Central Bank Independence and economic crises: how both the fed and ECB managed to rely on unconventional monetary policies
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2018-0030 | Journal eISSN: 2558-9652
Language: English
Page range: 335 - 348
Published on: Jun 15, 2018
Published by: Bucharest University of Economic Studies
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 times per year
Keywords:
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© 2018 Mădălina Doroftei, Alexandru Pătruți, published by Bucharest University of Economic Studies
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