achieve organizational learning. Informant 6’s desire to be included earlier in the planning phase of new missions may be one way of anchoring experience transfer in the organization. The other reason for why the focus on learning is not continuous is that there was uncertainty regarding positions and contracts when personnel returned home from Mali.

Many started in new positions. Informant 1, for example, held four different positions throughout the year he was deployed in Mali, creating uncertainty regarding his position when he returned to Norway. Also, several informants report that new positions and a hectic everyday life impacted the potential for learning after NORTAD 2. Based on this, we see a preference in the force protection group to continue doing the things that they have always done, or to do more of what the force protection group is already doing. The group therefore misses out on the double-loop learning required to address more fundamental reasons why problems or challenges arise (Argyris & Schön, 1978; 1996).

How the force protection group learns in single-loop learning is illustrated by the last-minute learning model. In the figure below, we see an illustration of the model in which the single-loop learning of the force protection group occurs in the bottom points, representing the time between operations. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that single-loop learning is not exclusively negative. Single-loop learning will be necessary as one is often required to correct errors and discrepancies, something the force protection group does, before one can start a process of preventive work. However, double-loop learning facilitates this through a more fundamental form of change (Argyris & Schön, 1978). This is the equivalent to the concept of exploration as proposed by March (1991). In order to achieve a continuous focus on learning, one may nevertheless attempt to avoid the focus disappearing completely between operations.

It is possible that this goal can be achieved by facilitating processes that lead to learning. This may involve, for example, establishing routines for documentation and experience transfer, holding on to personnel, and thus competence, and providing greater reassurance regarding position. This does not mean that the force protection group should stop the already- established and effective learning processes, but that it is beneficial to double-loop learning within the group (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

Figure 2 illustrates this by showing how a declining focus on learning is reflected on an earlier constant (marked with a red line). In this way, the competence and knowledge gathered through the mission will not disappear. Indeed, it can be further developed between operations; the focus on learning, marked with green line, can continue at the level enjoyed when preparations for new missions are initiated. Such a focus, in conjunction with new missions, may also increase as a result of a greater emphasis on learning in general. While the focus on learning will both spontaneously increase and decrease, this could nevertheless lead to a continuous focus on learning in the force protection group. This accords with the recommendations of Torgersen et al. (2020).

This can be implemented such that the personnel who go to Mali are carefully selected precisely to share competence with their respective departments when they return, so that the force protection group will assimilate the knowledge gained. Another positive aspect is that new personnel, even personnel from other air wings, are also being deployed. As well as hiring more of the operators only on temporary contracts in Mali, this will ameliorate uncertainty regarding positions. This can ensure that expertise remains in the force protection group and that learning after international operations receives greater attention.

Conclusion

The findings of the current study confirm that military organizations need to address both formal and informal processes so that experience gained can contribute to a process of continuous learning (O’Toole & Talbot, 2011; Dyson & Pashchuk, 2022; Dyson, 2020; Maarten et al., 2022; Harig, 2020; Coticchia & Moro, 2016).

This study shows that the force protection group learns primarily through a high focus on formal skill learning, including operational- and relation-oriented debrief as part of the holistic debrief. Learning, that is, must be linked to the operational context, so that experiences from one context can be automatically transferred to another, in line with the perspective of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2009). Personnel also learn through communities of practice where experience-sharing occurs informally and a form of situated learning takes place. Learning through communities of practice shows that the single individual is the initiator both of the sharing and the preservation of knowledge. Through the high-performance culture, we see a consistent desire to constantly develop and improve. The high performance culture that we have identified may however be an obstacle: one may choose not to share or question one’s opinion for fear of seeming less competent within the group. Finally, we see the force protection group learning through what we call last-minute learning, when learning receives extra attention shortly before new missions.

The last result shows how the force protection group learns through last-minute learning (experience-sharing performed without the support of any deliberate routine, commonly on the initiation of a new mission). This is sporadic process, meaning an intermittent focus on learning.

This study has identified two main reasons why last-minute learning occurs. The first cause is the focus on new missions; it would appear that these take so much attention that there is no time for formal learning processes after the completion of the previous mission, or that such processes are simply not prioritized. The second cause is the dismissal of personnel and uncertainty among personnel regarding their positions. Staff spend a lot of energy and time pondering either their position or role while being deployed, and whether they’ll get their old positions back when they return home at the end of the mission.

In addition, some of the competence acquired from deployments in Mali may be lost because personnel are not offered new contracts when they return home. These aspects turn out to be recurring when new missions emerge. We therefore see that last-minute learning causes the force protection group’s learning processes to lean towards single-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978). The informants report that in the aftermath of NORTAD 2, they made the same mistakes as before, and that the focus on learning felt reactive when preparing for NORTAD 3.

Further work

We find that manning and time pressure also contribute to the emergence of last-minute learning. A follow-up study should look into how force protection could develop from what is demonstrated in Figure 1 into that illustrated in Figure 2. This would not only benefit the force protection, but other military organizations with deployment and rotation of personnel.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Further studies could offer another interesting perspective by considering how the force protection group learns when deployed in Mali. Our discussion about learning in the wake of NORTAD 2 could have taken a different direction if we had looked at how and what the personnel learned during the operation. The study also shows that the time aspect is important, so a study covering a longer duration would be particularly useful for looking at potential development between different operations.