References
- Abreu Zavaleta, Martín [2021a]. “Communication and variance”. Topoi 40: 147–69.
- Abreu Zavaleta, Martín [2021b]. “Disagreement lost”. Synthese 199: 1899–932.
- Abreu Zavaleta, Martín [2023]. “Partial understanding”. Synthese 202: 1–32.
- Begby, Endre [2013]. “Semantic minimalism and the “miracle of communication””. Philosophical Studies 165: 957–73.
- Bermúdez, José Luis [2017]. Understanding I: Language and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bermúdez, José Luis, Valente, Matheus & Verdejo, Víctor Martín (eds) [2025]. Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bezuidenhout, Anne [1997]. “The communication of de re thoughts”. Noûs 31: 197–225.
- Bilgrami, Akeel [1987]. “An externalist account of psychological content”. Philosophical Topics 15: 191–226.
- Bilgrami, Akeel [1992]. Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Bowker, Mark [2019]. “Saying a bundle: Meaning, intention and underdetermination”. Synthese 196: 4229–52.
- Buchanan, Ray [2010]. “A puzzle about meaning and communication”. Noûs 44: 340–71.
- Burge, Tyler [1979]. “Individualism and the mental”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–122.Churchland, Paul Montgomery [1986]. “Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology”. Mind 375: 279–309.
- Churchland, Paul Montgomery [1998]. “Conceptual similarity across sensory and neural diversity: The Fodor/Lepore challenge answered”. The Journal of Philosophy 95: 5–32.
- Davidson, Donald [1975]. “Thought and talk”. In D. Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, Donald [1982]. “Rational animals”. In D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, Donald [1991]. “Three varieties of knowledge”. In D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drobňák, Matej [2022]. “Normative inferentialism on linguistic understanding”. Mind & Language 37: 564–85.
- Drobňák, Matej [2025]. “Communication without shared meanings”. Acta Analytica 40: 311–28.
- Edelberg, Walter [1986]. “A new puzzle about intentional identity”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 15: 1–25.
- Edelberg, Walter [1992]. “Intentional identity and the attitudes”. Linguistics and Philosophy 15: 561–96.
- Egan, Andy [2007]. “Epistemic modals, relativism, and assertion”. Philosophical Studies 133: 1–22.
- Evans, Gareth [1982]. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fodor, Jerry & Lepore, Ernest. [1992]. Holism: A Shopper’s Guide. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Frege, Gottlob [1892]. “On sinn and bedeutung”. In The Frege Reader, M. Beaney (ed.). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell (1997): 151–72.
- García Carpintero, Manuel & Torre, Stephan (eds) [2016]. About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geach, Peter Thomas [1967]. “Intentional identity”. Journal of Philosophy 64: 627–32.
- Goodman, Rachel [2025]. “Shared thought and communication”. In Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication, J. Bermúdez, M.
- Valente & V. M. Verdejo (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heck, Richard Kimberly [1995]. “The sense of communication”. Mind 413: 79–106.
- Heck, Richard Kimberly [2002]. “Do demonstratives have senses?”. Philosopher’s Imprint 2: 1–33.
- Howell, Robert J. [2024]. Self-awareness and the Elusive Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackman, Henry [1999]. “Moderate holism and the instability thesis”. American Philosophical Quarterly 36.
- Lewis, David [1997]. “Naming the colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 325–42.
- Loar, Brian [1976]. “The semantics of singular terms”. Philosophical Studies 30: 353–77.
- Majid, Asifa [2010]. “Words for body parts”. In Words and the Mind: How Words Capture Human Experience, B. C. Malt & P. Wolff (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 58–71.
- Marques, Teresa & Wikforss, Åsa (eds) [2020]. Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Onofri, Andrea [2019]. “Loar’s puzzle, similarity, and knowledge of reference”. Manuscrito 42: 1–45.
- Pagin, Peter [2008]. “What is communicative success?”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38: 85–115.
- Pagin Peter [2020]. “When does communication succeed? The case of general terms”. In Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability, T. Marques & Å. Wikforss (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 51–66.
- Paul, Matthias P. [1999]. Success In Referential Communication. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Pollock, Joey [2015]. “Social externalism and the problem of communication”. Philosophical Studies 172: 3229–51.
- Pollock, Joey [2020]. “Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity”. Philosophical Psychology 33: 396–420.
- Pollock, Joey [2021]. “Content internalism and testimonial knowledge”. Inquiry 67: 1947–68.
- Pollock, Joey [2025]. “Radical holism and disagreement”. In Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication, J. Bermúdez, M. Valente & V. M. Verdejo (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quine, Willard Van Orman [1960]. Word And Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rapaport, William J. [2003]. “What did you mean by that? Misunderstanding, negotiation, and syntactic semantics”. Minds and Machines 13: 397–427.
- Recanati, François [1993]. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Recanati, François [2016]. “Indexical thought: The communication problem”. In About Oneself: De Se Thought And Communication, M. García Carpintero & S. Torre (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 141–78.
- Rosenthal, David [1986]. “Two concepts of consciousness”. Philosophical Studies 49: 329–59.
- Rowlands, Mark [2001]. “Consciousness and higher-order thoughts”. Mind & Language 16: 290–310.
- Sandgren, Alexander [2019]. “A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity”. Synthese 196: 3677–95.
- Sandgren, Alexander [2021]. “Turning aboutness about”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103: 136–55.
- Sandgren, Alexander [2023]. “Private investigators and public speakers”. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9: 95–113.
- Sawyer, Sarah [2025]. “An externalist shared thought view of communication, agreement, and disagreement”. In Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication, J. Bermúdez, M. Valente & V. M. Verdejo (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schoubye, Anders J. & Stokke, Andreas [2016]. “What is said?” Nous 50: 759–93.
- Schroeder, Tim [2007]. “A recipe for concept similarity”. Mind & Language 22: 68–91.
- Verdejo, Víctor Martín [2021]. “Perspectives on de se immunity”. Synthese 198: 10089–107.
- Verdejo, Víctor Martín & De Donato, Xavier Rodríguez [2021]. “Thinking disagreement”. Theoria 87: 1562–84.
- Weber, Clas [2013]. “Centred communication”. Philosophical Studies 166: 205-23.
- Wikforss, Åsa [2006]. “Content externalism and fregean sense”. In What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, T. Marvan (ed.). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press: 163–79.