Abstract
The present paper reflects on hallucination and delusion in schizophrenia from a phenomenological perspective. The paper’s aim is to understand the relationship between these two symptoms within the theoretical paradigm of schizophrenia as a self-disorder. The paper draws on fundamental insights from contemporary phenomenological research by Louis A. Sass, Josef Parnas and Thomas Fuchs. The argument begins with current definitions of hallucination and schizophrenia in the DSM-5. I will critically illuminate these definitions by key thinkers of phenomenological psychopathology (or close to it), such as Karl Jaspers, Eugène Minkowski, Henri Ey and Merleau-Ponty. The paper’s main challenge is to understand hallucination and delusion beyond their respective alignment with perception (as though hallucination would simply be a perception without an object to perceptive) or false belief (as if delusion would simply be an absurd conviction).