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Central Bank Independence – The Case of the Central Bank of Montenegro Cover

Central Bank Independence – The Case of the Central Bank of Montenegro

Open Access
|Sep 2018

References

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Language: English
Page range: 25 - 40
Submitted on: Dec 1, 2017
Accepted on: Dec 25, 2017
Published on: Sep 10, 2018
Published by: Central Bank of Montenegro
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year

© 2018 Milivoje Radovic, Milena Radonjic, Jovan Djuraskovic, published by Central Bank of Montenegro
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.