Frege’s Puzzle and Cognitive Relationism: An Essay on Mental Files and Coordination
References
- Bonardi, Paolo. 2018. A farewell to the creatures of darkness. Manuscript.
- Bonardi, Paolo. 2019. Manifest validity and beyond: an inquiry into the nature of coordination and the identity of guises and propositional-attitude states. Linguistics and Philosophy 42(5): 475–515.10.1007/s10988-018-9245-z
- Bonardi, Paolo. 2020. Rational belief and dialetheism. Manuscript.10.1515/ip-2021-2016
- Bonardi, Paolo. Forthcoming. Coordination, understanding, and semantic requirements. In Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, ed. by M. Dumitru. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Braun, David. 1998. Understanding belief reports. Philosophical Review 107(4): 555–95.10.2307/2998375
- Braun, David. 2002. Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions. Philosophical Studies 108(1): 65–81.10.1023/A:1015760114297
- Braun, David. 2006. Illogical, but rational. Noûs 40(2): 376–9.10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00616.x
- Braun, David and Saul, Jennifer. 2002. Simple sentences, substitutions, and mistaken evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111(1): 1–41.10.1023/A:1021287328280
- Campbell, John. 1987. Is sense transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 273–92.10.1093/aristotelian/88.1.273
- Cumming, Sam. 2013. Creatures of darkness. Analytic Philosophy 54(4): 379–400.10.1111/phib.12028
- Fine, Kit. 2007. Semantic Relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.10.1002/9780470690826
- Fine, Kit. 2010. Comments on Scott Soames’ “Coordination Problems”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(2): 475–84.10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00405.x
- Fine, Kit. 2014. Recurrence: a rejoinder. Philosophical Studies 169(3): 425–8.10.1007/s11098-013-0189-4
- Fine, Kit. Forthcoming. Comments on Paolo Bonardi’s “Coordination, understanding, and semantic requirements”. In Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, ed. by M. Dumitru. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frege, Gottlob. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. Translated as “On Sense and Reference” in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by P. Geach and M. Black. London: Blackwell, 1952.
- Goodsell, Thea. 2014. Is de jure coreference non-transitive? Philosophical Studies 167(2): 291–312.10.1007/s11098-012-0051-0
- Hall, Keith. 2013. Acquaintance and mental files. Disputatio 5(36): 119–32.10.2478/disp-2013-0012
- Kaplan, David. 1968. Quantifying in. Synthese 19(1/2): 178–214.10.1007/BF00568057
- Kaplan, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. by J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan, David. 1989a. Afterthoughts. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. by J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, 565–614. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan, David. 1990. Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64(1): 93–119.10.1093/aristoteliansupp/64.1.93
- Kaplan, David. 2011. An idea of Donnellan. In Having in Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan, ed. by J. Almog and P. Leonardi, 122–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.003.0008
- Kripke, Saul A. 1979. A puzzle about belief. In Meaning and Use, ed. by A. Margalit, 239–83. Dordrecht: Reidel.10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_20
- Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Murez, Michael. 2011. Mental files and the dynamics of identity. Manuscript.
- Pagin, Peter. 2013. The cognitive significance of mental files. Disputatio 5(36): 133–45.10.2478/disp-2013-0013
- Papineau, David. 2006. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, ed. by T. Alter and S. Walter, 111–44. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0007
- Pinillos, Angel. 2011. Coreference and meaning. Philosophical Studies 154(2): 301–24.10.1007/s11098-010-9543-y
- Priest, Graham. 2016. Towards Non-Being. Second edition. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783596.001.0001
- Pryor, Jim. 2016. Mental graphs. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7(2): 309–41.10.1007/s13164-015-0280-1
- Quiroga, Rodrigo Quian. 2012. Concept cells: the building blocks of declarative memory functions. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 13(8): 587–97.10.1038/nrn3251
- Quiroga, Rodrigo Quian, Leila Reddy, Gabriel Kreiman, Christof Koch and Itzhak Fried. 2005. Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the human brain. Nature 435(7045): 1102–7.10.1038/nature03687
- Recanati, François. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.001.0001
- Recanati, François. 2013. Mental files: replies to my critics. Disputatio 5(36): 207–42.10.2478/disp-2013-0018
- Recanati, François. 2016. Mental Files in Flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790358.001.0001
- Recanati, François. Forthcoming. Mental files. In The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, ed. by P. Stalmaszczyk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sainsbury, Mark and Michael Tye. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.001.0001
- Sainsbury, Mark; Michael Tye and Ruth G. Millikan. 2011. Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 85: 101–24.
- Salmon, Nathan. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Salmon, Nathan. 1989. Illogical belief. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 243–85.10.2307/2214270
- Salmon, Nathan. 1993. Analiticity and apriority. Philosophical Perspectives 7: 125–33.10.2307/2214118
- Salmon, Nathan. 1993a. Relative and absolute apriority. Philosophical Studies 69(1): 83–100.10.1007/BF00989625
- Salmon, Nathan. 1998. Nonexistence. Philosophical Perspectives 1: 49–108.10.2307/2214143
- Salmon, Nathan. 2006. The Resilience of illogical belief. Noûs 40(2): 369–75.10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00615.x
- Salmon, Nathan. 2012. Recurrence. Philosophical Studies 159(3): 407–41.10.1007/s11098-011-9773-7
- Saul, Jennifer. 2007. Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.001.0001
- Schiffer, Stephen. 1990. The mode-of-presentation problem. In Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, ed. by C.A. Anderson and J. Owens, 249–68. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Soames, Scott. 1987. Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content. Philosophical Topics 15(1): 47–87.10.5840/philtopics198715112
- Soames, Scott. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195145283.001.0001
- Soames, Scott. 2014. Two versions of Millianism. In Analytic Philosophy in America: and Other Historical and Contemporary Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0011
- Soames, Scott. 2015. Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400866335
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 1 - 40
Published on: Jul 15, 2020
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 times per year
Keywords:
Related subjects:
© 2020 Paolo Bonardi, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.