| Internal stakeholders | View reduction as clear moral and compliance progress, interpret numbers at face value, reinforce basic compliance messaging and “zero tolerance” narratives | Express concern over decline, perceive it as failure to meet expectations, push for mandatory attendance and simple controls rather than redesign of training |
| External stakeholders | Welcome reduction as a signal of improving integrity, rely on headline numbers, may communicate cautious approval but request reassurance | Question decline in participation, may ask for explanations or commitments to restore coverage, rely on company statements rather than independent analysis |
| Incremental stakeholders want improvement but lack the capacity to contextualize trends or causality. | Incremental stakeholders want improvement but lack the capacity to contextualize trends or causality. | Incremental stakeholders want improvement but lack the capacity to contextualize trends or causality. |
| Substantive | (High motivation – High analytical capacity) |
|
| type / group | Metric 1: Corruption cases (3 vs 5) | Metric 2: Training participation (88% vs 91%) |
| Internal stakeholders | Analyse trend quality, detection maturity, reporting culture, and benchmarking, assess whether decrease reflects prevention or under-reporting, initiate root-cause reviews | Disaggregate participation by risk group and geography, assess training effectiveness, not only coverage, redesign content, targeting and incentives |
| External stakeholders | Interpret reduction conditionally, compare to peers, sector risk, enforcement context, may request deeper narrative and assurance | Probe whether decline signals training fatigue or risk misalignment, expect corrective action plans and evidence of learning outcomes |
| Substantive stakeholders treat metrics as diagnostic tools, not reputational signals. | Substantive stakeholders treat metrics as diagnostic tools, not reputational signals. | Substantive stakeholders treat metrics as diagnostic tools, not reputational signals. |
| Selective | (Low motivation – High analytical capacity) |
|
| type / group | Metric 1: Corruption cases (3 vs 5) | Metric 2: Training participation (88% vs 91%) |
| Internal stakeholders | Acknowledge improvement but deprioritize unless cases threaten operations or reputation, avoid deeper system investments | Accept decline if not legally problematic, may support targeted training only in high-risk units |
| External stakeholders | Use data opportunistically, positive trends reduce pressure, scrutiny increases only if scandals emerge | Monitor participation mainly as compliance threshold, react only if it affects contractual or regulatory exposure |
| Selective stakeholders can interpret metrics but engage only when it aligns with other strategic interests. | Selective stakeholders can interpret metrics but engage only when it aligns with other strategic interests. | Selective stakeholders can interpret metrics but engage only when it aligns with other strategic interests. |
| Indifferent | (Low motivation – Low analytical capacity) |
|
| type / group | Metric 1: Corruption cases (3 vs 5) | Metric 2: Training participation (88% vs 91%) |
| Internal stakeholders | Consider corruption inevitable or irrelevant, see numbers as compliance formalism, no behavioural change | View decline as operational issue, little concern or ownership |
| External stakeholders | Barely notice disclosure, lack interest or understanding, rely on surface reputation | No reaction unless issue escalates publicly or legally |
| Indifferent stakeholders neither demand nor enable meaningful improvement. | Indifferent stakeholders neither demand nor enable meaningful improvement. | Indifferent stakeholders neither demand nor enable meaningful improvement. |
