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The Second Axelrod Tournament: A Monte Carlo Exploration of Uncertainty About the Number of Rounds in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Cover

The Second Axelrod Tournament: A Monte Carlo Exploration of Uncertainty About the Number of Rounds in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Open Access
|Apr 2025

Abstract

Strategic decision-making in multi-agent interactions inside the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is investigated in this work using Monte Carlo simulations. Building on Axelrod’s work, we present a second-generation tournament with stochastic components, including unpredictable game lengths, to evaluate strategy adaptability and resilience. We analyze how uncertainty influences strategic performance by using a comparison between instances with fixed and uncertain times. We identify, using a descriptive approach, methods demonstrating important behavioral differences between deterministic and uncertain settings. The results provide understanding of adaptive learning, response dynamics, and strategic flexibility, so helping to build strong collaborative strategies for artificial intelligence and decision-making systems. Our results highlight the limitations of exclusively deterministic methods and suggest the necessity for adaptive approaches to improve long-term cooperative success.

Language: English
Page range: 67 - 82
Published on: Apr 1, 2025
Published by: Babeș-Bolyai University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year

© 2025 Gabriel Pop, Mircea Milencianu, Alexandra Pop, published by Babeș-Bolyai University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.