Rightness = Right-Maker: Reduction or Reductio?

Joseph Long

doi:10.2478/disp-2015-0010

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Rightness = Right-Maker: Reduction or Reductio?

Disputatio

Volume 7 (2015): Issue 41 (November 2015)

By: Joseph Long

Open Access

|Dec 2018

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Abstract

I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.

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