References
- Acemoğlu, D. (2025). The simple macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy, 40(121), 13–58.
- Acemoğlu, D., Autor, D. & Johnson, S. (2023). Can we Have Pro-Worker AI? Choosing a path of machines in service of minds. CEPR Policy Insight, No 123. CEPR Press.
- Acemoğlu, D. & Johnson, S. (2023a). Macht und Fortschritt: Unser 1000-jähriges Ringen um Technologie und Wohlstand. Campus Verlag.
- Acemoğlu, D. & Johnson, S. (2023b). Democracy needs Ukraine to win. In Y. Gorodnichenko & V. Rashkovan (Hrsg.), Supporting Ukraine: More critical than ever (S. 7–12). CEPR Press.
- Acemoğlu, D. & Restrepo, P. (2019). Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 128(6), 2188–2244.
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369–1401.
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1231–1294.
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In P. Aghion & S. N. Durlauf (Hrsg.), Handbook of Economic Growth (Vol. 1 A, S. 386–472). Elsevier.
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. A. (2012). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Reply. American Economic Review, 102(6), 3077–3110.
- Acemoğlu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Business.
- Albouy, D. Y. (2012). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Comment. American Economic Review, 102(6), 3059–3076.
- Becker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Rogoff, K., & Weder di Mauro, B. (Hrsg.). (2022). Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine. CEPR Press.
- Buchanan, J. M. (1993). How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper? Constitutional Political Economy, 4(1), 1–6.
- Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.
- Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–359.
- Eucken, W. (2008). Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (E. Eucken & K. P. Hensel, Hrsg., 7. Aufl.). UTB. (Originalquelle veröffentlicht in 1952).
- North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. C. & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Journal of Economic History, 49(4), 803–832.
- Ogilvie, S. & Carus, A. W. (2014). Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective. In P. Aghion & S. N. Durlauf (Hrsg.), Handbook of Economic Growth (Vol. 2, S. 403–513). Elsevier.
- Olson, M. (2000). Power And Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist And Capitalist Dictatorships. Basic Books.
- Patel, D., Sandefur, J. & Subramanian, A. (2021). The new era of unconditional convergence. Journal of Development Economics, 152, 102687.
- Pennekamp, J. (2024, 10. Dezember). Seit Jahrzehnten löst die Demokratie nicht ein, was sie verspricht. FAZ.Net.
- Prize Committee. (2024a). Scientific Background to the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2024.
- Prize Committee. (2024b). They provided an explanation for why some countries are rich and others poor. The Prize in Economic Sciences 2024. Popular Science Background. Royal Swedish Academy.
- Sachs, J. D. (2001). Tropical Underdevelopment. NBER Working Paper, 8119.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3. Aufl.). HarperCollins. (Originalquelle veröffentlicht in 1950).
- von Petersdorff-Campen, W. (2024, 14. Oktober). „Musk fehlt Charakter“: Ökonom Acemoğlu über die gefährliche Macht der Tech-Milliardäre. FAZ.Net.