Abstract
The article examines current trends in organized cybercrime in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, with an emphasis on information operations and their underestimated danger in Europe. The authors prove that Russia’s cyberattacks are part of its military strategy, combining traditional and digital means of warfare, including information campaigns, disinformation, attacks on critical infrastructure, economic espionage, and the use of cryptocurrencies to finance illegal activities. Cases of attacks on Ukrainian energy networks, examples of the use of deepfake technologies, and the latest manifestations of online fraud related to the war are considered. The legal regulation of cyber operations is analyzed in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL), the Budapest Convention, and the new UN Convention on Cybercrime. Particular attention is paid to the Tallinn Manual as a tool for the legal qualification of cyberattacks as an act of armed aggression. The authors emphasize the need to develop new legal concepts (cyberwar, cyberpropaganda, information operations) and create effective mechanisms to counter organized cybercrime at the international level. Ukraine’s experience in cooperation between the state and civil society in cyberspace is presented as an example of effective counteraction to hybrid threats. The purpose of the article: to show what are the trends in cybercrime during war with a focus on information operations, the danger of which is still underestimated in Europe. To justify the need to regulate orga-nized cybercrime within the framework of cyberwar.