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Interbank Network as a Channel of Credit Contagion in Banks: Is Moral Hazard Transferable? Cover

Interbank Network as a Channel of Credit Contagion in Banks: Is Moral Hazard Transferable?

Open Access
|Sep 2022

References

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Language: English
Page range: 117 - 135
Submitted on: Aug 14, 2021
Accepted on: Nov 29, 2021
Published on: Sep 23, 2022
Published by: Central Bank of Montenegro
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year

© 2022 Željko Jović, Milena Lutovac Đaković, published by Central Bank of Montenegro
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.