A Puzzle about Disagreement
Abstract
A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 283 - 297
Submitted on: Feb 16, 2013
Accepted on: Jul 3, 2013
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 times per year
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© 2018 Víctor M. Verdejo, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.