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Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics Cover

Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics

By: Ivan Jankovic and  Walter Block  
Open Access
|Dec 2019

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0019 | Journal eISSN: 1804-1663 | Journal ISSN: 1213-2446
Language: English
Page range: 365 - 397
Submitted on: Jun 7, 2019
Accepted on: Nov 15, 2019
Published on: Dec 21, 2019
Published by: Mendel University in Brno
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 issues per year

© 2019 Ivan Jankovic, Walter Block, published by Mendel University in Brno
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