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Mapping research on disinformation and misinformation across the Nordic countries: An integrative review Cover

Mapping research on disinformation and misinformation across the Nordic countries: An integrative review

Open Access
|Jul 2025

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2025-0015 | Journal eISSN: 2001-5119 | Journal ISSN: 1403-1108
Language: English
Page range: 175 - 220
Published on: Jul 9, 2025
Published by: University of Gothenburg Nordicom
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 issues per year

© 2025 Hilkka Grahn, Bente Kalsnes, Elsa Isaksson, Eva Mayerhöffer, Jón Gunnar Ólafsson, Jesper Falkheimer, Frederik Møller Henriksen, Jakob Bæk Kristensen, Dominic Saari, published by University of Gothenburg Nordicom
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