Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism
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Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 219 - 232
Submitted on: Jul 19, 2016
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
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© 2018 Javier González de Prado Salas, published by University of Lisbon
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