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John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism

Open Access
|Jun 2019

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0003 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 23 - 44
Published on: Jun 20, 2019
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 times per year

© 2019 Dmytro Sepetyi, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.