Tab. 1
Top construction management journals according to authors (Bröchner and Björk, 2008)
| Journal | Acronym | Publisher |
|---|---|---|
| Automation in Construction | AIC | Elsevier |
| Building Research and Information | BRI | Taylor and Francis |
| Construction Innovation | CI | Emerald |
| Construction Management and Economics | CME | Taylor and Francis |
| Engineering, Construction, and Architectural Management | ECAM | Emerald |
| International Journal of Project Management | IJPM | Elsevier |
| Journal of Construction Engineering and Management | JCEM | ASCE |
Tab. 2
Incidence of keyword ‘principal–agent’ in selected journals
| Keyword/Journal | AIC | BRI | CI | CME | ECAM | IJPM | JCEM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Papers | 1 | 5 | 7 | 23 | 17 | 70 | 25 |
| Titles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Abstracts | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 5 |
| Keywords | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 |
[i] P–A, principal–agent.
Tab. 3
Papers cited
Tab. 4
Incidence of associated keywords in selected journals
| Keyword/Journal | AIC | BRI | CI | CME | ECAM | IJPM | JCEM | Sum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adverse selection | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Agency theory | 1 | 4 | 2 | 7 | ||||
| Change management | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||
| Cooperation/collaboration | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | ||
| Communication | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | ||||
| Contracts | 7 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 26 | |||
| Corruption | 2 | 1 | 3 | |||||
| Financial management | 1 | 2 | 3 | |||||
| Governance | 2 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 19 | |||
| Hold-up | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||
| Incentives | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 15 | |||
| Information asymmetry | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | |||
| Information systems | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 9 | ||
| Institutional theory | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Moral hazard | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Opportunism | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | ||||
| Organisation theory | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Partnership | 5 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 20 | |||
| Procurement | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | ||
| Professional ethics/professionalism | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||
| Reputation | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Risk management | 2 | 2 | 10 | 6 | 20 | |||
| Social capital | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Social networks | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 | ||||
| Social theories | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Stewardship theory | 1 | 2 | 3 | |||||
| Strategic planning | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | ||||
| Supply chain management | 3 | 2 | 2 | 7 | ||||
| Temporary organisations | 2 | 2 | ||||||
| Transaction costs | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 10 | |||
| Trust | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | |||
| Uncertainty | 1 | 2 | 4 | 7 |

Fig. 1
Network visualisation of interconnected keywords in Gephi.
Tab. 5
Node characteristics, data from Gephi
| Node | Degree | Weighted degree | Closeness centrality | Betweenness centrality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adverse selection | 3 | 3.0 | 0.44 | 0.0 |
| Agency theory | 8 | 13.0 | 0.54 | 5.3 |
| Change management | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cooperation | 7 | 11.0 | 0.56 | 9.04 |
| Communication | 5 | 8.0 | 0.52 | 2.78 |
| Contracts | 18 | 46.0 | 0.72 | 61.63 |
| Corruption | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financial management | 4 | 6.0 | 0.48 | 0.28 |
| Governance | 12 | 24.0 | 0.64 | 40.0 |
| Hold-up | 2 | 2.0 | 0.44 | 0.0 |
| Incentives | 13 | 27.0 | 0.65 | 30.26 |
| Information asymmetry | 8 | 10.0 | 0.58 | 8.06 |
| Information systems | 9 | 11.0 | 0.54 | 37.42 |
| Institutional theory | 1 | 1.0 | 0.35 | 0.0 |
| Moral hazard | 2 | 2.0 | 0.43 | 0.0 |
| Opportunism | 5 | 5.0 | 0.52 | 0.9 |
| Organisation theory | 1 | 1.0 | 0.38 | 0.0 |
| Partnership | 14 | 28.0 | 0.64 | 39.53 |
| P–A theory | 16 | 28.0 | 0.7 | 68.26 |
| Procurement | 9 | 12.0 | 0.52 | 10.82 |
| Professionalism | 3 | 4.0 | 0.45 | 0.0 |
| Reputation | 2 | 2.0 | 0.44 | 0.0 |
| Risk management | 11 | 24.0 | 0.61 | 15.92 |
| Social capital | 4 | 5.0 | 0.47 | 1.23 |
| Social networks | 4 | 5.0 | 0.47 | 0.38 |
| Social theories | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Stewardship theory | 4 | 7.0 | 0.49 | 0.56 |
| Strategic planning | 2 | 2.0 | 0.42 | 0.0 |
| Supply chain management | 4 | 4.0 | 0.5 | 1.18 |
| Temporary organisations | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Transaction costs | 10 | 23.0 | 0.6 | 39.07 |
| Trust | 11 | 14.0 | 0.56 | 15.62 |
| Uncertainty | 6 | 10.0 | 0.54 | 2.76 |
[i] P–A, principal–agent.
| Keywords | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | Sum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Adverse selection | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2. Agency theory | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 14 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3. Change management | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4. Cooperation/collaboration | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5. Communication | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6. Contracts | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 50 | ||||||||||||||
| 7. Corruption | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8. Financial management | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 6 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9. Governance | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 33 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 10. Hold-up | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11. Incentives | 3 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 30 | |||||||||||||||||||
| 12. Information asymmetry | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13. Information systems | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14. Institutional theory | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15. Moral hazard | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16. Opportunism | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17. Organisation theory | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18. Partnership | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 30 | ||||||||||||||||||
| 19. Principal–agent theory | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 30 | ||||||||||||||||
| 20. Procurement | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 13 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21. Professional ethics/Professionalism | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22. Reputation | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23. Risk management | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 28 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 24. Social capital | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25. Social networks | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 8 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26. Social theories | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27. Stewardship theory | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28. Strategic planning | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29. Supply chain management | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 8 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30. Temporary organisations | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31. Transation costs | 1 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32. Trust | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33. Uncertainty | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 12 |
[i] P–A, principal–agent.