Abstract
The evidentiary threshold for establishing intent to commit genocide remains one of the most intricate and contested issues in international criminal law. While the 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as requiring ‘dolus specialis’—the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, this mental element has proven difficult to substantiate, particularly in instances of systematic or state-orchestrated mass violence. This study critically examines whether the prevailing doctrinal interpretation of genocidal intent adequately reflects the evolving character of contemporary atrocities and assesses the potential of alternative conceptual models, such as inferred or knowledge-based intent, to enhance legal accountability. Employing a doctrinal methodology, it draws upon international jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Criminal Court, together with treaty interpretation and theoretical scholarship. The analysis identifies the restrictive construction of intent as a principal impediment to effective prosecution, especially in the absence of explicit statements or documentary evidence. It contends that the current legal framework risks obscuring structural manifestations of genocidal policy by privileging direct proof of subjective intent. The article concludes that a context-sensitive, inferential approach to genocidal intent is both legally tenable and necessary to realise the preventive purpose of the Genocide Convention.