Abstract
This paper places the concept of freedom at the center of feminist and ecological ethics of care. It challenges dominant liberal accounts of liberty understood as self-sufficiency or unconstrained choice and instead advances a conception of relational freedom, defined as the genuine capacity to initiate and sustain worthwhile actions with and for others within supportive social and ecological conditions.
First, drawing on the work of Carol Gilligan, the paper argues that freedom is not merely the absence of interference but the presence of developed moral capacities—such as attentiveness, responsiveness, and responsibility—that enable individuals to navigate concrete relationships without coercion, neglect, or disregard. On this view, freedom expands when relations of care enhance rather than constrain agency, when dependency is met with support rather than stigma, and when harm is prevented through sustained moral attention.
Second, following Joan Tronto, the paper emphasizes the public and institutional dimensions of freedom. When care work is rendered invisible, unequally distributed, or structurally unsupported, many individuals lack the time, energy, and material resources required to exercise meaningful choice. Institutions that recognize care, distribute it justly, and protect time sovereignty create the social conditions under which liberty can be substantively exercised rather than merely formally affirmed.
Third, drawing on Val Plumwood, the paper demonstrates that relational freedom requires an ecological perspective. Dualisms such as human versus nature and mind versus body sustain hierarchical frameworks that obscure material dependencies. When ecosystems are degraded, exposure to harm increases and practical options diminish; although formal rights may remain intact, the substance of freedom is undermined. Relational autonomy reconceives the self as ecologically embedded, such that the protection of living systems constitutes a foundational condition of freedom rather than an external moral constraint.
The paper concludes by proposing a framework for assessing relational freedom as expanding where domination is reduced and where supportive human and ecological relationships are actively sustained.