The role of judicial independence in strengthening the rule of law in transitional democracies

The impact of judicial independence on strengthening the rule of law in transitional democracies constitutes a significant area of analysis in this paper. The study focuses on a comparative examination of four transitional European democracies: Croatia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary. Judicial independence is a fundamental prerequisite for institutional stability, the integrity of judicial decision-making, and the overall credibility of the legal system. To assess the relationship between judicial independence and the rule of law, the analysis incorporates a range of international institutional and empirical indicators, including the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, the V-Dem Judicial Independence Index, CEPEJ data, and the EU Justice Scoreboard. These indicators provide a comprehensive framework for evaluating judicial performance and the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to safeguard judicial autonomy. The findings indicate that countries characterized by transparent procedures for the appointment and discipline of judges, together with robust judicial self-governance mechanisms, tend to maintain higher levels of judicial autonomy and institutional effectiveness. Conversely, political interference and the absence of independent oversight mechanisms are closely associated with diminished judicial credibility, reduced institutional performance, and a weakened rule of law. The study concludes that the adoption of transparent institutional practices aligned with international standards is essential for consolidating the rule of law and fostering the development of democratic institutions in transitional democracies.