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Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing Cover

Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing

By: Atsushi Tanaka  
Open Access
|Sep 2020

References

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Language: English
Page range: 123 - 134
Submitted on: Mar 11, 2019
Accepted on: Jun 27, 2019
Published on: Sep 18, 2020
Published by: Central Bank of Montenegro
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year

© 2020 Atsushi Tanaka, published by Central Bank of Montenegro
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.