The limits of quantified compassion: A critique of effective altruism

This paper critically evaluates effective altruism (EA) and contends that its utilitarian methodology undercuts its compassionate aims. The analysis identifies three major critiques: First, EA’s treatment of humans as purely rational agents overlooks motivational complexity, unstable preferences, and the intrinsic moral value of relationships, labeling these factors as cognitive biases. Second, EA’s strong focus on measurability reduces well-being to quantifiable metrics such as QALYs, neglecting other significant values, such as dignity, community, and the potential for systemic progress. This approach presents ideological decisions as mere objective calculations. Third, EA reflects neoliberal tendencies by depoliticizing structural issues and presenting justice as a matter of individual philanthropy, notably illustrated in Earning to Give. This study maintains that EA conflates altruism with ‘effective philanthropy’—merely a rationalized system of distributing resources. We propose adopting methodological pluralism to reincorporate emotion, social context, and political participation into moral reasoning, with an emphasis on personal engagement in systemic change over calculation-driven, individualistic methods.