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Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems Cover

Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Volume 22 (2012): Issue 4 (December 2012)
By:   
Open Access
|Dec 2012
References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10006-012-0071-0 | Journal eISSN: 2083-8492 | Journal ISSN: 1641-876X
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Language: English
Page range: 951 - 969
Published on: Dec 28, 2012
Published by: University of Zielona Góra
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
Keywords:
Nash equilibrium,
coordination in hierarchical systems,
decentralized control,
asymmetric information.
Related subjects:
Mathematics,
Applied mathematics

© 2012 Michał P. Karpowicz, published by University of Zielona Góra
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License.

Volume 22 (2012): Issue 4 (December 2012)
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