References
- Posnam ‘The New Economic Geography: who profits in a post-American world?’ Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 2025
- Chivvis. S and Kapstein Ethan B. 2022 US Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Trade-offs. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/04/us-strategy-and-economic-statecraft-understanding-the-tradeoffs?lang=en
- There has been a moratorium on duties on cross border provision of services since the conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The question of making this a permanent ban is still debated. Developing economies are concerned that the digitalisation of the economy will result in a reduction in potential tariff revenue.
- The US trade deficit is considerably smaller if trade in services in included.
- It is worth noting that even after the recent unilateral tariffs, around 70% of world trade in goods is still on the basis of MFN tariffs.
- This section draws on Chivvis and Kapstein (2022) but uses terminology more in line with trade policy. For example, Chivvis and Kapstein use the terms ‘America First’ rather than unilateralism and ‘globalisation 2.0,’ rather than promoting a trading system that suits US interests.
- For smaller economies alliance-based trade statecraft could well be the choice between which major pole to tie up to in a multipolar economic order.
- See for example, Gowa J 1994 Allies, Adversaries and International Trade; Princeton University Press. VanGrasstek C. ‘Trading with Allies’. In: Trade and American Leadership: The Paradoxes of Power and Wealth from Alexander Hamilton to Donald Trump. Cambridge University Press; 2019:167-250.
- In the United States this would mean for example the State Department would lead in shaping trade statecraft as it did during the period from 1934 until the 1962 Trade Act.
- In a narrow sense there are of course similarities with current US tariffs on goods trade, which are also based on another classical mercantilist idea of avoiding trade deficits. See Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 ‘Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits.’ The comparison is only of limited value. In the 19th century goods trade was far more important for the US economy than it is today given the role of services and services-based trade.
- The current average tariff on goods after the imposition of “reciprocal” tariffs in April 2025 is about 17% although this will vary with changes and exemptions See The Historic Significance of Trump tariff actions. Peterson Institute for International Economics 2025 https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/historic-significance-trumps-tariff-actions
- Preeg. E 1970 Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Brooking Institution, Washington https://doi.org/10.1177/000271627139300176
- Nationalist China initially participated but not the PRC.
- See Putnam, R.D 1988 ‘Diplomacy and the Logic of Two-Level Games.’ International Organisation Vol 42 No 3 (Summer 1988) pp 427-460.
- See Bobroske. A. 2025 ‘US economic diplomacy’ in Woolcock. S. (ed) The New Economic Diplomacy: decision-making and negotiation in international economic relations, 5th edition, Routledge.
- See Woolcock. S and Wallace. H 1995 ‘European Regulation and National Enterprise’ in Hayward. J Industrial Enterprise and European Integration. Oxford University Press. https://www.routledge.com/The-New-Economic-Diplomacy-Decision-Making-and-Negotiation-in-International-Economic-Relations/Woolcock/p/book/9781032457925
- These protectionist pressures were due to macroeconomic factors as well as more longer-term structural increases in import competition.
- Destler. M 1991 ‘US Trade Policy-making in the Eighties in Politics and Economics in the Eighties’, pp 251-284 Politics and Economics in the Eighties, University of Chicago Press. www.nber.org/books/alse91-1
- The wording proposed for the so-called Gephardt amendment was for tariffs on countries that “...maintained both a large bilateral trade surplus with the United States and unfair barriers to imports.” Quoted in Hughes. K .2003 American Trade Politics from the Omnibus Act of 1988 to the Trade Act of 2002 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/event/tradehughes.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiBlNqd7OKPAxXRNPsDHWu6MrMQFnoECDQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw33VfyrJBCtzve20ccul4KO
- See Hoekmans B, Wauters J ‘US Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping’. World Trade Review. 2011;10(1):5-43. doi:10.1017/S1474745610000467
- There was concern expressed in the US that the Single Market represented a fortress Europe. Others argued that the agreed rules constituted a general liberalisation. See Bangermann. M (1989) ‘Fortress Europe: The Myth’ North West Journal of International Law and Business, Vol 9, Issue 3.
- Chinese accession to the WTO entailed negotiations with the major existing WTO members. The rules of the WTO include provisions on transparency that would identify potential ‘unfair’ trade practices.
- The European Union also sought to include competition policy on the grounds that as markets were global but competition/ anti-trust policies national, but this was opposed by the US. See Woolcock. S 2003 ‘The Singapore Issues in Cancún: a failed negotiating ploy or a litmus test for global governance,‘ Intereconomics, Heidelberg, Vol 38. Issue 5 pp 249-255.
- US – EU differences over international rules or investment were also one of the major difficulties in the TTIP negotiations. The US negotiators wanted the classical dispute settlement mechanism used in the existing bilateral investment treaties, while the EU favoured more qualified protection and a clearer right to regulate. See Koeth. W 2016 Can the Investment Court System (ICS) save TTIP and CETA European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper 2016/W/01
- This was for example the case with the Doha Declaration on the application of the TRIPs agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights.
- See speech by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Delivering on the Promise of Economic Statecraft, 17 November 2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm The fact that Hillary Clinton subsequently ceased to support for TPP for largely electoral considerations reflects how domestic political utility came to shaped US trade statecraft.
- Woodward. B 2018 Fear: Trump in the White House, Chapter 21.
- Bobroske. A 2025 “US Economic Diplomacy’ in Woolcock. S. (ed) The New Economic Diplomacy: decision making and negotiation in international economic relations, 5th edition.
- See case before the US Supreme Court in Trump v VOS Selections ect. on whether the Trump administration has the power to impose discriminatory tariffs inter alia. under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/oral-argument-summary--learning-resources--inc.-v.-trump-(tariffs). The general expectation is that if it loses this case the Administration will use another instrument.
- European and other governments conditioned withdrawal of digital services tax on the conclusion of an effective international agreement such as the BEPS agreement. Without either they face a progressive erosion of their tax base and thus their ability to invest in public services.