Abstract
Endre Begby [2021a, 2021b] identifies a phenomenon he refers to as evidential preemption whereby a testifier seeks to preemptively undermine future counter-testimony by noting extant disagreements while simultaneously asserting the claim under dispute. Such preemption is typified by claims of the form: “my opponents will tell you that q; but I say p” (Begby [2021b: 99]). Begby makes a plausible case that this strategy is often employed in ordinary and public discourse. Begby argues further that evidential preemption can often succeed in altering how a subject who has encountered such a preemptive statement ought to treat the future predicted counterevidence when they encounter it. Begby provides both intuitive and Bayesian arguments in favor of this position. I argue that, contra Begby, evidential preemption does not have epistemic force. I then distinguish my arguments from those presented by Kelly [2024] and show how my diagnosis of the failure of evidential preemption can be used to undermine the arguments Begby [2024] makes in response to Kelly’s criticisms.