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Practical Identity and Duties of Love Cover

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

By: Berit Brogaard  
Open Access
|Jul 2021

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0002 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 27 - 50
Published on: Jul 17, 2021
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2021 Berit Brogaard, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.