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The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past Cover

The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past

By: Ned Markosian  
Open Access
|Dec 2020

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0006 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 137 - 165
Published on: Dec 8, 2020
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2020 Ned Markosian, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.