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Can Minimalism Account for the Value of Truth? Cover

Can Minimalism Account for the Value of Truth?

By: Edward Moad  
Open Access
|Dec 2018

References

  1. Dummett, Michael. 1959. Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 59: 141–162.10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.141
  2. Horwich, Paul. 1999. The Minimalist Conception of Truth. In Blackburn and Simmons (ed.), Truth (pp. 239–263). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  3. Quine, W.V. 1999. Philosophy of Logic. In Blackburn and Simmons (ed.), Truth (pp. 144–146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2008-0001 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 271 - 279
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2018 Edward Moad, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.