Table 1
Types of the relationship between formal and informal institutions
| Ineffective formal institutions | Effective formal institutions | |
|---|---|---|
| Compatible goals between actors in formal and informal institutions | Substitutive | Complementary |
| Conflicting goals between actors in formal and informal institutions | Competing | Accommodating |
[i] Source: Helmke and Levitsky [2003] in Estrin and Prevezer [2010: 7].
Table 2
Questionnaire items
| Variable | Type | Source | Items | Scale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Formal rules positive perception | Independent | WEF pillar | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) |
| Formal rules negative perception | Independent | WEF pillar | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) |
| Informal rules positive perception | Independent | WEF pillar | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) |
| Informal rules negative perception | Independent | WEF pillar | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) |
| Judicial system efficacy perception | Independent | WEF pillar |
| Heavily influenced – Entirely independent (7 point scale) |
| Corporate governance efficacy perception | Independent | WEF pillar |
| Management has little accountability to investors and board – Management is highly accountable to investors and boards (7 point scale) |
| ethics and behavioral firm perception | Independent | WEF pillar |
| Extremely poor among the worst in the world – Excellent among the best in the world (7 point scale) |
| Property and intellectual rights | Independent | WEF pillar | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Extremely weak – Extremely strong (7 point scale) |
| Market orientation | Dependent |
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) | |
| Network orientation | Dependent |
| Not at all – Very much (7 point scale) | |
| Self-efficacy | Dependent | Jerusalem and Schwarzer [1999] | Average calculation index of the following items:
| Not at all true – Exactly true (4 point scale) |
Table 3
Differences in the perception of the judicial system efficacy
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.29 | 1.69 | 4.84 | 1.40 | −6.63 | p < 0.001 | 1.00 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.84 | 1.40 | 3.62 | 1.63 | 5.88 | p < 0.001 | 0.80 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.29 | 1.69 | 3.62 | 1.63 | −1.51 | p = 0.136 | 0.99 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 1
Perception of judicial system efficacy.
Table 4
Perception of property and intellectual rights protection
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.77 | 1.39 | 5.75 | 0.582 | −12.30 | p < 0.001 | 2.00 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (242) | p | Cohen's d |
| 5.75 | 582 | 3.56 | 1.48 | 13.23 | p < 0.001 | 0.32 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (243) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.77 | 1.38 | 3.56 | 1.48 | 1.08 | p = 0.281 | 0.15 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 2
Perception of property and intellectual rights protection.
Table 5
Perception of corporate governance efficacy
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.97 | 1.50 | 5.58 | 1.23 | −12.30 | p = 0.003 | 0.45 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 5.58 | 1.23 | 4.66 | 1.56 | 4.75 | p < 0.001 | 0.64 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.97 | 1.50 | 4.66 | 1.56 | 1.48 | p = 0.140 | 0.19 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 3
Perception of corporate governance efficacy.
Table 6
Perception of ethics and firm Behavior
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.59 | 1.40 | 6.48 | 10.04 | −2.69 | p = 0.008 | 0.50 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 6.48 | 10.04 | 4.75 | 7.66 | 1.51 | p = 0.131 | 0.19 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.59 | 1.40 | 4.75 | 7.66 | −1.41 | p = 0.157 | 0.26 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 4
Perception of ethics and firm behavior.
Table 7
Perception of formal institutions as a chance
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.40 | 1.61 | 4.81 | 1.25 | −1.92 | p = 0.055 | 0.29 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.81 | 1.25 | 5.02 | 1.56 | −1.06 | p = 0.290 | 0.15 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.40 | 1.61 | 5.02 | 1.56 | −2.98 | p = 0.003 | 0.39 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 5
Perception of formal institutions as a chance.
Table 8
Perception of formal institutions as an inhibiting factor
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.97 | 1.56 | 4.03 | 1.35 | −0.310 | p = 0.757 | 0.04 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.03 | 1.35 | 5.04 | 1.38 | −5.50 | p < 0.001 | 0.74 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 3.97 | 1.56 | 5.04 | 1.38 | −5.59 | p < 0.001 | 0.72 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 6
Perception of formal institutions as an inhibiting factor.
Table 9
Perception of informal institutions as a chance
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t (175) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.08 | 1.74 | 4.50 | 1.25 | −1.72 | p = 0.086 | 0.28 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.50 | 1.25 | 4.60 | 1.47 | −0.541 | p = 0.589 | 0.07 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.08 | 1.74 | 4.60 | 1.47 | −2.50 | p = 0.013 | 0.32 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 7
Perception of informal institutions as a chance.
Table 10
Perception of informal institutions as an inhibiting factor
| Morocco | Germany | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | SD | M | SD | t(175) | P | Cohen's d |
| 4.40 | 1.58 | 3.34 | 1.27 | 4.89 | p < 0.001 | 0.75 |
| Germany | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (244) | P | Cohen's d |
| 3.34 | 1.27 | 4.52 | 1.58 | −6.03 | p < 0.001 | 0.83 |
| Morocco | China | |||||
| M | SD | M | SD | t (245) | p | Cohen's d |
| 4.40 | 1.58 | 4.52 | 1.58 | −0.615 | p = 0.539 | 0.08 |
[i] Note: Values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 8
Perception of informal institutions as an inhibiting factor.
Table 11
Linear Regressions
| Independent variable | Morocco | China | Germany | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Dependent variable | Dependent variable | |||||||
| Self-efficacy | Market orientation | Network orientation | Self-efficacy | Market orientation | Network orientation | Self-efficacy | Market orientation | Network orientation | |
| Formal mean index positive | β = 0.288 p = 0.017* | β = 0.263 p = 0.019* | |||||||
| Formal mean index negative | β = 0.315 p = 0.015* | β = 0.272 p = 0.015* | |||||||
| Informal mean index positive | |||||||||
| Informal mean index negative | β = 0.314 p = 0.011* | ||||||||
