International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

José Antonio Alonso; Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga

doi:10.2478/izajodm-2020-0020

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International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

IZA Journal of Development and Migration

Volume 11 (2020): Issue 1 (January 2020)

By: José Antonio Alonso and Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga

Open Access

|Nov 2020

Figures & Tables

Relation between democracy in host countries and rights of admitted migrants.

Relation between rights of migrants and openness.

Relationship between openness and the income gap.

Kernel distribution of the normalized income levels difference index.
*Note*: var1 describes the differences in GDP per capita (in PPP) between two partner countries relative to the differences between the richest and poorest country in the world in the year being considered. The variable has been estimated for each five-year period. The vertical axis describes the number of BLAs per income gap.

		Host

		Open	Close
Home	Coop	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, η^{S}, η); H^{D} (γ^{D}, η^{S}, η)$	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
	Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)

*H^D* (*γ^D*,*η^S*,η) and *H^D* (*γ^D*) functions for *η^S =* 1 – η.

Table 1

η^s thresholds obtained for different (ϵ;Δ;ξ,δ) variables and (γ^D,γ^U) values.

Threshold values	γ^U = 0.7	γ^U = 0.8	γ^U = 0.9
(ϵ = 2;Δ = 2,ξ =1;δ = 2)	0.9	0.931	0.964
(ϵ = 2;Δ = 2,ξ =1;δ = 3)	0.87	0.913	0.955
(ϵ = 4;Δ = 2,ξ = 2;δ = 3)	0.79	0.855	0.922

	Open	Close
Coop	H^U (γ^U ,η^S ,η); H^D (γ^D ,η^S ,η)	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}) - k (η^{S} - η_{-}^{S}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$	$H^{U} (γ^{U}) - k (η^{S} - η_{-}^{-}); H^{D} (γ^{D})$

*H^U* (*γ^U*, *η^S*, η) and $H^{U} (γ^{μ}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}) - k (η^{S} - η_{-}^{S})$ when *η^S* = 0.9 and $\underline{η^{S}} = 0.8.$ In order to simplify the presentation, we have assumed: ϵ = 4; Δ = 2; ξ = 2; δ = 3, for all developing countries.

	Open	Close
Coop	H^U (γ^U ,η^S ,η); H^D (γ^D ,η^S ,η)	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \bar{η})$

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2020-0020 | Journal eISSN: 2520-1786

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Language: English

Published on: Nov 30, 2020

Published by: Sciendo

In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

Keywords:

international migration,

unskilled and skilled migration,

adverse interest,

factor endowments,

asymmetric migration effects,

migratory agreements

JEL:

J61,

J68,

J82

Related subjects:

Business and economics,

Mathematics and statistics for economists,

Econometrics

© 2020 José Antonio Alonso, Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Volume 11 (2020): Issue 1 (January 2020)

International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

Figures & Tables

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Table 1

Figure 6

Paradigm

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