The Primacy of the Giving of Facts Around the Problem of Apriorism in Max Scheler

The discussion revolves around the thesis that “in no case does apriorism lead to idealism”, taken as a fulcrum around which two movements are made. Firstly, this thesis is explained and then, in the second movement, reasons are given for thinking about the meaning of apriorism from the immanence of phenomenological experience, by grounding the problem in the essential and immediate intuition of knowledge-data. Consequently, the primary meaning of a priori is determined from the eidetic correlation between what is given in an absolute and evident way, in the sphere of facts, and the intuitive vision. This clarifies the meaning of the material character of the self-giving of facts, without naively identifying materiality with the mere sensible content of empirical observations. In the last movement, starting with the indication of the meaning and essence of knowing as (lovingly) partaking in the object of knowledge, the meaning of apriority in the sciences is discussed, tracing the emergence of formalism back to a certain type of reduction that artificially constructs the object. In this procedure, the prejudice against the sensible operates by relegating it to data deprived of original forms, justifying the need to mold them into forms exclusive to the understanding. Scheler’s intention to remove the problem of apriorism from the hermeneutic horizon of modernity is thus evident, because its tendency, rooted in “hatred of the world” and hostility to the “chaos” of the sensible, consists of functionalizing the spirit’s forms of thought and intuition by admitting them as a formative activity and synthetic force typical of reason.