Abstract
In 1940, Wolfgang Metzger began a profound reflection on the meaning of the phenomenological approach to Gestalt psychology, which had its starting point in the rejection of what he called the “Eleatic” or “Eleatic–Rationalistic Postulate,” that is, the notion that, in his opinion, had dominated Western scientific and philosophical thought of the past centuries, according to which any assertion about the state of things that could lead to self-contradictory conclusions had to be considered unfounded. On the basis of this rejection and with exclusive reference to access to experiential data, Metzger proposed to distinguish five meanings of reality: (1) the physical or experiential world; (2) the intuitive or experienced world; (3) the experienced world (met, Angetroffen) in contrast to the represented world; (4) the something or fullness in contrast to emptiness or nothingness; (5) the real in contrast to the apparent. For Metzger (1950), this concept, although primarily related to perception, has far-reaching implications for our conception of others and of society. We question here the validity of Metzger’s concept, its explanatory significance, and its relation to other phenomenological concepts, such as that of Merleau-Ponty.